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This comparative study of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain illustrates why they should not 
be viewed as reified communities with fixed essence, but as a product of ethno-racial 
identities and prejudices developed and nurtured during the phases of Zimbabwe’s history. 
Through an analysis of personal interviews, participant observation, and secondary and 
primary sources, the thesis identifies and engages historical experiences which had been 
instrumental in not only constructing relations between Zimbabwean immigrant 
communities, but also their economic and social integration processes. The quest to 
recognise historic legacies on Zimbabwean immigrants’ interactions and integration 
processes necessitated the first thematic chapter to engage the construction of ethno-racial 
identities in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe’s history.  
With contemporary literature on the Zimbabwean communities in Britain tending to create 
perceptions that Zimbabwean immigrants are a monolithic community of Blacks, the thesis’ 
examination of inter-community relations between Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians 
unveils Zimbabwean immigrants fragmented by historic racial and ethnic allegiances and 
prejudices. Examining education and employment as economic integration indicators has 
also facilitated the identification of historical experiences that have been influential in 
determining economic integration patterns of each Zimbabwean community. Intermarriage, 
language, religion and relations with the indigenous population were critically engaged to 
gauge the influence of historical socialisation on Zimbabwean communities’ interaction with 




While it is undeniable that colonial Zimbabwe was beset with a series of political and 
economic policies which set in motion salient racist discourses that inevitably facilitated the 
construction of racially divided diaspora communities, the thesis also unveils a Black 
diaspora community imbued with historic communal tensions and prejudices. By focusing 
on Black Zimbabwean immigrants, the thesis will not only be acknowledging an increase of 
Sub-Saharan Africans in Britain, but also offers an alternative perspective on Black British 
History by moving away from the traditional areas of study such as eighteenth century 
slavery and post-1945 African-Caribbean migration.    
Exploring the dynamics of diaspora relations of the Shona and the Ndebele will expose how 
both the Nationalist Movement and the post-colonial government failed to implement 
nation building initiatives needed to unite Africans that had been polarised along ethnic 
lines. Black Zimbabweans therefore migrated as products of unresolved ethnic conflicts that 
had been developed and nurtured throughout the phases of Zimbabwe’s history. In the 
absence of shared historic socio-economic or cultural commonalities within the Black 
community and between the Zimbabwean diaspora communities demarcated by race, the 
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Chronology of Zimbabwe’s Key Historical Events    
 
 
1838                       Ndebele Kingdom in the west of what was to become Zimbabwe. 
1857                       Most major Shona chieftaincies subjects of the Ndebele. 
1888                       Ndebele king Lobengula signed the Rudd Concession. 
1889 (October)    The Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company granted the Royal             
                                Charter to annex and administer the territory of what was to become   
                                known as Zimbabwe. 
1890 (September) Pioneer column arrived in Salisbury Harare and raised the Union   
                                  signalling the occupation of Mashonaland. 
1893                         Anglo-Ndebele war resulting in the occupation of Matabeleland. 
1895 (May)              Name Sothern Rhodesia officially adopted by British South Africa   
                                 Company. 
1896 (March)         Ndebele uprising in Matabeleland. 
1896 (June)            Shona uprising (First Chimurenga). 
1923                        Responsible Government succeeds the British South Africa Company. 
1932                        Land Apportionment Act came into effect. 
1945                        Post-war Influx of White settlers. 





1957                        Formation of the first nationalist party, Southern Rhodesia African   
                                 National Congress. 
1958                       Southern Rhodesia African National Congress banned. 
 1960                      Formation of the National Democratic Party. 
1961                       National Democratic Party banned to be replaced by Zimbabwean African  
                               People’s Union. 
1962                      Rhodesian Front wins election in Southern Rhodesia led by Winston Field. 
                               ZAPU banned in September. 
1963                       Dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
                                Zimbabwe African National Union formed on 8 August. 
                                Both ZANU and ZAPU started sending recruits for military training in   
                                socialist countries.   
1964                     Ian Smith becomes Rhodesia’s Prime Minister. 
1965                     Unilateral Declaration of Independence declared by Ian Smith on 11  
                              November.   
                              Sanctions imposed by Britain on selected Rhodesian products. 
1966                     Full embargo on Rhodesian trade imposed by British Government. 
 
 
                               United Nations imposes oil embargo. 
1968                    United Nations imposes mandatory Sanctions. 
1973                   Zambia shuts its border with Rhodesia. 
1975                    Mozambique becomes independent and becomes base of ZANU. Liberation  
                             struggle Intensifies. 
1979                    Abel Muzorewa wins elections. The country is renamed Zimbabwe-  
                             Rhodesia. The Nationalist movement did not recognise his win. The war   
                             intensifies. 
1979                    Lancaster House Agreement paving the way for democratic elections. 
1980                    Robert Mugabe’ ZANU PF won election. Mugabe became the Prime Minister  
                             of a  coalition government.  
1982                    Coalition collapsed. PF ZAPU leadership thrown out of government and  
                             others detained. 
1982                   Start of Gukurahundi (Civil conflict). 
1983                   Fifth brigade sent to Matabeleland to crush the insurgency. 
1989                   Unity Agreement between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU to form a new ZANU PF  
                            party with Mugabe as the leader and Joshua Nkomo his deputy. 
1999                   Formation of the Movement for Democratic Change political party marking  
 
 
                            the first credible challenge to Mugabe’s rule. 
2000                   Government defeated on draft constitution referendum.  
2000                   Invasions of White farms Zimbabwe. Exodus of White farmers. 
2000                   MDC gains nearly 50% of parliamentary seats in violence ridden elections. 
2002                   Mugabe wins presidential elections amidst violence 
2002-2008         Targeted sanctions by the West on Mugabe’s government and ruling party  
                             officials. 
                             Increased political violence on political opposition.   
                            Mass emigration intensifies.  
2008                   Inflation over 250 million per-cent. 
2008                   MDC wins parliamentary elections and Morgan Tsvangirayi wins first round  
                            of presidential elections. Mugabe wins the second round after political  
                           violence. 
2009                  Government of National Unity formed with Mugabe as president and  







2013                 Term of Government of National Unity ended.  
                          Zimbabwe approves a new constitution. 
                          Mugabe and his ZANU PF party win controversial presidential and   
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This study of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain is set within the historiographical paradigms 
which do not only trace the history of immigration in Britain, but also the experiences of 
immigrants as they transform British society. Discourses on the transformation of Britain’s 
demography from the nineteenth and twentieth century clearly illustrate how migrants 
from within Europe have been instrumental in Britain’s social and economic evolution.1 
Migration historians identify the European migration trends between 1800 and 1945 to 
have been dominated by communities such as the Irish, Jewish, Italian, French and German. 
This historical focus on European immigrants’ transformation of British society has not been 
restricted to the pre-World War Two era. Kathy Burrell’s examination of migration and post-
migration experiences of Greek-Cypriots, Polish and Italians in Leicester is part of migration 
historiography which also reveals how the contemporary diversity of the British population 
has been a product of post-war European migration.2    
However, with fourteen per-cent being recorded as non-White in the 2011 UK census,3 the 
explanation of the ethnic composition of British society also lies in the transformative 
impact of the arrival of non-European communities throughout Britain’s migration history. It 
is the immigration of people from beyond Europe’s borders that paved the way for Africans 
to contribute to the transformation of Britain’s demography. This thesis’ examination of 
1 See, for example: Azadeh Medaglia Patriarchal structures and ethnicity in the Italian community in Britain 
(Aldershot: Ashgate.  2001), pp-73-79; David Cesarani (Ed) The Making of modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell 1990); Roger Swift and Sheridan Gilley (Eds) The Irish in Britain, 1815-1939 (London: Pinter.  1989)  
Panikos Panayi German immigrants in Britain during the nineteenth century, 1815-1914 (Oxford : Berg 
1995);Kathy Burrell and Panikos Panayi (Eds)  History and Memories: Migrants and their History in Britain 
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).  
2 Kathy Burrell Moving lives: Narratives of nation and migration among Europeans in post-war Britain 
(Aldershot: Ashgate 2006). 
3 Office of National Statistics, ‘Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011’ available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-
wales/rpt-ethnicity.html#tab-Ethnicity-in-England-and-Wales ( Accessed on 25th August 2015). 
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Zimbabwean communities in Britain will therefore be complementing the emerging 
historiography of the Afro-British that has been exploring the experiences of African 
immigrants within British social and economic structures. 
African migration to Britain should not be understood as a post-war phenomenon. There is 
archaeological and literary evidence that traces the longevity of Africans resident in Britain 
to the ‘Romano-British period.’4 David Killingray affirms the early presence of Africans in the 
British Isles by identifying ‘trading, raiding and slaving sea routes’ as being responsible for 
bringing Africans especially from North Africa to Britain in the Middle Ages.5 Africans would 
arrive in a variety of roles mainly as seaman, slaves or manual labourers.6 The expanding 
maritime and slave trade allowed the trend to continue until the early nineteenth century 
when slavery was made illegal. The growth of the African immigrant population in Britain 
continued into the first half of twentieth century as illustrated by Table One below: 
Table 1: Growth of African Population  
Year Estimated Population 
1911 4 540 
1921 4 940 
1931 5 202 
1951 11 000 
Source: Killingray, ‘Africans in the United Kingdom an Introduction’ p.2  
4 See for example: Paul Edward, ‘The Early African Presence in the British Isles’ in Jagdish  Gundara and Ian 
Duffield (eds) Essays on the History of Blacks in Britain (Aldershot: Avebury 1992) p.9; Peter Fryer Staying 
Power: the History of Black People in Britain (London: Pluto.  1984) pp.1-32. 
5 David Killingray (ed), ‘Africans in the United Kingdom an Introduction’ in David Killingray Africans in Britain 
(Ilford: Frank Cass.1994) p.3. 
6 Ibid. 
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Despite this early recognition of African diaspora history in Britain, Hakim Adi notes how 
current documentary evidence suggests that the early presence of Africans either as visitors 
or permanent residents can only be traced back from the sixteenth century.7 Killingray’s 
assertion that the vast majority of Africans to arrive in Britain ‘over the last 400 years were 
either non-literate or left no personal written record’8 can therefore not be ignored when 
exploring why African history in Britain is mainly restricted to the post-sixteenth century 
period. Without written sources it was inevitable for migration historians to face challenges 
in accessing African immigrants’ personal or individual ‘biographies, networks or 
communities’ since their personal history would have been lost.9 It is only in recent decades 
that migration historians as alluded by Killingray have started to catapult personal or 
community experiences of early Africans from obscurity by using fragmented records of 
parish registers, newspapers or criminal records as sources.10  
However, placing Africans in Britain’s migration research as illustrated by a collection of 
essays in Killingray’s volume Africans in Britain, by notable scholars on Afro-British history 
unravels a West African bias or those connected with slave or mercantile trade links. It was 
the Scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, (in which the British were leading 
participants), that started the process of new forms of socialisation between the colonisers 
and the colonised indigenous communities which would influence future migration patterns 
of Africans who were not directly linked with slave mercantile trading. These were 
individuals from the elite community of students or businessmen who had the linguistic and 
literacy competency to interact with British socio-economic structures. 
7 Hakim Adi, ‘West Africans in the 20th Century’ in Mark Christian (Ed) Black identity in the 20th century: 
Expressions of the US and UK African diaspora (London: Hansib.  2002) p.34. 
8 Killingray, ‘Africans in the United Kingdom’ p. 5. 
9  Ibid p.3. 
10 Ibid p.5. 
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With pre-emigration exposure to westernisation, it is therefore not surprising that 
publications by leading academics on Afro-British history, notably Anthony Kirk-Greene, 
Hakim Adi, John Hargreaves and Marika Sherwood unveil a confident and educated African 
community from the late nineteenth century by examining issues related to: African student 
communities or individuals, pan-Africanism, diaspora political activism and political 
refugees.11  For example, Adi in his essay, ‘West African Students in Britain, 1900-60: The 
Politics of Exile' chronicles pan-Africanist political activism of West African students in 
Britain. Maintaining the theme of Pan-Africanism, Adi further explores how refugee or 
asylum seeker migration statuses encouraged the development of Pan-Africanism within the 
exiles from the later decades of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century.12    
However, despite the historiographical recognition of the presence of Africans in Britain 
since the Middle Ages, Panayi pointed out how they ‘only counted a few thousand’ in 
1945.13 It was only after the end of World War Two when a new trend in Britain’s 
immigration started to emerge with the arrival and permanent settlement of a significant 
number of non-European immigrants of which Africans were part. The majority of the non-
European post-war arrivals as noted by Leo Lucassen were from Britain’s colonies and 
former colonies in the West Indies, South Asia and Africa.14 The new post-war migration 
trends of non-Europeans had not only coincided with the collapse of the British Empire, but 
11 Collection of essays in Killingray’s  Africans in Britain by: Anthony Kirk-Greene, ‘Doubly Elite: African Rhodes 
Scholars, 1960-90 pp.220-234; Hakim Adi ‘West African Students in Britain 1900-60: The politics of Exile’ 
pp.107-128; John Hargreaves, ‘ African Students in Britain: The Case of Aberdeen University’ pp.129-144; 
Marika Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years’ pp.164-194. 
12 Hakim Adi, ‘African Political Thinkers, Pan-Africanism and the Politics of Exile, c1850-1970’ in Stefan Manz 
and Panikos Panayi (Ed) Refugees and cultural transfer to Britain (Abingdon: Routledge. 2013) pp.143-171 
13 Panayi,  An Immigration History of Britain, p.23. 
14 Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850 
(Illinois: University of Illinois Press 2005), p.23.  
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also Britain’s demand for unskilled and unskilled labourers following its economic boom of 
the 1950s and 1960s.15  
Migration scholars Joanna Herbert and Ceri Peach point out how the increase in Britain’s 
non-European immigrant population in response to the economic boom was helped by pull 
factors linked to the Nationality Act of 1948.16 To ensure a guaranteed supply of mainly 
unskilled or semi-skilled manpower, the Act encouraged citizens from the New 
Commonwealth to settle and work in Britain, since the British government conferred 
citizenship on them.17  The new post-war phase in British migration had therefore provided 
the opportunity for Blacks to become more visible in the British population.  
The impact of the arrival and permanent settlement of non-European immigrants with 
different social, cultural and physical characteristics to what the British had been 
accustomed to was recognised by migration scholars such as Avtar Brah, Zig Layton-Henry 
and Peter Fryer. Brah states how the post-war presence of Blacks and Asians added a new 
dimension in the dynamics of societal interactions by elevating ‘culture, political and 
identity’ differences.18 With culture and identity beginning to be significant influences in the 
construction of relations in a British society that was increasingly becoming racially diverse, 
stereotypes and prejudices naturally led to the development of doubts over whether the 
new non-European migrants would successfully fit into Britain’s society. This was because 
the new arrivals as argued by Layton-Henry were perceived by the British as being inferior 
15 Ibid., p.130. 
16 See for example: Joanna Herbert, Negotiating Boundaries in the City: Migration, Ethnicity and Gender in 
Britain (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008) p.16; Ceri Peach, ‘South Asian Migration and Settlement in Great 
Britain,1951-2001’, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 15, (2006), pp.133-146. 
17 Peach, ‘South Asian Migration’.  
18 Avtar Brah, ;’The Asian in Britain’, in N Ali, V.S Kalra and S Sayyid, (Eds),  A Post-Colonial People: South Asians 
in Britain (London: C Hurst and Company, 2006), p.6. 
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to European immigrant communities which had dominated Britain’s immigration landscape 
in the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth century.19  
With reference to West Indians Fryer explains how two-thirds of Britain’s White population 
had ‘a low opinion of Black people or disapproved of them.’20 They were seen as 
‘uncivilised, backward people inherently inferior to Europeans.’21 It was therefore an 
expected outcome that John Solomos’ analysis of post-war legislation and public policies in 
his volume Race and Racism in Britain demonstrates how the new settlers found themselves 
experiencing racial exclusion in their attempts to establish their communities whilst 
interacting with Britain’s economic and social structures.22  
It was this development of prejudices and stereotypical views of the non-European post-war 
immigrants that attracted academic interest exploring themes identified by Burrell as ‘social 
integration and assimilation, race and racism, segregation and inequality, moving more 
recently into debates on multiculturalism and post-colonialism’.23 These themes 
demonstrate how Britain’s attitude to non-European immigrants had facilitated post-war 
migration research to be dominated by discourses exploring interactions between 
immigrant communities and their host society’s socio-economic and political structures.  
Migration scholars Tariq Modood, Joanna Herbert, Sarah Hackett and Lorna Chessum have 
developed arguments exploring the evolutionary nature of social and economic integration 
of the post-war non-European immigrants in the British society. They used integration 
indicators like employment, education or housing to determine Britain’s receptiveness to 
19 Zig Layton-Henry The politics of immigration: Immigration, ‘race' and ‘race' relations in post-war Britain 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1992) p.28. 
20 Peter Fryer Staying Power: the History of Black People in Britain (London: Pluto.  1984) p.374. 
21 Ibid. 
22 John Solomos Race and Racism in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  2003).  
23 Burrell, Moving Lives, p.1. 
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immigrants. Tariq Modood mainly refers to South Asians and West Indians, with limited 
reference to West Africans when exploring prejudices experienced by ethnic minorities as 
they attempted to settle.24 Using Leicester as a case study, Joanna Herbert provides an 
insight on race relations mainly between South Asians and the indigenous white 
population25 whilst Lorna Chessum complements research on South Asians in the city by 
examining how migration and settlement of the African Caribbeans from the late 1940s 
further transformed the city’s racial demographics.26  
Sarah Hackett recognises the significance of cultural identities of immigrants in their 
integration processes by examining Muslim immigrant communities in Britain and Germany 
from the post-1945 era into the last decade of the twentieth century.27 Hackett’s 
comparative analysis of Muslims in two European countries demonstrates the evolving 
complexity in the experiences of non-European immigrants arriving with distinct cultural 
differences to most Europeans. Arriving with a way of life alien to most of Europeans made 
it an inevitable response as alluded to by Lucassen that religion gradually emerged as a 
significant component in determining their receptiveness to foreigners.28  
However, the majority of this academic attention on the post-war experiences of non-
European immigrants in Britain tends to skirt discourses on the socio-economic integration 
of Africans, especially those from Southern Africa. This is despite a steady post-war increase 
of African immigrants in Britain. There was an inextricable link between decolonisation and 
24 Tariq Modood, Ethnic Minorities in Britain diversity and disadvantage (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1997). 
25 Herbert, Negotiating Boundaries. 
26 Lorna Chessum, From immigrants to Ethnic Minority: Making Black Community in Britain (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000). 
27 Sarah Hackett, Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: the Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and 
Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2013).  
28 Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat, p.129.  
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an increase of Africans in Britain after World War Two. As the British Empire in Africa 
collapsed, Africans, as pointed out by Robert Dawson, joined other Commonwealth 
Immigrants from the West Indies and South Asia migrating to Britain.29 The inevitable 
consequence was that the African population in Britain continued to grow throughout the 
1970s and the later decades of the twentieth century with the arrival mainly of students and 
political refugees from both English and non-English speaking states.30  
Killingray illustrates how Africans by the end of the twentieth century had established 
themselves as a noticeable community of non-European migrants when he points that the 
1991  census recorded over 207 000 residing in Britain.31 This was the census in which for 
the first time individuals were invited to record their ethnic origin. This trend of African 
migration into Britain continued into the twenty-first century as part of what Burrell 
describes as ‘an increasingly globalised world.’32 The 2011 census affirmed the extent to 
which Africans have become a significant immigrant community within Britain’s twenty-first 
century demography by recording 989 000, that is, 1.7% of the population in England and 
Wales as Africans.33  
By focusing on Zimbabweans in Britain as a case study, the thesis will not only be offering an 
alternative perspective on Black British migration history by moving away from the 
traditional areas of Black immigration study such as eighteenth century slavery and post-
1945 African-Caribbean migration, but will also be acknowledging an increase of 
29 Robert Davison, Black British: Immigrants to England (London: Oxford University Press.  1966), p. 2 
30 Killingray, ‘Africans in the United Kingdom ’, pp. 19-20. 
31 Ibid. p.2. 
32 Burrell, Moving Lives, p. 2. 
33 The Office of National Statistics, 2011 Census Analysis: Ethnicity and Religion of the Non-UK Born Population 
in England and Wales: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/ethnicity-and-religion-of-
non-uk-born-population-in-england-and-wales--2011-census/rpt.html#tab-Ethnicity-of-the-non-UK-born-
population-  (First Visited 20 October 2015). 
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contemporary Sub-Saharan Africans in Britain; especially those from its former colonies in 
Southern Africa. Examination of Zimbabweans as an African community in Britain is 
therefore a worthy study since it demonstrates that Africans are an immigrant community 
distinctive from West Indians.  
Analysis on the diaspora Zimbabwean community also contributes to what can be perceived 
as a historiographical gap which tends to shy away from the interrelated impact of 
colonialism, nationalist movements and post-colonial governance on Africans in the 
diaspora. Erik Bleich is one of the few scholars to have explored the impact of colonial 
exposure to immigrants. His comparative analysis on how France’s indirect rule policy on it 
colonies (that has been highly assimilationist) and Britain’s indirect rule is an example of 
academic interest that presents arguments showing an inextricable link between 
colonisation and migrants socio-economic integration in their receiving society.34 
Choosing Zimbabweans in contrast to other African immigrants provides what Lucassen 
describes as ‘some scope for the historical analysis of the course of the integration 
process.’35 The thesis will demonstrate how the colonial era’s socialisation by the British 
created the foundation for construction of identities and prejudices that mirrored that of 
the British. The diasporic Zimbabwean community would therefore not escape migrating 
with inherited social, economic and cultural backgrounds (biased toward the British way of 
life) that would be essential in mapping their integration processes as they settled in Britain.   
Zimbabweans in Britain 
34 Erik Bleach, ‘The Legacies of History? Colonisation and Immigrants Integration in Britain and France’, Theory 
and Society, vol.34 (2005), pp. 171-195. 
35 Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat, pp.115. 
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The Office of National Statistics (ONS) identified Zimbabweans as one of the African 
communities from African Commonwealth countries that have been adopting Britain as 
their first choice migration destination; a trend that continued into the new millennium.36  
The rapid rise of the Zimbabwean population in Britain illustrated by Figure One below 
demonstrates how Zimbabweans had always embraced Britain as a migration destination in 
both the colonial and post-colonial era. Zimbabwe’s special relationship with its colonial 
master had always been cemented by what Robin Cohen identifies as ties of kinship, 









36The Office of National Statistics, Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 
2011:  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_346219.pdf (First visited 29 April 2015) 
37 Robin Cohen, Frontiers of Identity 1994: The British and the others (London: Longman,  1994),  p .17 
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Sources: Office of National Statistics, 201138; and International Organisation of Migration, 
200639  
Even at independence in 1980, Cohen states how White Zimbabweans of British descent 
continued to cling to their passports as a means of affirming their British identity and 
hedging their political bets if they would be forced to migrate in the future.40 For a majority 
of Blacks with no ancestral links with Britain, the distance between the two countries could 
not deter them from migrating. As a former colonial master that had economically 
benefitted from Zimbabwe’s resources, there were perceptions within Blacks that Britain 
‘owed’ them.41 Zimbabweans’ migration to Britain in both the colonial and post-colonial era 
38 Office of National Statistics, Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-characteristics-of-
non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-non-uk-born-
populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print (First Visited 29 April 2015). 
39  International Organisation of Migration, Zimbabwean Mapping Exercise, December 2006, Available at 
http://unitedkingdom.iom.int/sites/default/files/doc/mapping/IOM_ZIMBABWE_MR.pdf (First Visited 29 April 
2015). 
40 Cohen, Frontiers of Identity, p. 17. 
41 Dominic Pasura, African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of 
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could therefore be classified into the following five categories: visitors, students, those with 
dual nationality or ancestral heritage, political asylum seekers and those on work-permits.42 
Social scientists and not migration historians have been the quickest in recognising the 
growth of the Zimbabwean community in Britain. Leading social scientists on Zimbabwean 
immigrants namely Alice Bloch, JoAnn McGregor, Dominic Pasura and Beacon Mbiba have 
been exploring inter-related themes which include: reasons for migration; socio-economic 
integration; diaspora activism of home politics; and transnationalism. Alice Bloch’s paper 
‘Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’ provides a comparative analysis of 
Zimbabweans in Britain with those in South Africa by examining how the Zimbabwean 
community she describes as possessing a ‘higher average level of qualifications’ than other 
immigrants in their countries of settlement faced deskilling as they struggled to find 
employment suitable to their qualifications.43  
JoAnn McGregor also gives an insight into the economic integration of the Zimbabwean 
diaspora community in Britain by unveiling how the care sector had been the largest 
recruiter of contemporary first generation Zimbabweans determined to find employment so 
as to circumvent the trappings of immigrant poverty and meet their transnational 
obligations.44 Beacon Mbiba reinforces the economic integration of Zimbabwean 
immigrants in Britain by identifying how blocked mobility in Britain’s labour market 
persuaded some within the community to be entrepreneurial by opening businesses.45 
Dominic Pasura covers social aspects of the diaspora Zimbabwean community by exploring 
42 Ibid pp.43-47. 
43 Alice Bloch, ‘Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’, Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 40 
(2006), pp. 67-87. 
44 JoAnn McGregor, ‘Joining the BBC (British Bottom Cleaners): Zimbabwean Migrants and the UK care Industry 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 33 (2007), pp.801-824. 
45 Beacon Mbiba, ‘Beyond Abject Spaces: Enterprising Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain’, African Diaspora, Vol. 
4 (2011), pp.  50-75. 
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issues related to religious identities, changes in domestic gender roles, transnational 
engagements such as political activism in home politics and sending of remittances back 
home.46  
This academic research into Britain’s Zimbabwean population has been significant, though 
not exhaustive. This is because: the emerging academic discussions tend to focus on Black 
Zimbabwean immigrants with very little, if any, acknowledgment of Whites, Coloureds 
(Mixed Race) and Asians. This limited academic attention on Zimbabwean minority 
communities in Britain by social scientists also mirrors the neglect of the historiography on 
colonial Zimbabwe. Whilst there has been detailed historiographical focus on construction 
of the White community in the colonial era, Coloureds and Asians failed to attract the 
attention of historians. This is despite Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson’s volume ‘The Indian 
Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi’ recognising the emergence of the Asian 
community at the turn of the 20th century.47  
As for Coloureds, their early presence in Colonial Zimbabwe had been recognised by John 
Pape who pointed out that by 1930 1,138 Coloured children from White fathers had been 
enumerated by the colonial government.48 James Muzondidya’s ‘Walking a Tightrope: 
Towards a Social History of the Coloured People of Zimbabwe’ has also been an invaluable 
source in providing an insight into how this growing Coloured community constructed its 
identity amidst marginalisation in both colonial and then in post-colonial Zimbabwe.49 Julie 
Seirlis’ essay ‘Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–1980’ further 
46 Pasura, African Transnational Diasporas. 
47 Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi (London: Yale 
University Press.  1968).  
48 John Pape, ‘Black and white: The “perils of sex” in colonial Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
Vol. 15 (1990), pp.  699-720. 
49 James Muzondidya, Walking a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured People of Zimbabwe 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005). 
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explores the extent to which Coloureds’ participation in Rhodesia’s military operations 
against the nationalist led liberation struggle was not only fully appreciated by the 
Rhodesian government, but it also carried the potential of undermining Coloureds’ claim to 
citizenship in post-colonial Zimbabwe.50  With each racial community migrating with a 
background of different historic experiences, the imported identities and prejudices of 
Zimbabwe’s minority communities should therefore not be trivialised when seeking to 
understand the construction of relations and their integration processes. 
Despite Shari Eppel’s affirmation that contemporary Zimbabweans are still a product of 
prejudices, identities and unresolved conflicts of race and ethnicity rooted in pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial events,51 much of the literature has also downplayed the 
presence of Zimbabwe’s past when explaining ethnic or race relations between the 
Zimbabwean diaspora communities. Ethno-racial prejudices and traumas developed and 
nurtured during the phases of Zimbabwe’s history facilitated the construction of memories 
and experiences that have been instrumental in defining how the diaspora communities of 
Zimbabweans interact with each other and with Britain’s social and economic structures. By 
examining the ethno-racial relations and integration processes of Zimbabweans living in 
Britain the thesis will therefore be presenting an argument showing why diaspora 
communities from former colonial states should not be understood as a product of fixed 
50 Julie Kate Seirlis, ‘Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–1980’,  African Studies, vol. 
63 (2004) , pp. 73-93 .  
51 Shari Eppel, ‘Gukurahundi: The need for Truth and Reconciliation’, in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage, 
(eds),  Zimbabwe Injustice and Political Reconciliation (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 
2004), p. 43. 
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essence  but as the ‘outcome of historical political and cultural processes through which the 
ideas of belonging come to be defined’.52  
The colonisation of Zimbabwe spearheaded by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 
September 1890 marked the start of socialisation processes in which community or 
individual identity constructions were to be based on racial superiority. Although the BSAC 
control of the territory was ended in 1923 when the British government granted self-
governing colony status, historiography on Zimbabwe’s colonial era illustrates the extent to 
which the granting of self-governing status motivated the White settlers to implement 
distinctive political policies based on racial prejudices.53 Despite the British government 
reserving the right to veto the implementation of policies affecting the Black Africans, 
Jeffrey Herbst outlines how the British government never exercised its powers.54 The 
ultimate consequence was increased White immigration as alluded to by Alois Mlambo.55 
The failure to restrain the self-governing colonial administration served to confirm that both 
the British and the settlers did not collectively care about the welfare of Blacks. This was 
demonstrated by the passing of legislation such as the Land Apportionment Act in 1930 that 
facilitated the removal of Africans from productive farming areas assigned to Whites; and 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 that excluded Black Africans from definition of 
employee.56 It was the creation of this exploitative and colonial environment based on a 
52 JoAnn McGregor, ‘The Making of Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora’, in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka Primorac, eds, 
Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora: Displacement and Cultural Politics of Survival (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010) ,  
p. 6. 
53 See for example Reginald Austin, Racism and apartheid in Southern Africa - Rhodesia: A book of data (Paris: 
Unesco Press, 1975). 
54 Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990) p.16. 
55 Alois Mlambo, ‘Building a White Man’s Country: Aspects of White Immigration into Rhodesia up to World 
War II’,  Zambezia Vol 25 (1998) pp.123-146. 
56 See Austin, Racism and apartheid in Southern Africa, pp.34-35, 63 ; Theodore Bull, Rhodesian perspective 
(London, Michael Joseph, 1967) pp.27-35. 
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racist discourse that was to provide the framework for future societal relations which were 
to be replicated during the colonial and post-colonial eras and exported to the diaspora.   
Apart from race, ethnicity also emerged as a significant component used by the colonial 
administration to construct identities within African communities despite historiographical 
acknowledgment that colonisation did not invent the African ethnic groups. In support of 
the argument that tribal identities were a pre-colonial invention Gerald Chikozho Mazarire’s 
essay, ‘Reflections on pre-colonial Zimbabwe 850-1880s’ presents pre-colonial Zimbabwe as 
a multi-ethnic society inhabited by people we refer to now as the Shona and Ndebele 
comprised of linguistic or sub-ethnic groups.57 The Zezuru and Korekore (in what is now 
known as Mashonaland), the Manyika and Ndau (in present day Manicaland), and the 
Karanga (in the south-Masvingo) were the major linguistic groups who became collectively 
known as the Shona. However, the arrival of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe in the 1830s was to 
transform these pre-colonial Zimbabwe’s demographics. The Ndebele had been once part of 
the Zulu nation and had been forced to migrate after altercations between their king, 
Mzilikazi and Zulu King Shaka. Pre-colonial relations between the Shona and Ndebele 
communities were to be characterised by conflicts which were to be exploited by the 
British.  
On arrival in Zimbabwe the British were therefore confronted with an already multi-ethnic 
society of the Shona and Ndebele speaking communities divided by language dialects and 
loosely defined territories. Jeffrey Herbst points out how the British aggravated the ethnic 
split by reinforcing consciousness of ethnic differences through the creation of regional and 
57 Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, ‘Reflections on pre-colonial Zimbabwe 850-1880s’ in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois 
Mlambo (eds), A History From The Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009).  
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administrative boundaries along ethnic lines.58 Creation of ethnically named regions, 
primarily known as Mashonaland and Matabeleland, officially endorsed ethnic separation 
between the Shona and the Ndebele which fostered a sense of safety and belonging when 
among their own tribe. Reinforcing awareness of ethnic divisions had presented the colonial 
administration with a perfect environment to ‘divide and rule’ the Africans. By formally 
dividing the Africans the White administration was creating an awareness of ethnic 
identities which were to determine future relations between African communities.   
By critiquing ethnic categorisation processes in colonial Zimbabwe the thesis will be 
complementing existing literature on the nature of British colonial rule on indigenous 
communities. This facilitates identification of any recurring pattern or political processes in 
Britain’s approach to its colonies such as in British India. David McDermott Hughes’ 
assertion that after the Zimbabwe natives’ uprising in 1896-97, Whites pacified ‘native 
polities, monopolising politics and the economy’59 resonates with events in India after the 
mutiny in 1857. Ian Talbot presents an argument on how the British overemphasised 
historic communal differences to divide and rule Indians by reinforcing caste and religious 
stereotypes through census reports and army recruitment.60 
Whilst in British India the dislocation of the existing relationships was partly through the use 
of caste and religion in the decennial census from 1871,61 in Zimbabwe the sharpness of 
differences in society stemmed from the complementary effects of ethnically named 
geographical regions to officially sanctioned ethnic segregation. As Zimbabwe’s ethnic 
communities (just like in British India) became aware of their numerical advantages, 
58 Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe p.169. 
59 David McDermott Hughes, Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),  p.4. 
60 Ian Talbot, Indian and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation (London: Arnold, 2000) pp.22.  
61 Judith Brown, Modern India the Origins of an Asian Democracy (Oxford:  University Press, 1985), p. 158. 
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tensions were inevitable as they adjusted to their new identities thus allowing the 
infiltration of prejudices and allegiances which would inhibit future interactions.   
Parallel to these internal initiatives of using geographical locations to reinforce awareness of 
ethnic divisions among the Africans, the colonial administration also elevated racial 
prejudices by officially categorising Zimbabwe’s community into natives (Black Africans), 
Coloureds (Mixed Race), Asians (those of Indian origin) and Whites. The colonial 
administration’s classification of the population was based on a hierarchical structure in 
which Whites were elevated to be masters, Coloureds and Asians occupying the second 
strand and Black Africans placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy.  The racial 
hierarchical classification had therefore started a process of: consolidating identities based 
on race; allowing the implementation of policies in which race would be the main 
denominator in determining access to the country’s wealth; and  continuously reminding 
Black Africans that they were ‘subjugated people’ dependent on Whites.  
The hierarchical racial categorisation of the population cannot be understood in isolation 
from June Ellis’ assertion which points out how enacting colonial political legislation and 
socio-economic policies were usually driven by African myths characterising Africans as 
primitive, savage and trapped in ‘ignorance, darkness and death’.62 This stereotypical 
thinking had emerged to be the driving force behind the racial categorisation, thus leading 
to the construction of what Ellis refers to as ‘unbridled paternalism’, built on the sense of 
civilising Africans.63 Exposure of westernisation had therefore started a socialisation process 
of conditioning Africans to perceive the British way of life as a standard of civilisation. The 
62 June Ellis, Africans in Britain: A Meeting of Two Cultures (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1978), p. 1. 
63 Ibid. 
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consequence recognised in the thesis was the creation of Africans with identities which 
despised traditional values by elevating a European way of life.  
Whilst the position of Whites allowed them to nurture racial superiority, the colonial racial 
categorisation of the population had also exposed Coloureds and Asians to potential 
marginalisation in a Black ruled independent Zimbabwe. Colonisation had deliberately 
placed Zimbabweans in an environment in which the ideologies of racism and tribalism 
would be germinated, nurtured and inevitably blossom.  By exploring the multifaceted 
historical interludes of colonial racial segregation and ethnic prejudices the thesis will 
therefore establish why historic experiences developed during the colonial era should not 
be ignored when seeking to understand the construction of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
community.  
Whilst it is undeniable that colonialism imparted serious problems to ethnic and racial 
relations in colonial Zimbabwe, the contribution of the nationalist movement cannot be 
omitted when analysing contemporary ethnic and racial relations within the Zimbabwean 
community. The dominant Zimbabwean nationalist movement’s ideology that guided the 
prolonged liberation struggle for independence became ‘bankrupt of ideas as it only 
succeeded in entrenching nostalgic thinking devoid of nation building in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe.’64  
The thesis will therefore establish that whilst the White community under colonial rule was 
unified by their White identity founded on racism and an idea of a nation which excluded 
the Black majority, the Black Nationalist movement had to contend with competing and 
often overlapping ethnic identity claims. The nationalist led struggle for independence 
64 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Dynamics of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the 21st Century’, African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.3 (2003),  pp. 99-134. 
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became embroiled in a series of ethnic conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele. The 
thesis’ interrogation of internal ethnic conflicts within the nationalist movement unravels 
how independent Zimbabwe was born with visible ethnic and racial conflict birthmarks that 
needed to be addressed in building a post-colonial national identity that would have formed 
the basis of diaspora relations. 
Although the thesis recognises ethnic allegiances as being critical influences in the 
construction of diaspora relations within the Black community, there is a limited 
historiography on Zimbabwe’s evolving internal ethnic relations in both the colonial and 
post-colonial eras. Despite the importance of ethnicity in creating national identities that 
influence communities’ interactions, Enocent Msindo explains how Zimbabwean historians 
have been reluctant to critically engage the interaction of identity, ethnicity and nationalism 
in nation building.65 Msindo’s assertion has been affirmed by Brilliant Mhlanga who reveals 
how in post-colonial Zimbabwe any attempts to discuss ethnicity risked being labelled as 
‘tribalism’ working against the creation of a united nation.66 The perceived risk of 
politicisation and criminalisation when assessing the impact of ethnic relations in either 
colonial or post-colonial eras has inevitably undermined detailed assessment on post-
colonial government initiatives in building a united nation.  
The thesis will therefore capture how the construction of Zimbabwean personalities in 
Britain cannot only be explained as ‘recent tragedies of colonialism’67 but they also stem 
from the post-colonial initiatives to effectively deal with ethnic tensions between African 
65 Enocent Msindo, ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo 1950-1963’, Journal of 
African History, Vol.48 (2007), pp. 267-290. 
66 Brilliant Mhlanga, ‘Ethnicity or Tribalism? The discursive construction of Zimbabwean national identity’, 
Vol.11 African Identities, (2013), pp.47-60. 
67 William Ackah, ‘Pan-African Consciousness and Identity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century’, in Mark 
Christian, ed., Black Identity in the Twentieth Century, (London: Hansib Publication, 2002), p. 4. 
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communities and racial prejudices. At independence on 18 April 1980, the new government 
of Zimbabwe was beset with challenges of not only constructing a new united nation from 
the dungeon of colonial racial segregation, but also tactfully dealing with the significant and 
permanent boundary of ethnic polarisation between the minority Ndebele and the majority 
Shona oriented groups. Regrettably, just as it was during colonial rule, Brian Raftopoulos 
and Alois Mlambo express how ‘in the era of post-colonial politics, the movement towards 
an unquestioned national identity was to prove to be a dangerous fantasy, one that could 
not conceal the faculties of ethnicity, class, gender and history’.68 The absence of a clear, 
deliberate and effective mechanism to ensure ethnic or racial unity seems to endorse the 
argument which shows that the new nationalist Zimbabwean government measured its 
success with the replacement of minority rule with a Black led government.  
The thesis’ discursive construction of the Zimbabwean diaspora community reveals how 
early on into independence the nationalist government of Robert Mugabe undermined 
efforts to create a united Zimbabwe when it became embroiled in racial and ethnic 
conflicts.69 The most notable was the outbreak of a violent civil conflict in Matabeleland (an 
Ndebele dominated region) after the Ndebele accused the Shona dominated government of 
marginalisation in military and civil service institutions and regional development. The 
politicisation of the conflict and criminalisation of the Ndebele by the Shona led government 
of Mugabe constructed and nurtured ethnic perceptions of resentment that were to be 
imported into the diaspora.  
68 Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, ‘The Hard Road to Becoming National’ in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, A 
History from the pre-Colonial Period to 2008,  p. xvii. 
69 James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 
1980-2007’, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.2 (2007),  pp. 257-297. 
                                                          
40 
Chapter 1 
Whilst the colonisation of Zimbabwe irrevocably set in motion the construction of racial 
prejudices that cannot be ignored when exploring the socio-economic integration of the 
Zimbabwean community in Britain, the thesis recognises how the failure at independence to 
trigger an effective desensitisation of the colonial identities allowed the diasporic 
Zimbabwean community to migrate with identities and prejudices developed and nurtured 
in both the colonial and post-colonial era. Despite the positive post-colonial developments 
in gender equality, agriculture, education and health captured by Diana Auret, the first 
decade of independence became a decade of missed opportunities in crafting policies 
essential for the development of a more inclusive Zimbabwe.70 It was during this era in 
which Zimbabwe was governed under the Lancaster House Agreement’s Constitution signed 
in 1979, paving the way for a ceasefire and ultimately democratic elections in 1980. The 
thesis will establish how the provisions of the Constitution emerged to be a hindrance in the 
implementation of nation building initiatives essential in constructing a cohesive 
Zimbabwean immigrant community which rejected any colonial nurtured prejudices or 
identities.   
The Lancaster House Constitution incorporated a series of compromises and political rights 
of the minority White community.71 The most notable compromise was introducing a two 
tier electoral system to allay the fears of the Whites on how a Black led government was to 
address the colonial injustices. Whites were guaranteed a political voice in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe’s parliament by reserving twenty seats during the first decade of independence. 
However, the thesis will establish how a significant number of Whites could have used this 
as an opportunity to cling to the social and economic benefits they had inherited from the 
70 Diana Auret A Decade of Development: Zimbabwe 1980-1990 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1990). 
71 Raftopoulos and Mlambo, ‘The Hard Road to Becoming National’ , p. xxviii. 
                                                          
41 
Chapter 1 
colonial era. This led to the reinventing and reinforcing of racial prejudices, whose impact 
resonates in interactions within multi-racial Zimbabweans residing in Britain.  
A holistic understanding of the debate on inter-personal interactions between the 
Zimbabwean communities in Britain and with Britain’s socio-economic structures could not 
have been fully appreciated without the thesis’ analysis of the impact of farm invasions on 
the White community at the turn of the new millennium. The experience of not being able 
to protect their businesses or properties did not only highlight White Zimbabweans’ 
vulnerability to Zimbabwe’s nationalist violent attempts to resolve colonial injustices, but it 
also endorsed the stripping of their citizenship rights that would have guaranteed protection 
of their properties by politicians or the police.  
Emigration had therefore emerged to be the only viable option that would potentially give 
White Zimbabweans opportunities to pursue economic integration processes to guarantee 
future socio-economic stability for themselves and their children. As immigrants, the thesis 
will establish how relations with other Zimbabweans (especially the Black community) and 
their economic integration would therefore be driven by a consciousness of the violent 
seizure of their properties in Zimbabwe which had robbed their children of their inheritance. 
The bitterness of the circumstances surrounding their immigration facilitated the 
reincarnation of a Rhodesian national identity that became a hindrance to both interactions 
with other Zimbabweans and their social integration.   
Examining ethnic or racial relations within the Zimbabwean community in Britain helps to 
find answers to the questions: ‘how far has colonialism and post-colonial governance 
influenced the construction of a visible community in Britain?;’ and ‘to what extent did 
Zimbabwe’s prolonged period under colonial rule influence identity construction of 
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Zimbabweans in the Diaspora?’ Addressing these questions is essential in evaluating the 
impact of unresolved historic conflicts of racism and ethnicity on those in the diaspora.  
Zimbabweans in the diaspora have imported racial or ethnic personalities or prejudices 
constructed either during colonialism or the post-colonial era and they are now being (or 
have been passed) from generation to generation, thus influencing community relations and 
socio-economic integration patterns. The thesis therefore aims to make a contribution to 
the historiographical void by assessing whether the multiracial Zimbabwean community in 
the diaspora are a product of identities constructed in the colonial and post-colonial eras. 
The historical influences would be measured by two processes that would be examined in 
the thesis. The first one will be the level and nature of interactions between the diaspora 
communities demarcated by race and ethnicity. Secondly, it will be a comparative analysis 
of the communities’ economic and social integration patterns.  
Thesis Outline 
In developing the argument that explores the impact of historically developed identities and 
prejudices on the diaspora communities’ relations and socio-economic integration 
processes, the thesis consists of three thematic chapters which are chronologically 
structured. The chronological structure of the thematic chapters traces the progression of 
the development of ethno-racial identities and prejudices in the three phases of Zimbabwe’s 
history: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. 
Divided in three sections, the first thematic chapter (that is, chapter two) forms the basis of 
historical debates exploring the influence of the historical socio-economic and political 
systems on the processes of creating a Zimbabwean national identity. The first section 
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examines the pre-colonial origins of Shona-Ndebele tensions which formed the basis of 
ethnic allegiances in subsequent generations and the implementation of a ‘divide and rule’ 
agenda by the colonial administration.      
The chapter’s second section exposes how race and ethnicity as identities promoted by the 
colonial administration and within the nationalist movement served to create boundaries 
and ‘dichotomies’ that were to demarcate mental spaces of Zimbabweans as they negotiate 
forging interactions.72 The evolving way of thinking during the colonial era entrenched in the 
hierarchical categorisation of the population had legitimised the recognition of the Africans 
as an inferior species who owed their existence to the civilising mission of the colonisers. It 
was this stereotypical thinking within the White community which activated the nationalist 
movement, ravaged by internal ethnic and regional conflicts, to spearhead the struggle of 
natives against racial injustices perpetuated by the colonial administration. However, the 
disunity within the nationalist movement had devastating consequences on nation building 
in post-colonial Zimbabwe whose impact was not to be confined within Zimbabwe’s borders 
but was to extend to diaspora communities. 
As the euphoria of 1980’s Independence and hope of prosperity subsided, it is undeniable 
that the Shona dominated new government of Robert Mugabe faced insurmountable 
challenges in its attempts to build a united nation ravaged by racial injustices and ethnic 
divisions. The chapter’s third section will therefore examine how the roots of ethnic and 
racial relations which were to characterise the Zimbabwean communities both in Zimbabwe 
and in the diaspora cannot be divorced from how the new government communicated its 
nation building polices to its citizens. The section also captures how the first decade of 
72 Anias Mutekwa, ‘Gendered Beings, Gendered Discourses: the Gendering of Race, Colonialism and Anti-
Colonial Nationalism in Three Zimbabwean Novels’, Social Identities, Vol.15 (2009),  pp.725-740  
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independence turned out to be characterised by missed opportunities in reconciling the 
nation. The 1980s violent civil conflict, marginalisation of Coloureds and Asians in the 
political processes, and the continued economic dominance by Whites, reinvented and 
reinforced ethnic and racial divisions. The discussion of the reincarnation of post-colonial 
ethnic and racial divisions allows the thesis to identify imported memories of experiences 
that have been influential in the construction of community relations and socio-economic 
integration processes of the settled Zimbabwean communities in Britain.  
By exclusively focusing on Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain, chapter three critically 
explores the impact of colonialism and post-colonial governance on the construction of 
relations within a racially and ethnically diverse community. The chapter will also recognise 
that the construction of Zimbabwean immigrant communities in Britain should not be solely 
analysed as a contemporary phenomenon. Britain’s efforts to assist Black African students 
and political instability were contributory factors which also led to the rise of a multi-racial 
Zimbabwean immigrant community that peaked in the 1970s.   
In recognition of Zimbabweans who migrated during the colonial era, the chapter’s colonial 
immigration section briefly explores the extent to which homeland influences of racial 
discrimination and the activities of the national movement were significant factors in 
construction of community relations. Although colonial emigration was undertaken by all 
racial communities, the chapter will establish how the Black student community emerged to 
be the most visible. By virtue of being the largest and the most recognisable community 
during the colonial era, this chapter’s comparative analysis will be largely biased towards 
the Black community.  
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After a brief examination of homeland influences on the Zimbabwean immigrant community 
of the 1970s, the chapter will turn its focus to the contemporary community. The post-
colonial section will develop a narrative that reveals the extent to which contemporary 
diaspora relations stem from the failure of post-colonial initiatives to effectively deal with 
historic ethnic tensions and racial prejudices  
In exploring the dynamics of ethnic and racial interactions between the Zimbabwean 
communities each racial group will be discussed separately. Tackling the racial communities 
separately facilitates a comparative analysis of the reasons for migration and the extent of 
the impact colonial and post-colonial memories on different racial or ethnic groups. To 
avoid oversimplification in defining relations between Black Zimbabweans, the chapter will 
also examine the impact of historical experiences which were transmitted through different 
ways in the diaspora Shona and Ndebele communities.  
Chapter four presents a critical perspective revealing how Zimbabweans’ interaction with 
Britain’s economic and social structures mirrors the identities, prejudices and experiences 
developed and nurtured by Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial past. The chapter’s 
section analysing the economic integration of the diaspora Zimbabwean communities 
focuses on historical influences on education, nature of employment and entrepreneurship. 
The historical influence on language proficiency, religion and inter-marriage will be 
examined in the social integration section of the chapter.  
In recognition of the racial and ethnic diversity of the Zimbabwean immigrant community, 
the chapter adopts a comparative analysis between the Shona, Ndebele, White, Coloured 
and Asian communities. Since these communities do not have shared or similar historic 
experiences, analysing each community separately allows the chapter to not only identify 
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the reasons why integration processes differ between the communities, but also evaluates 
the impact of integration processes on each community.  
After having explored the complex process in the construction of a Zimbabwean community 
in Britain, the concluding chapter provides a detailed comparative analysis showing the 
inextricable link between the construction of a diaspora Zimbabwean community and 
historical, social, political and economic systems. By assessing the impact of ethnicity and 
race on community relations, the thesis’ conclusion will provide a critical perspective 
showing how imported historical memories of racial superiority, jealousy, mistrust and 
suspicions have undermined the construction of a national identity in Britain. It is this 
fragmentation of the Zimbabwean community identified in the conclusion chapter which 
triggers the question; Does a Zimbabwean diaspora community exist in Britain? 
Methodology 
To facilitate a detailed analysis on the impact of historical experiences on Zimbabwean’s 
minority immigrant communities, the main part of the dissertation’s findings were extracted 
from interviews with thirty-nine Blacks, eight Whites, seven Coloureds and five Asians. The 
racial mixture of the interviewees differentiated by gender, age and educational or 
professional qualifications illustrated in Table Two below provided an adequate cross-
section of views on the relationship between colonial and post-colonial legacies on the 
construction of interactions between Zimbabwean immigrant communities and their socio-
economic integration processes. Use of interviews therefore enabled the research 
participants to have what Brian Roberts described as a voice to interpret their historical life 
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memories73 that would have been developed and nurtured during the colonial and post-
colonial phases of Zimbabwe’s history. 
Table 2: Distribution of Interviewees by Race, Gender, Age and Country of Residence 
                                          Race of Interviewees         Total 
 Blacks Whites Coloureds Asians Number %* 
Gender       
Males 25 5 3 4 37 63 
Females 14 3 4 1 22 37 
Age Range 
(Years) 
      
20-29 6 2 1 1 10 17 
30-39 10 1 0 0 11 19 
40-49 10 2 1 0 13 22 
+50 13 3 5 4 25 42 
Country of 
Residence 
      
Britain 36 8 6 4 54 92 
Zimbabwe 3 0 1 1 5 8 




      
Colonial 2 0 1 1 4 7 
Post-Colonial 34 8 5 3 50 93 
*Percentage rounded off to nearest whole figure 
Before the interview process had commenced it was imperative to explicitly recognise any 
of my potential prejudices or pre-suppositions that would have compromised the thesis’ 
partiality. A conscious effort to set pre-suppositions aside had to be made so as to allow 
73 Brian Roberts, Biographical Research (Buckingham: Open University, 2002), p. 105. 
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being ‘surprised by findings’74. This was because: like most researches, the research topic 
was constructed from what Bruce Berg identifies as the researcher’s oriented position 
influenced by knowledge of historical events or the researcher’s past experiences.75 My 
personal tragedy of having a parent killed by the Rhodesian security forces in 1978 and 
exposure to post-colonial media propaganda had the potential of blurring objectivity when 
conducting the research. It was therefore imperative that the interview process would 
ensure that my past experiences would not distort the interview process by viewing 
participants as human subjects to be manipulated to justify historically constructed pre-
suppositions or prejudices.76 Special attention had to be given to minimise the risk of 
premature ending of interviews. This was done by avoiding the use of prejudicial language 
or questions which participants could interpret as insensitive, personal and hypothetical.  
To maintain a ‘façade’ of neutrality or objectivity that undermines my prejudices and 
suppositions, care was taken in regularising the interview process through four approaches: 
the sampling of interviewees; research design; the choice and construction of interview 
questions; and addressing the ethical issues. This approach did not only minimise the 
influence of presuppositions when interpreting data sourced from oral accounts, but also 
facilitated an interview structure to be devised that allowed both the interviewer and the 
participants the opportunity to interchange views in an informal way whilst not deviating 
from the core aims of the research. My historical experiences and knowledge of the internal 
dynamics of relations between Zimbabwean communities assisted in the development of 
74 Nigel King ‚‘The Qualitative Research Interview‘ in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, Qualitative Methods 
in Organisational Research A Practical Guide (London: SAGE Publications, 1994), pp. 31. 
75 Bruce Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, (London: Pearson. 2004) pp.155-156. 
76 Bob Mathews and Liz Ross, Research Methods: A Practical Guide for Social Sciences, (London: Pearson 
Education, 2010), pp.225-226. 
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interactive, flexible and informal interview sessions especially when interviewing Ndebele, 
Whites, Coloureds and Asian minority communities.  
It would have been naïve for the interview process to ignore the potential challenges posed 
by the diverse nature of historical experiences between Zimbabwe’s ethnic communities. 
The diaspora community, reflecting Zimbabwe, was still fractured along ethnic or racial lines 
with restricted interactions of the communities. The 1980s civil conflict had caused a 
significant number of the Ndebele to migrate with a separatist attitude from the Shona, 
whilst a majority of White Zimbabwean immigrants still harboured a sense of racial 
superiority developed and consolidated during the colonial era. However, regardless of 
these potential challenges, it was essential to identify ways of accessing potential 
participants reflecting the ethnic and racial diversity of the Zimbabwean diaspora 
community. 
To circumvent the potential challenges, potential participants were initially drawn from 
those with whom I had an established rapport. These were acquaintances I had consulted 
during my MA research on the Zimbabwean and Somali communities in Leicester and those 
from everyday life interactions drawn mainly from family members, my local church, and 
former work colleagues.77 It was from this initial pool of acquaintances that a network of 
potential interviewees was established thus initiating snowballing as more participants were 
identified. Being introduced to potential participants by already known contacts not only  
established a rapport prior to interview, but it also allowed individualisation of interviewing 
techniques with the hope of encouraging participants to confidently narrate their life 
experiences, especially on issues related to race or ethnicity.   
77 Christopher Roy Zembe, ’A Comparative Study on the Integration of Culturally Diverse Zimbabwean and 
Somali Communities in Leicester’  unpublished De Montfort University MA thesis, 2012, pp. 76-79. 
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Using known contacts to identify potential interviewees also facilitated a more meaningful 
sampling process of identifying potential participants that was not too random to the extent 
of undermining the core aims of the research. This was because: advice from acquaintances 
was invaluable in identifying individuals who had the potential of contributing positively to 
the research as advised by Berg.78  
The racial profile of the interviewees shown in Figure Two in which Blacks are the 
overwhelming majority was (and is still reflective) of Zimbabwe’s population. At 
independence, Blacks’ share of the overall population was 97.6%; those of European 
descent at 2.1%; Coloureds at 0.3%; and Asians 0.2%.79 The Zimbabwe Statistical Agency’s 
statistics of the last census taken in 2012 showed the White population to have diminished 
in size to less than 1% of the overall population whilst the Black African population rose to 
99.7%.80 The violent evictions of White farmers from their farms were undoubtedly a 
contributory factor to the decline of the White population. The only minority communities 
which essentially maintained their overall share of the population were Coloureds and 





78 Berg, Qualitative Research Methods, pp.112. 
79 Lucy Mazingi and Richard Kamidza, ‘Inequality in Zimbabwe’, in Herbert Jauch and Deprose Muchena (Eds), 
Tearing us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 
2011), p. 326. 
80 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, Available at Zimbabwe Population Census 2012 
http://www.zimstat.co.zw/dmdocuments/Census/CensusResults2012/National_Report.pdf (Accessed on 9 
April 2015).  
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The ethnic diversity of the Black interviewees shown in Figure Three above is also reflective 
of the demographics in Zimbabwe. Historically, the Shona has been the dominant Black 
community with an approximate share of the population of 80% with the Ndebele being the 
second largest ethnic community at approximately 15%.81 The dominance of the Shona 
community who regarded themselves as the true natives of what was to be known as 
Zimbabwe had been the source of historic tension with the Ndebele.  Reflecting on my 
position as a Shona, the interview process was therefore to be conducted in a way in which 
interpretation of the collected data of the minority Ndebele group would not be a product 
of what Nigel King describes as the ‘researcher’s prejudices and prior expectations.’82 As a 
member of the majority Shona these prejudices and expectations would have been 
consciously or subconsciously developed by historical events that defined relations between 
the two African ethnic communities.  
As shown in the bibliography, the interview process had to be reflective of the uneven 
dispersal of the Zimbabwean population throughout Britain. This was essential in 
constructing a comparative discourse on how Zimbabweans in different British locations are 
constructing economic or social interactions with their host society and between 
themselves. Informal discussions with other Zimbabwean immigrants and the 2011 Office 
for National Statistics’ census, showing regional distribution of Zimbabweans in the UK, 
assisted in identifying areas with a higher concentration of Zimbabweans.  
The interviews were conducted in contrasting public and private spaces. Participants’ 
workplaces in cafes, canteens, and Church buildings were public spaces utilised in the 
81 Saliwe Kawewe ‘Social Welfare of Indigenous Peoples in Zimbabwe’, in John Dixon and Robert 
Scheurell(Eds), Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 280. 
82 King, Qualitative Research, p. 31. 
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research process, whilst offices and homes provided the private spaces. Within the comfort 
of their private spaces, participants assumed some control of the environment which was a 
way of undermining perceptions that they are taking part in a controlled experiment. This 
was because interviewing participants in what they perceived as a secure private 
environment crucially facilitated the nurturing of mutual relationships with the participants 
necessary for the discussion of sensitive racial, ethnic or political issues.  
Interviewing people within the confines of their homes also provided a platform on which 
participants’ everyday cultural identity norms were unconsciously expressed through the 
language spoken to other family members (present as non-participants) and the greeting 
procedures on arrival by both adults and children. Observing how participants’ families 
interact or behave in the presence of a guest was essential in determining the extent to 
which imported historic influences have been significant catalysts in Zimbabweans losing 
their traditional cultural identities as they integrate into the British way of life.  
Although it is undeniable that interviewing is an integral research method that captures 
immigrants’ homeland stories and experiences that cannot be obtained in any other way, 
there are some historians who still view oral history with suspicion.83 Since individual 
memory is a crucial component in oral history’s reconstruction of the past, reliability of 
personal narratives can be compromised when interviewees deliberately alter past events 
so as justify their contemporary way of life.84 This is because human memory would tend to 
be selective when reconstructing and interpreting historical life experiences. 
83 As noted by Kathy Burrell and Panikos Panayi ‘Immigration, History and Memory in Britain’ Kathy Burrell and 
Panikos Panayi (Ed) History and Memories: Migrants and their History in Britain (London, Touris Academic 
Studies, 2006) p.14.   
84 Ibid.  
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Safeguarding reliability and validity was therefore an anticipated challenge when conducting 
interviews within a Zimbabwean community that had been grappled with memories of 
historic ethnic or racial mistrust and suspicions. In trying to justify contemporary behaviour 
or attitudes intrinsically linked to historical events, there was always the potential that what 
interviewees say may be different from other historical sources thus undermining their 
validity as historical evidence.  
While it was conceivable that the interviewees’ re-collection of historical events having an 
impact on their life experiences would have been correct, the validity of the information 
they narrated still had to be properly validated. The mechanism of validating information 
from the participants was based on Alice Hoffaman’s assertion that a high degree of 
conformity between the oral historic reports of the events and the event itself as recorded 
by other historical sources provides credibility to the interview process.85  To ensure the 
credibility of the participants’ historical accounts, it was therefore essential to continuously 
validate information acquired during interviews against a range of other oral accounts, and 
primary and secondary historical sources.  
To further minimise the thesis’ conclusions based on subjective personal opinions, 
observations were also conducted to assess the reliability of the oral accounts describing 
how Zimbabweans of different ethnic, racial or social class background interact with each 
other. The observations were carried out according to what Roy Horn describes as 
‘unobtrusive observation’ where the participants were unaware that they were being 
observed.86 Over a period of six consecutive fortnightly meetings, observations were carried 
85 Alice Hoffaman, ‘Reliability and Validity in Oral History ‘in David K Dunaway and Wila K Baum, eds, Oral 
History:  An Interdisciplinary Anthology (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), p. 89. 
86 Roy Horn, Researching and Writing Dissertations: A Complete Guide for Business and Management Students, 
(London: Chartered Institute of Personnel Development, 2009), p. 129.  
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out on a Leicester based Asylum Seekers and Refugee Support Group. These observations 
were complemented by observing inter-ethnic interactions between Zimbabwean members 
of a Leicester based church.  
Although the observed church was not a home grown Zimbabwean church, the 
demographics of the Zimbabwean congregants were essential in analysing the patterns of 
interaction. Statistically, both the Shona and Ndebele were adequately represented in the 
church, although the Ndebele were slightly in the majority. The membership demographics 
in the church were in contrast to most Zimbabwean home grown churches where those 
from the Shona community were usually the majority.87 Revelations from both observations 
did not only assist in evaluating the reliability of the oral accounts on how Zimbabweans 
interact, but they also assisted in the compilation or modification of interview questions 
needed to clarify the recurring patterns of behaviour or interactions within the observed 
groups.  
In support of Rutledge M Denis’ suggestion, interview questions were not ‘abstractly’ 
constructed.88 A combination of personal historical memories and experiences, and 
utilisation of colonial and post-colonial data from secondary and primary sources proved to 
be invaluable in the drafting of the interview questions. The interview questions were semi-
structured around the themes of colonial and post-colonial era, migration and settlement, 
diaspora interactions and transnational links.89 The semi-structured themed questions 
allowed participants to talk ‘in the way that is meaningful to them, in a language that is not 
87 Zembe, ‘A Comparative Study’, pp.131-132. 
88 Rutledge M Denis, ‘Participant Observation’ in  Jon Stanfield, (ed)., Race and Ethnicity in Research (London: 
Sage, 1993), p. 64. 
89 See Appendix 1 p.355. 
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imposed by questionnaire.’90 Adopting a thematic approach when drafting the questions 
facilitated an informative exchange of views on sensitive issues such as those related to 
ethnicity. This allowed systematic and consistent critical evaluation on how the interview 
sessions were progressing in relation to the research’s aims and objectives.   
When discussing post-colonial events, the participants were occasionally allowed to digress 
within the framework of the research’s theme of post-colonial governance. The digression 
was invaluable in assessing the level of frustrations Zimbabweans in the diaspora and those 
resident in Zimbabwe have against the Zimbabwean government. Allowing the participants 
to digress encouraged responses as it assured the participants that their opinions are 
respected and they are not being manipulated by the research process. One of the intended 
aims during the interview sessions was to always allow the researcher not to be perceived 
by participants as ‘merely interested in facts’ but as a means in which they can express their 
views on life’s experiences and what constructs their identity.91 
Interviews can be a flexible tool for data collection that involuntarily enable ‘multisensory 
channels’ of communication to be used in interpreting information provided by 
interviewees. Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion and Keith Morrison identify ‘verbal’ and ‘non-
verbal’ cues as one of the most essential multisensory channels of communication during 
interview sessions.92 Interpretations of verbal and non-verbal cues did not only help to 
evaluate the progress of the interview session, that is, if the interviewees were still engaged 
with the interview session, but they also helped to identify the level of importance 
interviewees place on specific life experiences. 
90 John Griffiths, ‘Research and Religion’ in Laura Marks (ed.), Qualitative Research in Context (Henley-on-
Thames: Admap Publications, 2000), p. viii. 
91 Roberts, Biographical Research, p. 106. 
92 Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion and Keith Morrison, Research Methods in Education  (New York: Routledge, 
2011), p. 409. 
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Interpretations of the verbal and non-verbal cues when interviewing a Zimbabwean 
community whose history was punctuated by episodes of ethnic or racial tensions allowed 
flexibility to the interview sessions. In some instances, interview sessions had to respond to 
the cues by modifying the interview questions or constructing follow-on questions to elicit 
responses on sensitive issues which would have been communicated via the cues. This 
flexibility made it possible to meet the interviewees in their own world rather than from 
abstraction and general opinions.93 As a consequence, interpretation of these cues became 
an invaluable asset when discussing the sensitive issues mainly related to the impact of the 
1980s civil conflict on the Ndebele community. The verbal and non-verbal cues from a 
significant number of Ndebele participants allowed what Mathews and Ross refer to as 
‘unanticipated’ sensitive explanations to emerge and be explored.94 Probing sensitive issues 
picked up from the cues therefore provided a platform for both the researcher and the 
participants to sensitively analyse the impact of ethnic mistrust and suspicions on the 
Zimbabwean community in Britain. 
A group interview session of Zimbabwean youths aged between 21 and 28 years was also 
conducted to either complement or counter the information acquired from adult 
Zimbabweans’ oral accounts. These were young Zimbabwean adults who were born after 
Zimbabwe’s independence and would not have experienced or witnessed the political 
processes or historical events influencing the shaping of community relations or integration 
processes in the diaspora. To extract relevant information by encouraging collective 
discussion from young Zimbabweans who might be ignorant of Zimbabwe’s history, it was 
essential to adopt a dual-method approach as a means of soliciting effective participation. 
93 King ‚‘Qualitative Research Interview‘, p. 14. 
94 Mathews and Ross, Research Methods, p. 219. 
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Prior to the group interview, the youths were asked to complete a simple questionnaire. The 
aim was to put them at ease, thus boosting their confidence to participate in the group 
interview.  
A questionnaire entitled ‘What Makes You Zimbabwean?’ was deliberately constructed to 
assess the extent to which their awareness of Zimbabwe’s history and knowledge of 
Zimbabwean cultural heritage is impacting on how they construct their identity and 
relations with other Zimbabweans.95 The questionnaire’s multiple choice questions were 
basic, with the majority of them requiring either dates, or a no or yes answer. Based on the 
questionnaire responses, semi-structured and open-ended questions were then constructed 
for the group interview. These explored issues such as celebration of Zimbabwe national 
events, intermarriages, transnational links and generational conflicts. The group’s responses 
emerged to be invaluable when evaluating the extent to which historical events, especially 
those to do with ethnic conflicts, have now become part of a history that is failing to 
dismantle ethnic prejudices or tensions needed to construct cordial inter-community 
interactions.  
Awareness of the inevitability of discussing sensitive colonial and post-colonial ethnic and 
racial conflicts made it imperative to manage and maintain a balance between what Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison identify as the demands of pursuing the truth and participants’ values 
and rights to personal safety.96 Discussing politically sensitive legacies of colonial rule or 
political events after independence had the potential of compromising the safety of the 
participants if the information becomes public. As a result, it was critical for the research 
process to safeguard confidentiality and anonymity of all participants. Whilst interviews 
95 See Appendix 2 p. 359.  
96 Cohen,  Manion and Morrison, Research Methods in Education,  p. 75. 
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conducted in the confines of private spaces such as participants’ homes guaranteed some 
privacy, anonymity was safeguarded by ensuring that participants remain nameless through 
the use of pseudonyms.  
The political and social risks of the information sought required mature individuals capable 
of making informed decisions on whether to participate or not in the research. As a result, 
the research process deliberately excluded children below the age of 18 years who might 
not fully comprehend the political consequences of the information if it becomes public. To 
make certain that all participants voluntarily took part, the principle of informed consent 
was applied. To guide them in making that informed consent, the participants were 
furnished with a summary of the research consisting of the research’s title, aims, objectives, 
themes and key questions. All participants were therefore required to sign a consent form 
with contact details of both the researcher and the first supervisor. Signing of the consent 
form with contact details gave the participants control of how they could respond if they 
believed the research would be handled in a way which would not guarantee their 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
 Parallel to providing participants with information which would lead to voluntary consent to 
participate, the potential participants’ were also assured ‘self-determination’ which was the 
right to withdraw their consent even after they have been interviewed.97 In a Zimbabwean 
diaspora community riddled with mistrust and suspicions engrained in historical 
experiences, affirmation of self-determination was a crucial component of the interview 
process. The right to self-determination would empower the participants by giving them a 
voice to withdraw from the research process if after the interview session they believed the 
97 Ibid. 
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research’s outcome might compromise their safety with community members who might 
not have similar shared historical experiences.  
Although all participants had the right to withdraw their consent, it was also essential to 
provide clarity on the length of time the participants had to exercise the right to withdraw 
that consent. To deal with the dilemma of agreeing on the length of withdrawal rights and 
the researcher’s aim of meeting thesis completion deadline, participants were provided with 
the research timetable. Access to the timetable was always preceded by explanation that 
the right to withdraw ceases when the write-up period commences. Participants’ awareness 
of the timetable became an essential component in providing that clarity which leads to 
informed decisions on whether to participate or not.   
It was also essential to recognise that migrating from a background of ethnic or racial 
tensions would have resulted in what Routledge M Denis described as conflicting and 
misleading reasons to be willing participants in sharing secrets of sensitive information.98 He 
alludes to the fact that sharing of such information can be influenced by selfish reasons of 
either wanting to get back at individuals or as a means of correcting the perceived bias of 
existing written sources. Denis’ argument was of relevance when interviewing Zimbabweans 
who believe they have been the victims of colonial racist policies and Zimbabwe’s post-
colonial failures in uniting the nation. The prospect of variances in the interpretation of 
Zimbabwe’s history was always going to be feasible when discussing particular issues such 
as Whites’ colonial privileges or civil conflict of the 1980s. Therefore, to avoid the research 
process becoming a source of instigating further ethnic disharmony, there was no sharing of 
98 Denis, ‘Participant Observation’, p. 68. 
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information given by one respondent or ethnic group with another. Further clarification of 
issues was only pursued by continuous modification of the questions during interviews. 
Mathews and Ross point out how essential it is for interviewees to respond in their own way 
using their own words which can be expressed in the participants’ language.99 However, my 
inability to speak the Ndebele language failed to provide the platform for the Ndebele to 
express themselves in their natural language. Instead, there were instances when the failure 
to converse in the Ndebele language created uneasy moments during interview sessions 
with some Ndebele participants. The development of an uneasy atmosphere could have 
been associated with perceptions of language genocide during the 1980s civil conflict when 
the Ndebele people were forced to speak Shona.  
To undermine any subtle language barriers, concerted effort was made to create an 
environment that would not resuscitate the post-colonial language sentiments. Greetings 
were always in the Ndebele language before asking the individual whether they would like 
to be interviewed in either English or Shona; even when it was known that the participant 
was fluent in Shona. Whether the participant opted to speak in either Shona or English, 
there was also deliberate and sporadic use of familiar Ndebele phrases. The effort to speak 
in Ndebele was instrumental in creating relaxed interview sessions, thus minimising 
language tensions as it would have consolidated mutual relationship. As a result, most oral 
accounts of those from the Ndebele community were provided in an interchangeable 
mixture of both Shona and English, punctuated by the use of Ndebele words or phrases to 
emphasize certain issues which the interviewee would immediately translate to either 
Shona or English.  
99 Mathews and Ross, Research Methods, p. 221. 
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Parallel to challenges of ethnicity within the Black community, the process of choosing 
potential interviewees also encountered racial challenges. With suppressed inter-racial 
interactions prior to emigration, it was an inevitable outcome that identifying visible 
communities of White, Coloured and Asian Zimbabweans in Britain would be difficult. Some 
of those identified were reluctant to participate in the interview process. Reasons for the 
reluctance to participate were a direct consequence of colonial legacies and the failure by 
the post-colonial government to facilitate the creation of a unified national identity.  
The assertion explaining why Whites were reluctant to participate was made by one of the 
White interviewees, Elizabeth, who had been of great assistance in identifying potential 
interviewees. Six of the eight Whites interviewed were identified by her. These were her 
Facebook contacts whom she assumed would not harbour historical prejudices or bitterness 
to decline the invitation to be interviewed. However, despite her anticipation of positive 
responses only six of the fifteen potential interviewees indicated their willingness to 
participate. It was the high rate of decline that made her identify the circumstances 
surrounding Whites’ emigration as the main reason they would want to participate in a 
research process conducted by a Black Zimbabwean.  
Elizabeth’s explanation of why so many Whites were refusing to participate was a plausible 
one considering that Whites who left in the early 1980s had failed to adjust to changes in 
the political environment that had ushered in a Black led government whilst the second 
wave of white migration at the turn of the new millennium consisted of those who migrated 
as a direct consequence of violently losing their farms. It was therefore inevitable for the 
diasporic White community not only to be bitter towards Blacks, but also to mistrust Blacks, 
especially if asked to provide oral accounts of their life’s experiences. Refusing to be 
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interviewed was one way of channelling that bitterness and mistrust. It had therefore 
became a frequent occurrence that in addition to the formalities of guaranteeing anonymity 
and confidentiality, the older White participants would feel comfortable if the person who 
would have introduced them to me re-emphasised the guarantees.    
To ensure a more detailed and comprehensive analysis on how the Zimbabwean community 
of Whites is constructing their identities and integration processes in Britain, the research 
also consulted the online Facebook community. The White Zimbabwean immigrants, still 
identifying themselves as Rhodesians, had established a strong virtual community on 
Facebook to provide information on events and news, and to offer a platform to discuss 
issues such as politics back in Zimbabwe, migration, employment or pensions. Consultation 
of the virtual community was essential in evaluating the extent to which some members of 
the white community have been willing to integrate with the Black community whilst 
stimulating that consciousness of a community identity based on past experiences. 
Just like with Whites, identifying and accessing potential Coloureds and Asians interviewees 
was a challenge. With Coloured Zimbabweans, the issues of identity and perceptions of 
marginalisation by both the colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwean government had 
resulted in a significant number of those in Britain adopting a separatist attitude from other 
ethnic or racial Zimbabwean communities. Asians on the other hand imported their 
Zimbabwean attitudes of separation from other Zimbabwean ‘races’ by assimilating 
themselves into Asian communities in cities like Leicester and Slough where there is a large 
Asian population. The difficulties in identifying Coloured and Asian interviewees were 
further exacerbated by the demographics of the Zimbabwean population in which both 
communities accounted for less than 1% of the overall population. 
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A rise of internet ‘Diasporic Media’ recognised by Winston Mano and Wendy Willems to 
have been set up by former Zimbabwean journalists to cater for the increasing Zimbabwean 
population in the diaspora provided a more critical perspective on how the Zimbabwean 
communities are constructing their identities in Britain.100 Websites such as 
‘newzimbabwe.com’ and ‘newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk’ were invaluable in covering a wide 
range of issues relating to the everyday life of Zimbabwean immigrants. The issues covered 
included: domestic or family problems; issues to do with immigration such as asylum 
applications; criminal activities; celebration of individual achievements and political 
activism. Discussions on the websites have also been invaluable in exposing the ethnic 
divisions within the Black community.   
To ensure a broader and credible assessment of colonial or post-colonial events that have 
been influencing the construction of a Zimbabwean community in Britain, five interviews 
were also conducted in Zimbabwe. However, conducting interviews in Zimbabwe was not 
immune from what David Henige identifies as ‘political’ and ‘cultural hurdles’ of working in a 
different society.101 Hostile political relations between Britain and Zimbabwe since the farm 
invasions of 2000 carried the potential of raising suspicion from Zimbabwe’s political and 
security authorities. Conducting interviews during the July 2013 presidential and 
parliamentary elections also required a high degree of caution to personal safety at a time 
when there was risk of unpredictable political violence. Therefore, to minimise any political 
suspicions that would have threatened the researcher’s personal safety, potential 
interviewees were identified prior to travelling. 
100 Winston Mano and Wendy Willems, ‘Debating Zimbabweanness in Diasporic Internet Forums: Technologies 
of Freedom’ in Macgregor and Primorac, Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora, p .187.  
101 David Henige, Oral Historiography (London: Longman, 1982), p. 60. 
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The envisaged access to Zimbabwe’s archival records of newspapers exploring post-colonial 
political events also turned out to be a challenge. Without a computerised system of 
retrieving archived newspapers, I was only able to access limited number of newspapers. 
The accessed newspapers of the early 1980s period were invaluable in providing 
information on post-colonial reconciliation of a society which for ninety years had been 
defined by ethnic or racial prejudices. The information retrieved from the newspapers 
enabled the evaluation of post-colonial government initiatives in incorporating different 
ethnicities and races into the socio-economic and political echelons of the country. 
The testimonies of the fifty-nine participants complemented by secondary and primary 
sources unravelled how the impact of ethno-racial prejudices and traumas developed and 
nurtured during the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe’s history facilitated the 
construction of memories whose influences were not to be restricted in Zimbabwe but were 
to extend into the diaspora. With post-war migration and settlement of immigrants 
continuing to attract academic historians, the overarching aim of the thesis will be to 
provide original arguments to academic debates seeking to understand the impact of 
historic memories or experiences on dynamics of community relations and integration 
processes.  
Zimbabweans, as a relatively contemporary non-European immigrant community falls in the 
category of migrants with a lower academic profile than those from the Caribbean or South 
Asia. Focusing on the relatively small Zimbabwean immigrant community is therefore 
recognition of Britain’s migrant communities becoming increasingly diverse. Seeking to 
understand the construction of the diaspora Zimbabwean community in the next three 
thematic chapters will be illustrated by three distinct, but overlapping themes. These are: 
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Chapter 1 
colonial and post-colonial development of racial and ethnic consciousness; the influence of 
imported historically identities on relations between the diaspora Zimbabwean 
communities; and the historical significance on the dynamics of Zimbabweans’ economic 





The Dynamics of Ethnic Prejudices and Identities:  
The Transformation of Society in Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s journey towards ‘unquestioned national identity’ has been described by Brian 
Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo as a ‘dangerous fantasy, one that could not conceal the 
faultlines of ethnicity, class, gender and race that marked the terrain of Zimbabwe’s 
history.’1 This was because: the socio-economic and political structures of the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial periods set in motion salient discourses instrumental in 
constructing prejudices and identities which determined interactions between Zimbabwe’s 
multi-ethnic communities and Zimbabweans’ interaction with the country’s socio-economic 
structures. The chapter’s critical examination of each phase of Zimbabwe’s history is 
therefore essential in unveiling and engaging the prejudices and identities which have 
played a critical role in the constructions of relations between Zimbabwean immigrant 
communities in Britain and their socio-economic integration patterns. 
The chapter’s historical narrative of the transient nature of Zimbabwe’s society (which form 
the basis of discussions in chapters three and four) is divided into three chronologically 
structured sections: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. The first section is a brief 
assessment on how the arrival of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe during the first half of the 
nineteenth century marked the start of the construction of a fragmented African community 
riddled by ethnic tensions. The ethnic tensions between the Shona, who saw themselves as 
the indigenous population of Zimbabwe, and the Ndebele, who the Shona perceived as 
1 Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, ‘The Hard Road to Becoming National’ in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois 
Mlambo, A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009),  
p. xvii. 
 





invaders, evolved into an effective colonial apparatus which was to be used by the British in 
the colonisation process. 
 The chapter’s second section, which focuses on the colonial era, starts by examining how 
the British colonial administration capitalised on the ethnic tensions by delivering the ‘divide 
and rule’ agenda needed to control the African community. Parallel to the implementation 
of the ‘divide and rule’ agenda was the colonial administration’s response to changes in the 
racial demographics of the population. There were deliberate efforts by the administration 
to construct a society in which race would be a significant community identifier. The colonial 
population was racially categorised into three hierarchical graded categories consisting of: 
Europeans (Whites); Coloureds and Asians of Indian descent; and Natives.2 It was this racial 
categorisation which became the basis upon which the colonial government was to 
introduce discriminatory legislation to determine access to the country’s economic 
resources and political participation. The racial categorisation of the population had 
therefore placed colonial Zimbabwe on a racial path demarcated by racially exclusionary 
barriers which were naturally going to have an impact on future community relations.  
It was under this racist discourse permeating colonial Zimbabwe’s society that the 
Nationalist Movement was created to spearhead the struggle for independence. However, 
the chapter’s second section’s examination of ethnic relations establishes how the 
nationalist movement became a contradictory movement as it failed to develop ideologies 
of uniting polarised African communities. The Nationalist Movement comprising the Shona 
dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) political party and Ndebele dominated 
2 James Muzondidya, ‘Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans: Invisible Subject Minorities and the Quest for Justice and 
Reconciliation in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe’ in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage (Eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice 
and Political Reconciliation (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), p. 214. 
 





Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) political party became embroiled with ethnic 
allegiances as both parties galvanised support within their respective ethnic communities. It 
was the reincarnation of the ethnic tensions within the nationalist movement which were to 
put a strain on nation building policies in post-colonial Zimbabwe.  
Upon attaining independence on 18 April 1980 the new Shona dominated ZANU PF 
government of Robert Mugabe faced insurmountable challenges in uniting a nation 
polarised by both racial and ethnic differences. The chapter’s third section examines these 
challenges faced by Mugabe’s government in redressing colonial injustices, prejudices and 
identities. However, section three’s analysis of the challenges faced by the new government 
will be incomplete without recognising how post-colonial nation building initiatives were 
undermined by the complex political events leading to Zimbabwe’s independence. Without 
an outright armed victory by the nationalist movement, the success of any post-colonial 
nation building policies were to a large extent dependent on how far the White community 
would be honest participants in the process of reconciliation.  
Parallel to government initiatives in seeking reconciliation with the White community, was 
the need to deal with historical tensions between the Shona and the Ndebele. The 
Matabeleland military insurgency in response to what they perceived as persecution and 
marginalisation of the Ndebele by Mugabe’s government emerged to be the most 
significant event in constructing post-colonial ethnic relations. It was the unfolding of post-
colonial civil conflict during the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence which has led to 
conclusions that Zimbabwe’s post-colonial reconciliation policies were devoid of nation 





reconciliation with the Whites whilst putting less emphasis on dealing with historic Shona-
Ndebele tensions. 
The Pre-Colonial Era: Migration of the Ndebele 
Drawing on research on pre-colonial Zimbabwe, David Beach concluded that prior to the 
arrival of the Ndebele, the Zimbabwean plateau was inhabited by communities of co-
existing Shona speaking chieftaincies with a simple ethnic history.3  The term ‘Shona’ was a 
collective noun conflating the linguistic, cultural and political attributes of a community of 
people who did not identify themselves with that term until the late nineteenth century.4 
Although the Shona were orientated in different directions by military and trading links, 
David Maxwell points out how they ‘shared a common political and religious repertoire.’5 As 
a result, the pre-colonial Shona chiefdoms had escaped political instability or hostilities 
associated with competing religious systems or centralised political and military structures.6 
Speaking the same language differentiated by regional dialects preserved a loose cultural 
identity which facilitated socio-economic interactions and political co-operation between 
the different Shona communities.  
Under the religious guidance of ancestral spirits, the pre-colonial relations between the 
Shona speaking chiefdoms were often dynamic, characterised by complex relations of 
conflict and co-operation facilitated through marriages, political alliances and population 
3 David Beach, Zimbabwe Before 1900 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984), p. 5. 
4 Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, ‘Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe 1850-1880s’, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois 
Mlambo (Eds),, A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe (Harare: Weaver Press, 
2009),  p. 3. 
5 David Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People c. 1870s-1990s 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p.11.  
6 Beach, ‘Zimbabwe Before 1900’, p. 5. 





movement.7 The occasional clashes were not constructed by external non-Shona foreign 
forces, neither were they driven by ethnic or regional superiority. Instead, Gerald Chikozho 
Mazarire argues that they were usually internally constructed conflicts responding to socio-
economic and political forces. With pastoralism and agriculture forming the basis of the 
economy as highlighted by Mazarire, it was inevitable that as human and livestock 
population increased, violent skirmishes would occur over control and ownership of 
pastoral, farming and hunting land.8  
Maxwell brings out a political argument in reinforcing the argument that Shona conflicts 
were usually internally instigated. He notes how political succession was a critical time that 
often prompted internal instability. In polygamous societies, succession by means of 
collateral inheritance in which chieftaincy would be passed from brother to brother 
inevitably created conflicts.9 Although chieftaincy was expected to rotate between houses, 
peaceful transitions would end if one house forcefully retained title.  
However, the arrival of the Ndebele in the nineteenth century ushered in a transformational 
phase in Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political structures by setting in motion the 
gradual development of antagonistic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. The 
Ndebele originated as a small clan in South Africa under the leadership of Mzilikazi a trusted 
general under Zulu nation leader Shaka.  Mzilikazi and his small Khumalo clan (later to be 
7 James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu Gatsheni, ‘Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 
1980-2007’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 7(2007), pp. 275-297. 
8 Chikozho Mazarire, ‘Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe c850-1880s’, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, A 
History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, pp. 36-37.  
9 Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe, p.11. 





known as the Ndebele) were forced to emigrate after Mzilikazi refused to hand over to 
Shaka ‘spoils’ captured after a successful battle in June 1822.10 
After years of migration, looking for a safe place to settle permanently, the small Khumalo 
clan managed to expand and ‘broadcast’ its power over people of different ethnicity 
through ‘raiding, conquest, assimilation and incorporation.’11 By the time they settled and 
occupied the south western part of the Zimbabwean plateau in 1839, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
points out how the Ndebele had not only used their language Isindebele (Ndebele) as a 
uniting factor, but they had also inculcated Ndebele values over the different assimilated 
and incorporated people.12 
Upon settling in south western Zimbabwe, the Ndebele used the advantage of a centralised 
political and military structure under the leadership of king Mzilikazi to consolidate their 
political presence by ‘plunder, pillage and violent raids upon their Shona neighbours.’13 The 
absence of a centralised political or military Shona system allowed the Ndebele to exert 
their influence on the majority Shona communities. The fragmented Shona communities 
could not organise themselves into a unified force to resist Ndebele invasions.  As a result, 
defeated Shona communities who resisted Ndebele excursions were either captured to 
work as slaves or herdsmen, or were forced to pay tribute.14 
As the Ndebele consolidated their settlement, Ndlovu-Gatsheni acknowledges how the 
Shona started to view the Ndebele not only as foreigners, but also as an offshoot of the 
10 Alfred John Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
p.63. 
11 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nation-Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism,’ African 









‘militaristic and brutal kingdom of Shaka.’15 A significant consequence of the skirmishes 
between the Shona and the Ndebele was a stimulation of a consciousness within the Shona 
communities that they were culturally different to the new arrivals; a particularistic 
consciousness which allowed the term Shona to gradually evolve from being a linguistic 
identifier to a major ethnic identifier.16 The violent nature of Ndebele-Shona early 
interactions had marked the beginning of antagonistic attitudes which were to determine 
future relations between the two communities.  
With the Ndebele transforming the demography of the society, it was therefore not 
surprising that by the time the British arrived in Zimbabwe they were able to identify a 
tension riddled African community with linguistic, cultural and historical differences. Taking 
advantage of the diversity, the British colonial process of controlling the Africans would be 
based on the implementation of a ‘divide and rule’ agenda influenced by how they 
perceived the two communities. The Ndebele military excursions on the Shona would prove 
to be a crucial determinant in the development of perceptions the British would use in 
constructing strategies on how to colonise Zimbabwe.  
Colonisation Process 
The British developed a colonisation process based on a mythical conviction that the Shona 
were a defenceless community routinely brutalised by the Ndebele kingdom’s raids and 
were therefore appreciative to the Whites for stopping the brutality. It was this fictitious 
conviction which determined the implementation of the ‘divide and rule’ agenda the British 
would use to systematically annex Zimbabwe whilst minimising suspicion of their intentions.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Mazarire, ‘Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe c850-1880s’, p.3. 





The ‘divide and rule’ process based on misguided perceptions was incarnated when the 
British exclusively approached the Ndebele as authoritative sole representatives of 
Zimbabweans by wielding what Ndlovu-Gatsheni refers to as ‘stick and carrot diplomacy.’17 
The rationale behind the divisive’ stick and carrot diplomacy’ was that, unlike the Shona, the 
Ndebele posed a greater military threat and therefore needed to be appeased. 
The British ‘stick and carrot’ diplomacy was embedded in the fraudulent and fictitious 
treaties signed with the Ndebele; treaties which were to pave the way for the colonisation 
of Zimbabwe. The most effective treaty in the colonial process was the Rudd Concession of 
1888 in which Mzilikazi’s successor Lobengula, gave Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) permission to hunt, mine and trade in Ndebele territory.18 In return, 
Lobengula was deceived into a false sense of security when he was offered rifles, 
ammunitions and a steamboat.19 However, the most significant deception of the Rudd 
Concession was ingrained in the route the BSAC’S Pioneer Column was going to use to enter 
Zimbabwe. The Pioneer Column was a group of approximately one thousand White soldiers 
and settlers recruited by BSAC from the British inhabitants in neighbouring South Africa.20 
To avoid clashes with the Ndebele, the Pioneer Column moving north from South Africa 
started the colonisation process by annexing territories occupied by the Shona communities 
on the Eastern side of Matabeleland.21  The aim was to control Mashonaland and make it 
17 Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘The Post-Colonial State and Matabeleland: Regional Perceptions of Civil-Military 
Relations, 1980–2002’, in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams (Eds), Ourselves to Know: Civil-
Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2003), 
pp. 17-38.  
18 Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, pp. 134-136. 
19 Ibid. 
20 James R Arnold and Roberta Wiennar, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe (Minneapolis: Twenty First Century 
Books, 2008), p. 15. 
21 Ibid.  





safe so as to allow the settlers to explore the region for mining and farming claims.22 Each 
member of the column had been promised ‘to mark out a three thousand acre farm and peg 
up to fifteen gold claims’ on arrival in Mashonaland.23 Without much resistance from the 
Shona, the Pioneer Column raised the Union Jack flag on 12 September 1890 in Salisbury 
(Harare) to signify the annexation of Mashonaland.24 By entering through what was 
perceived as militarily weaker Shona territories, the Pioneer Column did not only avoid 
confrontation with the Ndebele, but they also gave themselves enough time to consolidate 
their economic and political presence in Mashonaland whilst waiting for the perfect 
opportunity to attack the Ndebele.  
It was not long before the antagonistic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele 
provided Rhodes with that opportunity to invade Matabeleland in 1893. The sequence of 
events which triggered the invasion started when the BSAC confiscated a herd of cattle in 
retaliation of Shona tribesmen’s stealing telegraph wire in Fort Victoria area (Masvingo).25 
Although the cattle were returned after Lobengula protested that they belonged to the 
Ndebele (since the Shona were looking after the herd as proof of submission), Ndebele 
warriors on 9 July massacred the insubordinate Shona subjects as punishment for cattle 
rustling.26 The attack and massacre of the Shona by the Ndebele gave Cecil Rhodes that long 
awaited legal mandate to attack the Ndebele on the pretext of protecting their economic 
interests since the Shona formed the bulk of the labour force on White owned farms and 
mines.  
22 Ibid., p.15. 
23 Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, p. 140. 
24 Ibid, p.142. 
25 Stanlake Samkange, Origins of Rhodesia (London: Heinemann. 1968), p.243. 
26 Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, p. 148. 





Despite encountering ‘determined and better organised’ Ndebele warriors, the Ndebele 
succumbed to British invasion when Lobengula fled north following the capture of his 
capital, Bulawayo on 4 November.27 Within a few months after the departure and 
subsequent death of Mzilikazi in early 1894, Matabeleland came under British control and 
ceased to exist as an independent kingdom. However, the differences in the period of 
annexation and comparative analysis of the speed at which it took place between 
Mashonaland and Matabeleland, resulted in the development of a divisive military 
discourse between the Shona and the Ndebele. Encouraged by their military resistance, the 
Ndebele developed a narrative which stimulated a consciousness that unlike the Shona, 
their military prowess was the reason why Mashonaland was occupied (first) whilst 
Matabeleland was conquered last (because of Ndebele military resistance).28 
Consciousness of Ndebele military superiority over the Shona would be further reinforced 
during the unsuccessful 1896-1897 African uprisings. The uprising was described by Terence 
Ranger to have been started by the Ndebele in March 1896 with the Shona following suit in 
June.29 Despite starting the uprising, Ranger points out how the Ndebele, even when faced 
with inevitable defeat, managed to negotiate a conditional surrender settlement.30 
Although the surrender ended the existence of a centralised Ndebele Kingdom, terms of the 
conditional settlement allowed the Ndebele leaders to assume positions as salaried chiefs in 
charge of local areas whilst paving the way for displaced Ndebele to return to their homes 
as tenants of the BSAC.31  
27 Ibid, pp.150-151. 
28 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nation-Building in Zimbabwe’, pp. 27-56. 
29 Terence Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930 (London: Heinemann, 1970), pp. 1-3.  
30 Ibid, p.26. 
31 Ibid. 





Despite living as tenants whilst paying rent to BSAC signalled the loss of title to their land, 
the terms of the settlement allowed the Ndebele to preserve their identity. In contrast to 
Ndebele’s treatment, there was no provision of a negotiated settlement with the majority 
Shona community following their defeat. Undermining of Shona authority in comparison to 
the Ndebele was captured by Ranger when he explained how the Shona leaders of the 
revolt surrendered unconditionally and by 1898 most had been put on trial and hanged.32 
The process in the colonisation of Zimbabwe had therefore created a new frontier in Shona-
Ndebele relations. Whilst the Ndebele gloated over what they perceived as military 
superiority over the Shona, Lobengula’s signing of the Rudd Concession had also made them 
vulnerable to Shona accusations that they were foreigners who sold the country to the 
British. The ‘divide and rule’ agenda implemented during the annexation process had 
therefore created a favourable environment for mistrust, prejudices and ethnic allegiances 
to influence the progression of Shona-Ndebele relations throughout Zimbabwe’s history; 
whose impact was to be felt by subsequent colonial and post-colonial diaspora 
communities.  
The Colonial Era 
After the successful annexation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the colonial 
administration officially stimulated and consolidated a consciousness of ethnic particularism 
to effectively divide and rule the African community.33 As shown by the map below (Figure 
Four), the realisation of the diversity within the African communities resulted in the creation 
of ethnic named provincial administration regions. This formalisation of ethnicity did not 
32 Ibid., p. 1. 
33 Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990),  p.170. 





only raise the awareness of belonging to a particular community in which  individuals would 
feel safe when surrounded by those of the same ethnicity,  but it also created an 
environment in which communalism had the potential of evolving into an emotive and 
potent ideology.   
Figure Four: Provinces in Colonial Zimbabwe 
 
Source: British South Africa Police, ‘Police Provinces and Districts with Principal Centres’ 
Available on http://bsap.org/images/rhodesiaprovinces.jpg (First Visited 22 June 2014) 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni affirms the significance of ethnic particularist ideology within the first 
three decades of colonial rule. He describes how associations such as the ‘National Home 





instrumental in defining Ndebele’s particularism by regularly attacking the Shona working in 
Bulawayo claiming Ndebele is their city.34 The name change of Bulawayo residential area 
from Rufaro Township (Rufaro is a Shona word meaning happiness) to Njube Township 
(Njube was one of the sons of Lobengula) served to consolidate Ndebele’s particularism by 
excluding Shona references in Matabeleland.35 The Shona also responded by forming their 
own ethnic based society, such as the ‘Sons of Mashonaland Cultural Society’.36  
The creation of ethnic or sub-linguistic named regional and administration boundaries had 
therefore become a significant factor in defining relations within the confines of the colonial 
capitalist system that had forced Africans of different ethnicity to migrate into towns in 
search of employment. Enocent Msindo further argues that although the ethnic associations 
provided the perfect environment for the emergence of African nationalist leaders, they 
failed to stop the influences of ethnic allegiances in the Nationalist Movement.37 
Nationalism and ethnicity were now firmly established in the African community as co-
determinants of future relations between the Shona and the Ndebele.  
Parallel to the official stimulation of ethnic particularism was the colonial administration’s 
response to the racial transformation of Zimbabwe’s demographics. As the White 
population increased, Zimbabwe’s population ceased to be homogenously classified as 
being Black. As a result, the colonial administration had to recognise the racial 
transformation of the population by implementing policies to ensure that racial boundaries 
were clearly defined. To facilitate this, the population was hierarchically classified into three 
34 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘National Building in Zimbabwe ‘, pp. 27-56. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Enocent Msindo, ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950 to 1963’, Journal 
of African History, vol.48 (2007), pp. 267-90. 
 





categories based on presumptions of racial purity and fears of transgressed racial 
boundaries.  
The hierarchical classification of the colonial population was an effective catalyst in the 
creation of imagined racial boundaries which were not to be transgressed when competing 
for the country’s resources. Whites were placed at the top of the hierarchical ladder with 
Africans condemned to the lowest threshold. Coloureds and Asians as occupants of the 
second place became part of a small but significant intermediate category. Access to the 
colonial state’s economic resources or political participation was determined by the position 
within the racially graded hierarchical structure of the population.38 Racial categorisation of 
the population had therefore established itself not only as a dominant signifier of 
community identity, but also a determinant of the individual’s position in a society where 
Africans would subtly be constantly reminded that they were now subjugated people.   
The pervasive nature of racism embedded in the hierarchical categorisation of the 
population meant that Africans would experience the worst racial discrimination in the 
economic, social and political structures of the colonial society. Lucy Mazingi and Richard 
Kamidza point out how Blacks had limited access to basic social services such as education, 
health and other social amenities while the best services were accorded to the White settler 
communities.39 As occupiers of the second strand in the hierarchical structure, Mazingi and 
Kamidza further disclose how Asian and Coloured communities accessed the medium-range 
38 James Muzondidya ‘Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans: Invisible Subject Minorities and the Quest for Justice and 
Reconciliation in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe’, in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage, Zimbabwe: Injustice and 
Political Reconciliation (Cape Town: Institute for Justice, 2004), p. 214. 
39 Lucy Mazingi and Richard Kamidza , ‘Inequality in Zimbabwe’ in Herbert Jauch and Deprose Muchena, eds 
Tearing us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa (Johannesburg:  Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 
2011), p.323.  





services.40 The classification of the Zimbabwean colonial population had therefore not only 
condemned Africans to restricted upward social mobility, but had also placed Zimbabwe on 
a racial path punctuated by exclusionary barriers which were to determine future relations 
between the racially segregated communities. 
Whilst the racial categorisation of the population created racial boundaries, it failed to 
recognise the complexities of pre-colonial relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. 
Classifying the Shona and Ndebele as natives negated the historical fact that the Shona 
perceived the Ndebele as an immigrant ethnic community which settled in Zimbabwe during 
the early part of the nineteenth century. The unilateral classification of both the Shona and 
the Ndebele as natives was therefore not only redefining the indigenous population, it was 
also a creation of an African community with historical differences that needed to be 
addressed in any future nation building project.    
Although Coloureds had emerged to be a visible community within the population 
structures of the colonial state with clearly defined privileges over Blacks, Julie Kate Seirlis 
argues that the use of the name Coloured was ‘problematic’ as it implied people with no 
colour or too much colour.41 The rise in the Coloured population after 1901 was according 
to what Munyaradzi Mushonga described as a consequence of ‘rampant sex between white 
men and black women’ a trend that continued into the 1940s.42 These sexual relations with 
Black women were inevitable in an environment in which White men far exceeded the 
number of White women. For example in Bulawayo in 1895 there were 1 329 White men 
40 Ibid. 
41 Julie Kate Seirlis, ‘Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia1 1939–1980’, African Studies, 
vol. 63 (2004), pp. 73-93. 
42 Munyaradzi Mushonga, ‘White power, White desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rhodesia’, Journal of 
History and Culture, vol. 5 (2013), pp. 1-12. 





and 208 White women, whereas in Salisbury (Harare) there were 505 White man and 134 
White women.43 However, sexual relations between Black men and White women were 
greatly curtailed by the passing of legislation such as the ‘Immorality and Indecency 
Suppression Ordinance’ of 1903. The Act that criminalised sexual encounters between 
White women and Blacks was aimed at protecting White females from what was perceived 
as the ‘uncontrollable sexual drive of the non-white races and their limitless fertility’.44 The 
laws were therefore facilitating the development of racist stereotypes or prejudices which 
carried the potential of hindering intermarriages between Blacks and Whites.  
With most Coloureds being the offspring of relations between White men and African 
women, the colonial administration found it necessary to stimulate a Coloured 
consciousness guided by a philosophy that Coloureds were innately superior and more 
civilised than Africans. James Muzondidya states that Coloured children were removed from 
the rural African environment and placed in exclusive residential foster homes under the 
foster care of the White missionaries.45 With privileged access to health and education, the 
fostered Coloured children were conditioned to erase or undermine any potentialities of 
reclaiming their African identity by adopting English names and being forced to speak only 
English.46 
Pamela, a product of these residential homes from the age of eight, pointed out that there 
was a deliberate policy to create perceptions among Coloured girls that Black men were 
43 Ibid. 
44 Munyaradzi Mushonga, ‘White power, white desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rhodesia’, Zimbabwe 
African Journal of History and Culture, Vol. 5, (2013), pp. 1-12. 
45 James Muzondidya, Walking a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of Zimbabwe 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), p. 25. 
46 Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013. 





dangerous.47 She recalled how for their own safety they were instructed to ‘flee from a 
Black man towards a White man if they were to meet both men in a secluded area’.48  It was 
therefore inevitable that like most Coloured children, Pamela found her experience in the 
residential foster homes ‘psychologically traumatic.’ She struggled to construct an identity 
which disassociated herself from her African family; the only family she knew from birth.49  
 Pamela identified the deliberate instillation of the fear-factor towards Africans as one of 
the major reasons why most Coloured children faced an ’identity crisis’ as the families they 
knew as ’loving and caring’ were now being demonised as evil.  The colonial state’s 
deliberate policy of separating Coloured children from their African families had evolved 
into a ‘divide and rule’ tactic by the colonial state. Coloured children had been indoctrinated 
to appreciate the constructions of identities and interactions with Black Africans based on a 
racial superiority attitude of ‘them and us’.  
With a superiority mentality over Africans, it was therefore not surprising that a majority of 
Coloured children placed a premium on wanting to have white skin and straight hair.50 
Commenting on the ’want to be White’, Esther a Leicester based Coloured immigrant in her 
sixties explained how fairer skinned coloured children were envied as they were seen to be 
not indistinguishable from Whites. In contrast, those who were darker skinned with curly 
hair were usually despised as they were perceived to be indistinguishable from Blacks.51 The 
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‘an inordinate amount of time trying to make their skins lighter and their hair 
straightened’.52 
However, it would be misleading to conclude that all Coloured children escaped socio-
economic disenfranchisement by being placed in residential homes. Sixty year old Anita was 
one of those who could not be identified by the colonial administration or missionaries’ 
efforts of placing Coloured children in the residential foster homes. She identified the 
complexities of the circumstances surrounding her birth and up-bringing as the main 
reasons why she could not be identified for relocation into the residential homes.53 Her 
British born father had committed suicide before she was born following the exposure of 
the affair with her mother who was a farm labourer. Suicide had seemed to be the only 
option for her father who could not only not deal with the stigma of having an affair with a 
Black girl, but also with the expected punishment of being called up for military service.54  
The action by Anita’s father demonstrated the extent of the perils faced by White men 
attracted to African women who could not officialise the relationship because of pressure 
by those who wanted to maintain racial purity. John Pape illustrates the perils by 
highlighting how most White fathers often failed to acknowledge or support their Coloured 
children. This explains why as early as 1930 of the 1,138 Coloured children born from White 
fathers only 379 were acknowledged and supported; 139 were acknowledged but not 
provided for; 297 known but not acknowledged, and the rest did not know their father.55  
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With Anita’s mother dying shortly after birth from what she was told was a stress related 
illness caused by raising a child in a society that stigmatised single mothers with children 
born outside of marriage, she found herself being raised by her maternal grandparents.56 
Regrettably, her grandparents who were both illiterate failed to obtain a birth certificate 
that would have facilitated her registration as a Coloured. This would have allowed her to 
access government welfare privileges reserved for Coloured children such as exclusive 
education and health services. Without the opportunity to pursue education she got 
married to a Black businessman at sixteen. It was only after she took her eldest son to the 
hospital in the early 1970s that she became aware of the registration of Coloureds. This was 
after the White hospital administrator enquired why her son was being treated at an all-
Black wing of the hospital. By that time, her identity had been so engrained in the Black 
community that she did not attempt to identify herself with Coloureds of her generation.  
However, it has to be acknowledged that Anita’s experiences were not the norm. As 
occupiers of the second place in the population hierarchy, Muzondidya alludes to the fact 
that from an early age Coloureds had the potential of escaping economic disfranchisement 
experienced by a majority of Black Africans.57 It was a combination of these economic 
privileges and the creation of Coloured identity which made Coloureds vulnerable to 
Africans’ accusations that they could not be trusted as they had been modelled to be a 
buffer zone between the Black community and Whites.   It had become an irrefutable fact 
that some Africans would develop perceptions that a majority of Coloureds would rather 
collaborate with the colonial system than support any Black led political movement whose 
victory might lead to a potential loss of their privileges. The creation of a colonial Coloured 
56 Anita, Interview, 26 July 2013. 
57  Muzondidya, ‘Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans’ p. 216. 





community had therefore made it imperative that any future nation building initiatives 
would have to deal with the ‘dubious loyalties’ tag attached to the community by some 
within the Black community.    
Despite being recipients of socio-economic privileges not accessible to Blacks, Kelly Nims’ 
describes how a majority of Coloureds placed education at the periphery of their lives.58 
Trivialising education was a gradual process that happened when the quest of attaining 
economic mobility and stability by attaining better educational qualifications demonstrated 
by earlier generation of Coloureds failed to resonate with subsequent generations of the 
colonial era.59 These earlier generation Coloureds were described by Nims as individuals 
who had either been born in Zimbabwe or migrated from Cape Town.60   
Awareness of sustained marginalisation by Whites who were at the pinnacle of the 
hierarchical population structure created and consolidated the desire in subsequent 
generations to preserve Coloured consciousness and to have control over their own destiny 
by making choices that naturally trivialised self-development through education.61 There 
was general contentedness by a significant number of Coloured males to acquire technical 
skills that would allow them to be self-employed tradesmen.62 Patrick a fifty-year old ex-
Zimbabwean Coloured businessman living in Northampton pointed out that in most cases 
their skills would have been acquired through on the job training with no formal 
qualifications to prove their competence.63  
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The ultimate result of placing education at the periphery Coloureds’ lives was the 
construction of a consciousness within some that ‘education is simply not important for 
Coloureds.’64 Nurturing of that consciousness was to continue to be reinforced throughout 
Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial era. The long term consequence of failing to 
dismantle the consciousness of trivialising education emerged to be a significant factor that 
would influence the economic integration of the older members of the community in Britain 
(to be discussed in chapter four).  
To reinforce Coloured consciousness, young Coloureds were also able to use their verbal 
agility to reinforce their identity by developing a secret language known as ‘Kabid’.65 
Developing the language was evidence of the growth of a young politicised Coloured 
community that was determined to preserve their identity even if it meant going against the 
values of their parents or wider society. Development of the secret language would 
naturally result in mistrust of the Coloured community, especially when conversations 
would be conducted entirely in ‘Kabid’ in the presence of other ethnic communities. Using 
language to distance themselves from other Zimbabweans had therefore created a wedge 
with other ethnic communities which needed to be dismantled if a national identity was to 
be constructed in future generations of the post-colonial era.  
A majority of Asians, the co-occupants of the intermediate category with the Coloured 
community, have been identified by Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson as Indian immigrants 
who started settling in Zimbabwe in the nineteenth century.66 The 1911 census showed the 
64 Ibid. p. 186. 
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‘Asiatic’ population to be 870.67 Bella, a Zimbabwean based Asian in her late fifties spoke of 
how her grandfather was one of the early Indian immigrants to permanently settle in 
Zimbabwe as labourers seeking economic opportunities.68 A majority of these Indian 
immigrant labourers would have been motivated or assisted by kinsmen already established 
in neighbouring Mozambique and South Africa where they had settled to work on sugar 
cane plantations as labourers.69 Using their entrepreneurship skills Dotson and Dotson 
explain how the settled Indian immigrants quickly established themselves as a close knit 
community of successful traders and shop-owners competing with White entrepreneurs for 
African customers and labour supply.70 
However, it was not long before Asian business activities emerged to be the main 
determinant in influencing the nature of relations with both Black Africans and Whites. As 
Asians were establishing their businesses, Dotson and Dotson allude to the fact that Africans 
were simultaneously constructing perceptions that Indians were not different from the 
White settlers in regards to the exploitative treatment of Blacks.71 Using an Asian 
shopkeeper as an example to highlight the exploitation of Africans, Dotson and Dotson 
reveal that a master-servant relation developed between Asians and Africans in which 
Africans were either seen as a customer across the counter or as a shop assistant 
employee.72 Using their entrepreneurial skills especially in buying and selling to the Black 
population, Dotson and Dotson explain that it was not long before the settled Indians 
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started competing with Whites for a niche within the developing economy as market 
gardeners, traders and shop-owners.73 
Describing the master-servant relationship, Gutu, a Black Zimbabwean in his sixties spoke of 
how the phrase huya tingapangane (come let us negotiate) became synonymous with 
Asians’ tricks of wanting to exploit African customers or employees.74 The exploitation 
would either be in the form of underpayment of wages or being sold over-priced cheap 
quality products.75 This master-servant relationship between Asians and Africans had 
therefore placed Africans in a position to persuade themselves to believe that they would 
always be at risk of exploitation by Asians. This marked the development of relations 
between the two communities based to a large extent on suspicion and mistrust, with no 
intent of establishing interactions outside the business environment.  
Despite their shared category as occupiers of the second threshold in the racial 
categorisation of the population, Dotson and Dotson describe the relations between 
Coloureds and Asians as not always intimate.76 Asians’ negativity towards Coloureds was 
usually triggered by perceptions that Coloureds (because of their mixed heritage) were a 
representation of cultural abyss which can be seen as too Europeanised.77 Asians saw 
themselves as ‘puritanical’ in principle and practice, and therefore any limited interaction 
with Coloureds would safeguard them from moral or cultural contamination.78 Asian 
attitudes towards coloureds and the nature of their socio-economic relationship with Blacks 
73 Ibid. p. 37. 
74 Gutu, Interview 24 July 2013. 
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made them vulnerable to greater scrutiny on whether they would be honest participants in 
future nation building initiatives both in Zimbabwe and in the diaspora. 
Although Coloureds and Asians would have been accorded better privileges and rights than 
Africans they were usually on the periphery in any socio-economic propaganda by the 
colonial state. The Rhodesian propaganda seemed to promote images of White and Black 
soldiers serving in the army as happy comrades whilst Coloureds and Asians were 
completely left out.79 The representation of Coloureds and Asians in the military denied 
them the opportunity to build political credibility necessary to develop a strong national 
identity. Building a strong identity as Zimbabweans would have been a critical prerequisite 
in how Coloureds and Asians were going to manage the political transition from Colonial 
Zimbabwe to independent Zimbabwe.   
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
The creation of a Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 that united the British 
Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) with Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) also had a significant impact on colonial Zimbabwe’s racial 
demographics. The transformation of the population was to a large extent inextricably 
linked with the economic reasons for the establishment of the Federation.  Alois Mlambo 
argues that the need by the British settlers to utilise the economic benefits of Northern 
Rhodesia’s copper mines and Southern Rhodesia’s diversified economy of manufacturing, 
mining and agriculture was an important factor which influenced the creation of the 
79 Seirlis, ‘Undoing the United Front?’, pp. 73-93. 





Federation.80 However, the diversity of Southern Rhodesia’s economy resulted in the 
country emerging to be the main economic beneficiary with the fastest and strongest 
growth in manufacturing industries.81  It was this imbalance in economic benefits between 
the member countries of the Federation which triggered the racial transformation of the 
Southern Rhodesian population.  
The inevitable consequence of the rapid expansion of the Southern Rhodesia economy was 
an influx of Whites from neighbouring South Africa and from Europe, all hoping to gain 
access to the country’s economic prosperity.82 Mlambo identifies the majority of European 
economic immigrants during the Federation period as demobilised British soldiers and 
ordinary British citizens fleeing the harsh post-war living conditions in Britain.83 The  
economic benefits provided by Zimbabwe had become what Fay Chung described as a 
‘haven for Whites’ particularly the White working class who were enjoying a higher living 
standard than their compatriots in Britain.84 
It was this rapid increase in White immigration from within Africa and Europe that resulted 
in the Zimbabwean White community becoming culturally diverse. The diversity was 
captured by Katja Uusihakala when she pointed out that in the 1969 census, out of the 
228,296 Europeans, 40% were born in colonial Zimbabwe; approximately 23% born in 
Britain and 22% in South Africa, with the rest coming from different parts of the world.85 
The arrival of Whites from different parts of the world created a White Zimbabwean 
80 Alois Mlambo, ‘From World War II to UDI, 1940-1965’, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, A History from the Pre-
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community that could be described as a cosmopolitan community as those who had been 
born in Zimbabwe were joined by immigrants from within Africa, Europe and America.86  
The diverse post-colonial ancestral links was reflected within the research’s White 
participants who were the children or grandchildren of the original migrants. Elizabeth who 
was born in Zimbabwe was of Greek heritage; Patrick who migrated to Zimbabwe from 
Somalia in the early 1960s had Italian roots; Gareth was of Irish descent; Alison a 
Zimbabwean by birth had English background; and Kenneth also born in Zimbabwe was a 
Welsh descendant. 
Despite the diversity of the White population, Jeffrey Herbst argues that they were all 
united by the awareness that they were numerically outnumbered by Africans.87 As a result, 
they would not accommodate any community divisions which would jeopardise resistance 
against any threat to dislodge their privileges on the productive sectors of mining, 
manufacturing or agriculture.88 The construction of a Rhodesian identity to repel any 
external or internal threats to dislodge their privileged status would not have been possible 
without the development of a ‘sense of nationalism’ within the White community.  
Nurturing a sense of nationalism indicated the determination Whites had in ensuring that 
Zimbabwe would be transformed into a White man’s country with a permanent White 
population. Josephine Fisher acknowledges how creating an identity of seeing themselves as 
a nation allowed subsequent generations of Whites to gradually lose attachment with 
countries of their ancestors.89 The loss of attachment to their ancestral roots became 
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apparent at independence in 1980 when a significant number of them chose to remain in 
the country as they were prepared to be part of post-colonial nation building initiatives. 
Chapter four will establish how the failure to dismantle a sense of belonging to a nation 
emerged to be a hindrance in the social integration of White Zimbabweans who found 
themselves in Britain. 
A combination of seeing themselves as a nation and the need to preserve their privileged 
status set in motion the development of racial prejudices whose impact was to influence 
future racial interactions with other Zimbabwean communities.  By virtue of their privileged 
status within colonial Zimbabwe’s economic, social and political structures, Whites were 
placed in a prestigious situation as providers of essential expertise and skills needed in an 
expanding colonial economy. The contribution of the White immigrants to the economy 
became a source of racial prejudice against the Blacks as they perceived themselves as 
indispensable to the economic needs and success of Zimbabwe.  
The rapid increase of a settled White immigrant population in Southern Rhodesia inevitably 
resulted in a disproportionate distribution of the White population across the Federal 
states. By the time the Federation ended in 1963, the combined White population of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was significantly lower than that of Zimbabwe as shown 











Table 3: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland White population 
Year Number of Whites 
Southern Rhodesia 
Number of Whites 
Northern Rhodesia 
Number of Whites 
Nyasaland 
1951 135 596 37 079 1 948 
1956 177 124 65 277 6  732 
1961 221 504 74 549 *8 750 
*Preliminary census figures  
Source: Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and 
Malawi (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 42, 48, 51  
With Malawi and Zambia gaining independence in 1964, White Zimbabweans’ awareness of 
their minority status forced them to come up with a political solution to delay majority rule. 
That political solution was to be implemented by Ian Smith on 11 November 1965 when he 
unilaterally declared Independence from Britain. Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) did not only mean that Rhodesia was an independent state outside 
Britain’s jurisdiction, it also meant that the minority 230,000 Whites would govern the Black 
population of over 4 million Blacks.90 Denying Africans political power would allow Whites 
to continue implementing policies to protect their socio-economic privileges and interests. 
Support of Smith’s UDI which ultimately delayed Zimbabwe’s independence showed the 
extent to which nurturing a sense of nationalism by White Rhodesians had strengthened the 
determination to make Zimbabwe a White man’s country. It was therefore an inevitable 
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outcome that UDI marked the start of a protracted dispute between the White Rhodesian 
and the British governments, and the Africans; disputes which consolidated the desire to 
protect the White Rhodesian identity of being a nation.   
The British government’s response to Ian Smith’s UDI was to impose sanctions on the 
Rhodesian government. Although the economic sanctions imposed in 1966 led to a trade 
ban and an embargo on financial dealings between Rhodesia and British territories, they 
failed to end minority rule.91 The Rhodesian government was able to adapt its economy by 
encouraging internal agriculture and manufacturing industry. As a landlocked country it was 
also able to manage its exports and imports through neighbouring South Africa and the 
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.92 The ability to manage the economy 
under economic sanctions emerged to be the basis upon which subsequent generations of 
Zimbabweans would compare the competence of White led Smith’s government and that of 
Mugabe’s post-colonial government. The consequence of that comparison emerged to be a 
significant determinant on how the diaspora Black community in Britain would perceive 
businesses owned by Blacks. 
UDI and the failure of the economic sanctions had not only denied the Black majority 
independence, but it also consolidated racial segregation in accessing Zimbabwe’s natural 
resources. With Blacks being denied the right to participate in politics, racially driven 
legislation to ensure some legitimacy in the inequitable distribution of the country’s 
resources were passed with little or no opposition in parliament.  For example, legislation 
such as ‘The Land Tenure Act’ of 1969 (previously known as the Land Apportionment Act of 
91 House of Commons Select Committee on Economic Affairs Second Report, Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeconaf/96/9606.htm (Accessed on 7 October 
2013) Published in April 2007. 
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1930) became one of the most effective legislative tools in enforcing racially inequitable 
distribution of the country’s natural resources.93 
The 1969 ‘Land Tenure Act’ provisions legitimised racial categorisation of land in the 
countryside.94  The displaced Africans were given control of only 41.7 per cent of poor 
quality land. By contrast, Whites who were 5 per cent of the population had access to 40 per 
cent of the best arable land.95  The Act’s racial demarcation of the land had therefore 
disregarded the demographics of the population by allocating close to an equal amount of 
land to both Blacks and Whites irrespective of the size of the population.96 
The inevitable consequence of the racial categorisation of the land was consolidation of a 
dual agricultural structure. Blacks by virtue of being forced into areas with poor or less 
fertile soil experienced depressed agricultural production in comparison to White farmers. 
Increased productivity by White farmers naturally created an environment that encouraged 
the development of perceptions that Whites were indispensable to the agricultural needs of 
the country. Comparative statistics of Africans and Whites presented by James Barber 
showed the extent to which the land reform had efficiently organised White farming for 
cash crop production while African farming was to be perceived as inefficient. This was 
because: the value of agricultural produce sold was nearly £48 million for Whites and that of 
Blacks just above £3 million.97  
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The plight of Black peasant farmers gradually worsened when the colonial administration 
failed to readjust the size of the land categories in line with the population increase of the 
Black community. As a result, land reserved for Blacks became overpopulated, thus creating 
a growing class of landless Black Africans in rural areas. With depressed agricultural 
production and a growing landless peasant population, colonial land distribution had firmly 
placed Zimbabwe on a racial collision course when dealing with the racial imbalance in land 
ownership. The success of any future nation building agenda would therefore be 
determined by either: the extent White farmers would be willing to address the racially 
skewed ownership of agricultural land, or the methods Blacks would adopt in addressing the 
land imbalances.  
African peasants’ response to declining agricultural returns and increased landlessness was 
to migrate into urban areas in search of employment. The colonial administration 
responded to the growing number of Blacks in the urban areas by passing the ‘Vagrancy Act’ 
of 1968 and the ‘Area Accommodation Act’ of 1972.98 These laws enforced rigid racial 
boundaries by not only restricting movement of Blacks, especially within cities’ central 
business districts, but by also enforcing separate residential areas for Whites and Blacks. 
Black access to White residential areas was restricted to domestic workers.99 For the 
convenience of their White employers, a majority of domestic workers lived on the 
employers’ residential premises. They were accommodated in separately built one or two 
roomed domestic quarters (with a toilet, which also served as bathroom) situated on the 
fringes of the back yard garden so as to be as far away as possible from the main house.  
98 Innocent Chirisa and Smart Dumba ‘Spatial Planning, Legislation and the Historical and Contemporary 
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With large gardens and excellent provision of health and electricity, exclusive white 
residential areas, referred to as ‘Low Density Residential Areas’, were a stark contrast to 
Black’ residential areas.100 Black residential areas, known as ‘High Density Residential Areas’ 
were usually ravaged with sewer and electricity problems, and limited access to health or 
education facilities.101 The racial segregation of residential areas started nurturing 
perceptions within some in the Black community that any socio-economic success should be 
measured with the lifestyle or material possessions of Whites.  
Reminiscing on the impact of European living standards on Africans, Gutu explained how 
uses of phrases like dzimba dzechirungu (White man’s house), Kudya kwechirungu (White 
man’s food) or doro rechirungu (White man’s beer) started to be used by Blacks to 
commend or congratulate each other.102 Notable success which deserved congratulations 
ranged from: the ability to speak English, building a brick walled house in rural areas to 
changing food or eating habits to imitate a European lifestyle.103  Adopting Whites’ lifestyle 
became a dream for a majority of Africans, thus indirectly consolidating the superiority of 
Whites over them. 
The colonial racist discourse that manifested itself in the hierarchical classification of the 
population had therefore marked the subtle indoctrination process of perceiving Whites’ 
way of life as a bench mark of socio-economic status. Tolerance of some traits of the 
European way of life gradually became more visible within an emerging African middle class. 
The belief that a European lifestyle was something to be aspired to by some within the Black 
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community started the construction of personal identities which were to influence social 
integration patterns in Britain.  
 
The Rise of African Middle Class 
Mlambo identifies the introduction of European education and a monetary based capitalist 
economy as being instrumental in creating a small African middle class community of 
educated professionals in colonial Zimbabwe.104 Teaching, nursing, clerical and small scale 
entrepreneurship emerged as the main professions of the emerging African middle class.105 
Although the creation of a small but well-defined African middle class was essential for 
managing and sustaining the socio-economic and political structures of the colonial state, it 
also marked the start of an evolutionary process that would have a profound impact on the 
educational aspirations of Africans linked to socio-economic status. Traditional values would 
inevitably be challenged as individuals within the emerging African middle class tried to 
establish an identity in a capitalist system riddled by exploitation and undermining of those 
occupying the lower echelons of society.  
Although Mlambo acknowledges that the colonial capitalist system had created a small 
African middle class, it would be naïve to think that they were at economic parity with 
Whites. By virtue of occupying the lowest position in colonial Zimbabwe’s population 
hierarchy, Herbst alludes to the fact that Blacks (whether educated or not) were constantly 
subject to discriminatory systems which were curtailing their economic advancement.106 
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The colonial state’s economic system had managed to stifle the entrepreneurial potential of 
Blacks in major economic activities like mining, manufacturing or agriculture.107  
Blacks’ entrepreneurial activities were mainly restricted to grocery shops, bottle stores, 
maize grinding mills and transport. These were businesses which had been deliberately set 
up to serve the Black population either in rural or Black residential areas. Protecting Whites 
from entrepreneurial Blacks had therefore marked the start of a subtle construction of a 
mind-set in which Africans were gradually being conditioned to express their 
entrepreneurial skills by owning or managing small scale businesses instead of large 
corporate companies.  
The economic subjugation had placed a majority of Africans in what Austin describes as ‘an 
economically weak position’ from which it was virtually impossible to recover unless 
changes were made.108 Understanding the economic activities of the Black diaspora 
community in Britain could therefore not be achieved outside the context of colonial 
economic systems that denied Blacks the opportunity to express their entrepreneurial 
potential deemed to threaten White economic dominance.   
Political determination in stifling Blacks socio-economic progression was well articulated in a 
speech by Godfrey Huggins, Southern Rhodesia’s Prime Minister  from 1933-53 and the 
Federation’s Prime Minister  from 1953-56. In the speech he was emphasising that Black 
Africans’ participation should be that of assisting Whites as labourers and not to compete 
with them.  He stated: 
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…. The European in this country can be likened to an island of white 
in a sea of black ... with the artisan and the tradesman forming the 
shores and the professional classes the highlands in the centre. Is the 
native to be allowed to erode away the shores and gradually attack 
the highlands? To permit this would mean that the leaven of 
civilisation would be removed from the country, and the Black men 
would inevitably revert to barbarism worse than before.109 
To consolidate politicians’ determination to maintain racial superiority within the economic 
structures, Anias Mutekwa expresses how adult Black employees were usually 
‘infanticised’.110 This was apparent when White employers would not address them by 
name, but as ‘boys’ or ‘girls’ regardless of age.111 For example, titles like ‘house-girl’ ‘garden-
boy’, ‘house-boy’, ‘spanner-boy’ or ‘tea-boy’ were used to refer to Black employees. Use of 
such derogatory titles resulted in a significant number of Blacks being subtly conditioned to 
believe that relations between Blacks and Whites should be on the basis that Whites are 
superior and therefore they should be respected. The development of such perceptions 
would have an impact on the construction of post-colonial Black-White relations both in 
Zimbabwe and in the Diaspora.     
The colonial education system was also a critical component in creating an environment of 
pseudo meritocracy for Africans. The colonial education system gave pretence of equal 
opportunity by creating an environment in which Africans would identify education as the 
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only route to escape the entrapment of colonial induced poverty.112 Edward Shizha 
identifies The Education Act of 1966 as one of the most effective laws in giving Africans a 
false sense of equal opportunities by excluding a majority of them from attaining skills 
which would allow them to compete with Europeans on the job market.113 The Act 
legitimised the marginalisation of African children in the education system by screening and 
limiting the number of African children who could proceed to secondary school.114 Placing 
limits on African children who could proceed with their education had therefore constructed 
a deliberate hierarchical socio-economic stratification of the Black community which had 
the potential of determining the relations within the Black community.  
Embracing education as the most significant and realistic access to upward social mobility 
was to be a major catalyst influencing how Africans were to construct their personal 
identities. Personal success for a majority of individuals was to be measured by academic or 
professional qualifications. However, with limited opportunities to pursue education, a 
significant number of ambitious and academically gifted Africans were forced to train locally 
as teachers or nurses or wait for scholarship opportunities to leave the country to pursue 
their studies. Scholarships offered by the British Council and the Commonwealth to study at 
British Universities or Colleges emerged to be an escape route for the academically gifted 
Blacks who wanted to pursue further education but would have been denied the 
opportunity by racial policies.115  
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The colonial education system did not only create a sense of meritocracy within the Black 
community, it also legitimised the creation of racial cliques which were to determine future 
interracial interactions. This was made possible by embedding a racist discourse in the 
educational provisions so at allow them to mirror the hierarchical classification of the 
population. The colonial state’s education system insisted on the creation of a well-funded 
and resourced separate education for Whites, Coloureds and Asians which was being 
subsidised by underfunding in African schools.116 African education provisions were 
effectively bankrupted when education expenditure for Africans was reduced from 8.6% of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1965 to 2% in 1967.117  By 1972, £16.60 per student 
was being spent on African in comparison to £160.70 for Whites, Coloureds and Asians.118 
The better funded schools for the Whites, Coloureds and Asians were classified as ‘Group A’ 
schools, whilst the poorly resourced ‘Group B’ schools were for Africans.119 The imperial 
education system had therefore been designed to create White hegemony since reduced 
funding for African education meant that most Africans would be trapped in menial jobs.   
Africans as occupiers of the lowest threshold in the hierarchical classification of the 
population were not allowed to enrol at the ‘Group A’ schools and neither were Coloureds 
and Asians allowed to enrol at Whites only schools. Educating children separately also 
created interaction barriers which needed to be dismantled when implementing nation 
building initiatives in a post-colonial Zimbabwe. However, success of reconciliation 
initiatives in independent Zimbabwe depended on the extent to which respective ethnic 
communities were willing to be desensitised from inherited colonial prejudices. Failure to 
116 Reginald Austin, Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa - Rhodesia: A Book of Data (Paris: UNESCO Press, 
1975), pp.44, 45. 
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dismantle race-prejudices in independent Zimbabwe would mean memories of racial 
boundaries would inevitably be exported into the diaspora thus inhibiting interactions 
between different ethnic communities. 
The educational experience of Jonah, one of the Black participants, revealed the extent of 
the impact of racial segregation in the colonial education system.120 Despite being adopted 
by a ‘White Jewish’ Rhodesian couple he recalled how in the 1960s he was forbidden to 
attend Founders High, a Bulawayo based secondary school for Coloureds and Asians.121 He 
had to cycle fifteen miles to the nearest African secondary school. Even after the completion 
of his ‘O’ Levels he was not allowed to enrol for a ’book keeping course’ at the White 
dominated Bulawayo Technical College. However, despite his education experiences, he was 
able to become the first Black bank clerk at one of Bulawayo’s ‘Founders Building Society’ 
branches in the early 1970s; a position which he believed he could not have attained 
without his White parents’ influence.  
The experiences of Jonah ran parallel to those of the oldest male White participants in the 
research, Gareth and Robert who all started their education in the 1960s.122 In 1968, despite 
not having excelled particularly well at school, Gareth explained how he was able to join the 
police at a higher rank than Blacks. As for Robert, although he did not have a qualification 
apart from his ‘O’ Level, he was still able to secure a job ahead of Blacks in Zimbabwe’s 
financial sector in 1967. By the time Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 he had risen to 
middle-management level, a position reached through on the job training in which Blacks 
were naturally overlooked.  
120 Jonah, Interview, 24 March 2013. 
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The health sector, as pointed out by Diana Auret, was also not immune from the impact of 
colonial pluralistic socio-economic systems based on race.123 Like in other sectors of the 
colonial society, the racial classification of the population had facilitated the establishment 
of separate health facilities for Whites (with separate wards for Coloureds and Asians) and 
Blacks. The major white-only referral hospitals were Harare’s Andrew Fleming (now known 
as Parirenyatwa) and Bulawayo’s United Hospitals of Bulawayo. The disparity was clearer in 
health expenditure and distribution of personnel. For example, in 1979 thirty-two per-cent 
of the Z$54.2 million health budget was allocated to Harare’s Andrew Fleming.124 With 
regards to personnel distribution, Bulawayo offered a good example. This was when the 
city’s 410,000 Blacks in 1976 were served by one hospital whilst 69,000 Whites had three 
hospitals.125   
This racial demarcation in health delivery was also complemented by a two tier-training 
system for health personnel in which few Blacks, unlike Whites, had the privilege of 
completing secondary education to enrol for a full three year nurse training which would 
have entitled them to qualify as a ‘State Registered Nurse.’126 On the contrary, a majority of 
Africans who had wanted a career in nursing ended up enrolling for a two year course 
usually offered by mission schools to gain a lower State Certified Nurse qualification.127 The 
privileges accorded to Whites had therefore not only facilitated White-only hospitals to be 
manned by White nurses and doctors, they also facilitated the creation of an environment in 
123 Diana Auret, A Decade of Development in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1990), pp.39-40. 
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which Whites would be placed at the pinnacle of the profession.128  These privileges 
accorded to Whites in the health sector emerged to be a litmus test in determining whether 
Whites were prepared not only to work with Blacks as equals, but also how far they were 
prepared to provide health care to those they had accepted to be below them in the 
hierarchical classification of the population.   
Although European formal education pioneered by missionaries facilitated the equipping of 
Africans with academic or technical skills to improve their economic status, it also has to be 
recognised that it prompted Africans to either despise or become ignorant of their historic 
civilisation. By depicting Africans as an illiterate group of people who could not even write 
their own history, the introduction of formal education positioned itself as a constant 
reminder to the African community that they should be thankful to colonisation. In the 
absence of written sources on Africa’s history or civilisation it was therefore critical that 
formal education was to be presented in a way which would ensure that it was a creation 
and product of a superior European culture. 
Describing the Europeanization (and Americanisation) of Africans by the colonial education 
system, sixty-one year old Edison, a beneficiary of the colonial education system in the 
1960s, said: 
Shaka the great Zulu warrior was demonised as Shaka the Savage 
whilst Napoleon was described as Napoleon the Great in history 
lessons. In geography we knew more about the Alps and the Rocky 
Mountains... Children at a very young age were taught English 
128 Rudo Gaidzanwa, Voting with Their Feet: Migrant Zimbabwean Nurses and Doctors in the Era of Structural 
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Rhymes like Baa Baa Black Sheep and Humpty Dumpty instead of 
Shona or Ndebele folk songs…it was therefore not surprising that for 
most Zimbabweans, being educated did not only mean competently 
speaking and writing in English, but it was also about how much 
European or American geography and history you know.129 
Edison’s assertion indicates how the colonial education curriculum had created an African 
who subconsciously would have started to be sceptical of the relevance of their traditions or 
history in the face of what appeared to be the modern and progressive culture of 
Europeans. It was therefore crucial that at independence any nation building initiatives had 
to be implemented with the aim of freeing Africans from a colonial mentality that national 
or personal identities should mirror European political or socio-economic structures. Failure 
to dismantle the colonial constructed African mind-set that the European way of life was 
more civilised would have an impact on how African immigrants would construct social or 
economic integration patterns.  
Trivialising or undermining African traditions was not only restricted to the colonial 
education system. Ndlovu-Gatsheni also describes how Christian missionaries both 
positioned themselves as bearers of Christian ideology and also became agents of cultural 
imperialism by identifying themselves with an Anglo-Saxon civilising culture.130 The 
introduction of Christianity was based on demonising, despising and undermining traditional 
African religious beliefs and ways of life. For example, the role of ancestral spirits in African 
129 Edison, Interview, 17th January 2013. 
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worship was not only equated with demonic worship of people possessed with evil spirits, 
but was also blamed for stifling social development.131 
To further alienate Africans from their traditions, Christian teachings exposed certain 
traditional practices as morally wrong and stifling social development. The despised African 
traditional practices included: the role of ancestral spirits in exposing witchcraft, with those 
identified being executed even without adequate proof; issues of arranged marriage; and 
the killing at birth of twins, as twins were believed to be a bad omen.132 It was therefore 
inevitable, as argued by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, that Christian Missionaries’ activities were 
effective in stimulating African consciousness of seeing some aspects of African traditional 
customs as irrational and oppressive.133 
Africans embraced Christianity as a superior emancipating religion which provided refuge 
against the oppressive and irrational traditional customs. Belittling of ancestral spirits, who 
had been an integral part of Africans’ socio-economic and political systems, was essential in 
creating an African community which saw itself as a fortunate and grateful recipient of 
European civilisation. African Christian converts had started a transformation process which 
made them objects of European civilisation by ceasing to be active and rational participants 
in the preservation of their history and identity. Christianity had therefore emerged to be an 
important component in determining any future identity constructions of Black Africans that 
was to extend into the diaspora.  
The Spread of Christianity 
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Understanding the impact of historically constructed identities and prejudices on Black 
Zimbabwean immigrants cannot be divorced from the disparity in the spread of Christianity 
between Shona and Ndebele dominated regions. As suggested by Chengetai Zvobgo’s A 
History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939, there were significant differences in 
the conversion rate to Christianity between the Mashonaland and Matabeleland regions 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.134 The vicissitudes of missionary 
activities in Shona and Ndebele dominated regions can be attributed to four variable 
factors: the initial response of the Ndebele to Christianity; the colonisation process; the 
Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893; and the 1896-97 uprisings.  
The diverse nature in the spread of Christianity in the late nineteenth century is shown in 
Table Four below. Of the fourteen mission stations opened in Zimbabwe during the first 
decade of colonial rule (1890 to 1900), twelve were in Shona areas. This was despite the 
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London Missionary Society  Inyati (1859) 
Hope Fountain(1870) 
Roman Catholic Chishawasha(1892) 
Mzondo (1898) 
 
Empandeni Mission (1879) 
Anglican St Augustine (1891) 
St. Faith(1891) 
 





Dutch Reformed Morgenster (1891)  
American Board Mission Mt. Selinda (1893)  
American Methodist 
Episcopal 
Old Umtali (1898)  
Seventh Day Adventist  Solusi (1894) 
Salvation Army Howard Institute(1891)  
Sources: Chengetai J M Zvobgo, A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 
1996) ,pp.1-81; Herbert Chimhundu ‘Early Missionaries and the Ethnolinguistic Factor during the Invention of 
Tribalism in Zimbabwe’ Journal of African History, vol. 33 (1992), pp. 87-109 
 
Nineteenth century Ndebele resistance to Christianity marked the start of a process which 
would lead to diversity in the spread of the religion between Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland. Zvobgo argues that Ndebele negative response to Christianity had become 
apparent before colonisation when the pioneers of missionary enterprise in Matabeleland, 
the London Missionary Society failed to win a single convert between 1859 and 1880.135 
Ndebele consciousness of their autonomy and the divine nature of their king were 
135 Zvobgo, A History of Christian Missions p .1. 





instrumental in the rejection of Christianity.136 It was this initial resistance by the Ndebele 
which naturally stifled the implementation of plans by other missionaries to evangelise the 
Matabeleland region during the first decade of colonial rule.  
The colonisation process which was started by the Pioneer Column in 1890 marked the 
beginning of the diverse transformation of the Christian missionary enterprise that was to 
have a long lasting impact on the socio-economic way of life of the Shona and the Ndebele. 
When the Pioneer Column set off for Mashonaland in 1890, Father Andrew Hartmann, a 
Jesuit Missionary of the Roman Catholic Church, together with Canon Balfour of the 
Anglican Church, were Chaplains of the Column.137  Upon settling in Mashonaland, the BSAC 
gave the Anglican Church £600 to cover the expenses of establishing missions in 
Mashonaland.138  
The BSAC’s generous support, which was extended to other missionaries mainly through the 
allocation of land, paved the way for an influx of missionaries in Mashonaland before 
Matabeleland. Working in partnership with the secular BSAC, the missionaries were able to 
open mission stations in the region. The mission centres as unveiled by Zvobgo’s ‘A History 
of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939’ had two main objectives; to evangelise and to 
introduce western education. The objectives of the missionaries were not only invaluable in 
enabling the new converts to read the bible and church instructions, but they were 
equipping the Africans with skills to integrate in the colonial socio-economic structures.  
Whilst missionary activities were taking off in Shona dominated regions, the progress in 
Matabeleland was either halted or slowed down in some areas by the Ndebele uprising of 
136 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni ‘Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters 1880s-1930s’, p.42. 
137 Ibid, p. 3. 
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1893 and the insurgency of 1896-97 which was carried out by both the Shona and the 
Ndebele. Although the defeat of both the Shona and the Ndebele in the 1896-97 uprising 
was followed by an intensification of missionary activities in both Shona and Ndebele 
regions, the Shona were deemed to be more receptive to Christianity.   
Ranger presents an argument showing why the receptiveness of the Shona to Christianity 
should not be understood outside the context of the manner in which they were defeated in 
the uprising. Unlike in Matabeleland, he describes how the brutal suppression of the 1896-
97 rebellion had caused disillusionment among the Shona.139 With the spiritual leaders 
surrendering unconditionally and suffering the humiliation of being put on trial and 
executed, a significant number of the Shona turned to the Christian God.140 Their Shona 
spiritual leaders had been portrayed as being weak and ineffective when confronted by an 
enemy worshipping the Christian God.  
The epitome of the Shona receptiveness to Christianity according to Zvobgo was the 
translation of the Bible into the Shona language ahead of the Ndebele language.141 By 1907 
the translation of the Bible’s New Testament into Shona had been completed. With early 
European education being pioneered by the missionaries it was inevitable that positive 
receptiveness to Christianity had resulted in the Shona attaining literacy skills earlier and at 
a faster rate than the Ndebele. As a result Zvobgo acknowledges that, unlike the Ndebele, 
‘translation of the scriptures into vernacular enabled literate Shona converts to understand 
139 Terence Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1888-1930, (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 1 
140 Ibid, p. 3. 
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the teachings of the scriptures better than before’ thus triggering more conversions as some 
Shona took on the role of evangelising.142 
As more Africans converted to Christianity, Ndlovu-Gatsheni points out how the arrogant 
attitude of White missionaries triggered a formation of African churches.143 Maxwell argues 
how the Africanised versions of Pentecostalism to emerge from the 1920s had their roots in 
the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) whose first recorded entrance into Southern Rhodesia 
was in 1916.144 Although AFM’s first mission was in Matabeleland, it was in Mashonaland 
where there was a rapid growth of African churches. With a high conversion rate in Shona 
dominated provinces, it soon became apparent that literate entrepreneurial Shona 
Christians would have the confidence to establish churches to counter the arrogant 
attitudes displayed by some missionaries. 
Maxwell’s engagement of the origins of the rise of African Pentecostalism in Southern 
Rhodesia therefore affirms how Entrepreneurial Africans established Pentecostal 
Movements which had an ethnic bias in its leadership.145  As shown in Table 5, the six major 
African churches to have originated in Southern Rhodesia only two had Ndebele founders. It 
was this ethnic identity within the African church which started a process of constructing 
congregations which would mirror the ethnicity of the founder members in subsequent 
generations including those who migrated to Britain.     
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Table 5: African Churches Established 1900-1960 
 
Church Founder Established 
Zion Apostolic Faith Mission Samuel Mutendi (Shona) 1925 
John Marange, African 
Apostolic Church 
John Marange (Shona) 1932 
Gospel Of God Church 
(Johane Masowe-
Chishanu)_ 
Johane Masowe (Shona) 1932 
*Apostolic Faith Church of 
Southern and Central Africa 
Morgan Sengwayo (Ndebele) 1955 
*Harvest House 
International Church 
Colin and Sarah Nyathi 
(Ndebele) 
1955 
Forward in Faith (ZAOGA) Ezekiel Guti (Shona) 1960 
*Established in Matabeleland 
Sources: M L Daneel, ‘The Growth and Significance of Shona Independent Churches’ in M F C 
Bourdillion, Christianity South of THE Zambezi (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1977) pp. 177, 192; M F C 
Bourdillion, T Mashita and M Glickman, ‘Traditional Religion and Independent Church in M F C 
Bourdillion Christianity South of THE Zambezi,p.193; Religion in Zimbabwe, Pentecostal and African 
Initiated Churches http://relzim.org/major-religions-zimbabwe/pentecostal-aic/ (First Visited 22 June 
2014); David Maxwell, African Gifts of the Spirit: Pentecostalism and the Rise of a Zimbabwean 
Transnational Religious Movement (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), pp.52-54 
 
Shona entrepreneurship that was manifested in the establishment of African churches was 
also extended to other sectors of the economy. This was a consequence of accessing 
western education (provided by the mission schools) earlier and at a wider scale than the 
Ndebele. Embracing western education allowed the Shona to attain numeracy and literacy 
skills which gave them the confidence to be entrepreneurial by being self-employed or 
opening businesses thus positively engaging with the socio-economic structures of the 





in 1900 was in Shona regions.146 There were two African hawkers in Salisbury (Harare) and 
Fort Victoria (Masvingo).147 
Between 1910 and 1920, Mashonaland’s largest city, Harare, continued to experience a 
growing number of licensed African general-retail shops including the opening of the first 
ever catering business  when a licence was obtained to operate a ‘native eating house’ in 
1921.148   Two decades into colonisation the Shona in the vicinity of Harare owned a diverse 
range of businesses which included market gardening, transport businesses using wagons 
and donkeys, bricklaying, carpentry and tailoring. To emphasise the inextricable link 
between Christian mission schools and Shona entrepreneurship, Wild points out how those 
engaged in bricklaying, carpentry or tailoring had taken advantage of the introduction of 
western education by being trained at the Chishawasha Jesuit Mission near Harare.149  
Although Wild acknowledges that there were a few African market gardeners in Bulawayo, 
African entrepreneurial activities were not as visible or aggressive as in Harare. A few 
general-dealers licenses had been issued to a few Africans during the period 1910 to 1921 
compared to Harare. The businesses were not as diverse as in Harare during the 1920s as 
most of the African traders were ‘petty commodity producers such as boot-makers and 
tailors.’150 The slow progress in the Ndebele became apparent when a survey between 1949 
and 1950 revealed that of the ninety shops run by Africans only twenty were run by the 










Ndebele.151 This was because many of the African shop keepers hailed from Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia).152  
The diverse growth of African businesses in Shona and Ndebele regions had therefore 
created an environment in which there would always be a disproportionate ethnic 
representation in business ownership throughout the phases of Zimbabwe’s history. This 
marked the development of Shona arrogance and prejudices against the Ndebele by viewing 
them as being less entrepreneurial. The consequence of the attitudes surrounding the 
disproportionate ethnic representation in Black Zimbabwean businesses was not to be 
restricted to colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, but was to extend into the diaspora.  
The Nationalist Movement 
Table 6: Nationalist Movement Profile 
 




1957 Joshua Nkomo Banned 1957 
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Sources: Alois Mlambo, ‘From the Second World War to UDI 1940-1965’ in Brian Roftopoulos and 
Alois Mlambo (Eds), A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe (Harare: 









The formation of Nationalist Parties (shown in the Table 6 above) from the 1950s signalled a 
significant transition in Zimbabwean politics. The consequence was the creation of an 
environment that facilitated development and consolidation of ethnic allegiances and racial 
prejudices that would be a hindrance to future communities’ relations. The split of ZAPU 
party to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in August 1963 marked the 
beginning of the development of a nationalist ideology which was bankrupt of nation 
building ideas needed to evade the fragmentation of the nationalist movement along ethnic 
lines.153 The formation of ZANU emerged to be a significant catalyst in constructing an 
ethnic identity in the nationalist Movement as it challenged Joshua Nkomo’s credentials as 
‘Father of Zimbabwean Nationalism’ enjoying relative support from both the Shona and the 
Ndebele.154 This was because: the formation of ZANU presented itself as a Shona political 
party when a significant number of Shona leaders in ZAPU revolted against the leadership of 
Ndebele speaking Joshua Nkomo. They had become disillusioned by what they perceived as 
Nkomo’s insistence in pursuing non-militant or passive methods of resistance.155  
Besides the fundamental disagreement over methods to be implemented in the liberation 
struggle, many within what was to be the ZANU leadership criticised Nkomo for eliciting 
assistance from Asian businessmen and recruiting White advisors.156 Some of his White 
advisors identified by Chung included ‘Terence Ranger and John Reed from the University of 
Rhodesia, Leo Baron, a respected lawyer in Bulawayo, and Peter MacKay, a British military 
specialist’.157 ZANU’s initial resistance to non-Black participation in the nationalist 
153 Sabelo, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis in the 21st century’, African Journal on Conflict 
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movement courted perceptions of being an anti-White party that could not be trusted in 
nation building initiatives in an independent Zimbabwe.  
Relations within the Nationalist Movement were to undergo further transformation when 
both nationalist parties embraced the idea of military armed struggle by 1965; a move 
which resulted in the creation of military wings to spearhead the armed resistance. Shona 
dominated ZANU’s military wing was known as Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA) and ZAPU’s military wing was Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).  The 
respective military wings did not escape the clutches of ethnic identities which permeated 
the political structures of the nationalist movement.   
ZANLA as a military wing of Shona dominated ZANU had the privilege of recruiting from 80% 
of the African population, mainly in Mashonaland, Masvingo, Manicaland and parts of 
Midlands.158 In contrast, ZIPRA’s recruitment drive was heavily dependent on 15% Ndebele 
population mainly residing in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands and West 
Mashonaland.159  Access to a larger recruitment area did not only allow ZANLA to operate 
over a larger geographical area, but they also had significantly more guerrilla fighters than 
ZIPRA. The glaring difference of the size of the two forces was exposed by Norma Kriger 
when she noted that of the estimated 28 000 guerrillas fighting in Zimbabwe in 1979, 20 000 
were ZANLA fighters.160  
Until 1975 both ZANU and ZAPU with their military wings were based in Lusaka, Zambia. 
However, this changed in 1975 when the new Mozambican government provided sanctuary 
158 Statistics cited in Saliwe Kawewe, ‘Social Welfare of Indigenous Peoples in Zimbabwe’, in John Dixon and 
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for ZANU. Mozambique became the administrative and operational external headquarters 
for ZANU and ZANLA. Using the vast borders of Mozambique, ZANLA entered Zimbabwe 
through the Shona concentrated eastern and northern borders thus allowing it to operate 
on a larger scale. Summarising how significant the independence of Mozambique was to 
Shona dominated ZANU, Fay Chung says ‘a black government in Mozambique brought the 
prospect of thousands of miles of border territory opening up to guerrilla infiltration, so that 
the defeat of the Rhodesian regime on the battlefield was only a matter of time.’161 
Meanwhile, ZAPU continued to be based in Zambia, allowing ZIPRA to enter Zimbabwe 
through western borders.   
Having clearly defined operational regions demarcated by ethnic boundaries exacerbated 
ethnic tensions between the military wings of the nationalist parties. Violent clashes often 
occurred when the military wings encroached each other’s territory.162 An ethnic identity 
within the nationalists’ resistance to colonial rule had entered a new phase in which 
violence, hate speeches and slogans that were once exclusively reserved for the White 
community were now being used by Blacks against each other.  
The disparity in the size of the military wings and having clearly defined geographical areas 
of influence further provided the platform for the development of ethnic influenced rhetoric 
in explaining which military wing was contributing the most in the liberation armed struggle 
for independence. It is undeniable that analysis of contributions to the liberation struggle 
would have planted a seed of insecurity within the Ndebele community on how they would 
be treated in a post-colonial Zimbabwe ruled by a Shona dominated government.  
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As a minority ethnic community, the Ndebele would not have been naïve of the impact on 
any historical interpretations in post-colonial Zimbabwe which minimised the contribution 
of ZAPU or ZIPRA during the armed struggle for independence. The nationalist movement’s 
armed struggle had therefore succeeded in entrenching nostalgic ideas devoid of ethnic 
unity whose significance was not to be restricted in post-colonial Zimbabwe’s borders but 
was to extend to the diaspora Black community.   
Both ZANLA and ZIPRA needed to mobilise mass support to ensure the supply of basic 
necessities on the frontline. However, Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya and Teresa 
Barnes argue how on many occasions the impoverished peasants already reeling under the 
oppressive colonial political system were often forced to provide shelter and food.163 Failure 
to provide the expected support would lead to accusations of being a collaborator with the 
White administration. Regrettably, as argued by Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes, there were 
instances in which personal rivalries or jealousy would result in peasants falsely labelling 
each other as collaborators with the colonial state.164 With death or torture being the 
ultimate punishments of those labelled as collaborators with the colonial regime, there 
were a significant number of innocent victims of the war.  
These methods and disciplinary measures to ensure support were constructing a Black 
community which was not only fearful of the colonial state’s security forces, but also fearful 
of each other. It was therefore imperative that post-colonial Zimbabwe had to be politically 
stable so as to build a nation in which relations with the political establishment would not 
be based on ethnic allegiances or political intimidation. While the nationalist struggle for 
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independence was promoting and consolidating communalism and fear within Africans, it 
also undermined race relations necessary for the development of a national identity.    
Despite Seirils’ references to Coloured nationalists such as Gerry Raftopolous, Elaine and 
Joseph Culverwell and Herbert Foya-Thompson, the community’s involvement in the 
liberation struggle either as guerrillas or political activists was rare.165 Ellen, a widowed 
Coloured Zimbabwean in her sixties once married to one of the Black Nationalist leaders 
admitted that she was one of the few Coloureds who chose to align with the struggle for 
independence in 1958.166 She cited nationalists’ attitudes toward Coloureds for playing a 
significant role in restricting their participation in the armed struggle.167 She recalled how 
she had ‘to fight for recognition within the nationalist movement because of her mixed race 
background.’ This was despite proving her allegiance to the nationalist cause by quitting her 
nursing job so as to support her husband who was part of the nationalist movement 
leadership.168 For her, this was an expected response since a significant number of Blacks 
within the nationalist movement regarded Coloureds (and Asians) as beneficiaries of the 
colonial state and therefore as individuals should not be trusted.  
The issue of (mis)trust is reinforced by Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes when they point out that 
Coloureds were perceived by most Blacks as being vulnerable to shifting allegiances.169 It 
had become an irrefutable fact among Africans that a majority of Coloureds and Asians 
would rather collaborate with the colonial systems than support any Black led political 
movement whose victory might lead to a potential loss of their privileges.  
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With insignificant support from Coloureds and Asians against White colonial rule the 
nationalist movement’s construction of the idea of a nation evolved into racist rhetoric.170 
The wide use of the Shona slogan mwana wevhu (child of the soil) within ZANU as reference 
to the indigenous population naturally delegitimised claims of being Zimbabwean by 
Whites, Asians, Coloureds, and to some extent those from the Ndebele community.171 The 
use of these Shona slogans had therefore served to confirm how ZANU, as the biggest 
nationalist movement, was bankrupt of nation building policies. The slogans were helping 
send subtle messages, undermining the prospect of equal opportunities in a future 
independent Zimbabwe. ZANU was constructing perceptions of being anti-White, Coloured 
or Asian with the potential of practicing reverse racism once in power in a post-colonial 
Zimbabwe.   
The Post-Colonial Era 
The decolonisation of Zimbabwe in 1980 cannot be solely attributed to the national 
movement’s armed struggle. The Lancaster House Constitution agreed at cross party 
negotiations held in London from September to December 1979 emerged to be the most 
significant event which ensured a peaceful transition from colonial rule to multi-party 
democracy.172 During the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe was to be governed 
under the terms of the Lancaster House Constitution. Amendment to the constitution 
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during the ten years required a unanimous parliamentary vote from the one hundred cross 
party parliamentarians in Zimbabwe’s new parliament.173 
Without an undisputed armed struggle victory, Mugabe’s government had inherited a 
bruised but undefeated settler state which contained anachronistic elements that had the 
potential of becoming hostile to the political project of the new regime.174 Implementing 
nation building initiatives to promote cordial relations between Whites and Blacks would 
reflect the fact that colonial rule had not been solely terminated by an outright nationalist’s 
armed struggle victory but by the Lancaster House Constitution agreement.175 
Although the Lancaster constitution paved the way for a manageable transition to multi-
party democracy, the constitution embodied a series of compromises which involuntarily 
gave the minority White community racial protection.176 In the first decade, in which 
Zimbabwe was to be governed under the constitution, Whites were not only guaranteed 
continuous ownership of land acquired under colonial rule, but, more significantly, they 
were also granted a political voice.177 Of the one hundred seats in the newly established 
National Assembly, twenty seats were reserved for Whites.178 Reserved parliamentary seats 
for Whites could not be abolished within seven years of independence without a hundred 
per-cent vote in the parliament.179 The political and economic protection of Whites under 
the terms of the Lancaster House Constitution proved to be that litmus test for determining 
173 James Muzondidya, ‘ From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997’,  in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, A History from the 
Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, p. 172. 
174 Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, p.30. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997’, p.172. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid p.173. 
179 Ibid. 





if members of the White community would be genuine participants in dismantling their 
historical privileges in independent Zimbabwe.   
Despite securing the political and economic protection of Whites, the Lancaster House 
Constitution failed to explicitly address how the economic and political welfare of Coloureds 
and Asians would be managed in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Instead, Martyn Gregory explains 
how the communities were grouped together with the White community on the Voter’s Roll 
for the 1980 multi-party democratic elections.180 In a subtle way, the outcome of the 
Lancaster House negotiations had therefore set in motion the potential marginalisation of 
the Coloured and Asian communities in independent Zimbabwe. By being grouped with 
Whites, both communities were being placed at the periphery of society’s social strata 
without official recognition that they had exclusive needs which needed to be catered for if 
they were to attain upward social mobility in post-colonial Zimbabwe.  
Failure to officially recognise Coloureds and Asians at the Lancaster House negotiations had 
placed the respective communities in a precarious and complex position when attempting 
to construct a post-colonial identity. The Lancaster House Constitution had unwittingly 
started the construction of perceptions within the Coloured and Asian communities that 
post-colonial Zimbabwe would be a bifurcated society of Blacks and Whites, with Coloureds 
and Asians as invisible occupancies. This perceived bi-polarisation of Zimbabwe’s complex 
multicultural society was always going to bring much scrutiny on how the reconciliation 
project in independent Zimbabwe was to cater for both the victims and beneficiaries of 
Zimbabwe’s colonial past.  
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The Lancaster House Constitution’s racial partnership agreement between Whites and 
Blacks could not be translated to the ethnically polarised nationalist movement. The only 
symbolic gesture of the nationalist movement’s unity was when ZANU and ZAPU delegates 
attended the Lancaster House negotiations under one umbrella known as the Patriotic Front 
(PF). However, without a sustainable unity pact agreement, the Patriotic Front coalition 
collapsed when the two nationalist parties resolved to contest the first multi-democratic 
elections in February 1980 as rivals. The decision to contest the elections as rivals trivialised 
the adoption of the term Patriotic Front by both parties. ZANU led by Robert Mugabe 
became known as ZANU PF and ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo known as PF ZAPU. 
The decision by the two parties to contest the elections as rivals placed their supporters on 
a collision course with each other in the run-up period to the elections. Peter Stiff describes 
how ethnic driven intimidation as a method of electioneering became endemic in both 
ZANU PF and PF ZAPU controlled areas.181 Just as it was during the liberation struggle, any 
opposing election agents who ventured into either ZANU PF or PF ZAPU controlled areas 
were either harassed or in extreme cases murdered.182 The violent clashes between 
supporters of the major nationalist political parties exposed how trivial a nation building 
agenda was within the leadership of the nationalist movement. The violence only served to 
confirm that the Nationalist Movement’s leadership had been too focused in removing 
minority rule to the extent that they negated the urgency of formulating policies to deal 
with ethnic conflicts. 
181 Peter Stiff, Cry Zimbabwe: Independence Twenty Years On (Johannesburg: Galogo, 2000), p. 23. 
182 Ibid, p. 23. 





Zimbabwe’s ethnic demographics proved to be a major determinant in defining the 
outcome of the elections within the Black electorate. With the Shona constituting 80% of 
Zimbabwe’s population, the Shona dominated ZANU PF party emerged as clear winners with 
63% of the votes while PF ZAPU managed only 24%.183 Mugabe ZANU PF’s landslide victory 
meant that out of the eighty seats reserved for Blacks in the one hundred seat national 
assembly, ZANU PF had a majority with fifty-seven seats, Nkomo’s PF ZAPU controlling 
twenty seats, while Unite African National Council (UANC) led by Abel Muzorewa, Prime 
Minister of the short-lived 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government only three seats.184 The 
election results had therefore theoretically given Mugabe the mandate to control the entire 
country including the two Ndebele Matabeleland provinces where at most only ten per-cent 
of the electorate had voted for him.185 
Despite the Commonwealth Observers’ Group (COG) describing the elections as ‘free and 
fair’, Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger reveal how a significant 
number of the Ndebele rejected ZANU PF victory.186 These were individuals who convinced 
themselves that a combination of Shona numerical advantage, foul play, favouritism of 
ZANU PF by the British and neglect of PF ZAPU had led to ZANU PF’s victory.187 However, 
one outcome which was certain was that the election results confirmed that Nkomo’s 
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credentials as ‘father of Zimbabwe nationalism’ had been rejected by all except the Ndebele 
ethnic community.188 
Whilst the Black electorate voting pattern reinforced ethnic allegiances, the White voters 
were creating a new dimension in post-colonial racial relations by voting for Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesian Front party. The Rhodesian Front won all twenty seats reserved for Whites.189 
The Rhodesian Front’s monopoly of the reserved seats for Whites meant that the White 
electorate had given Ian Smith the political mandate to represent them despite being the 
architect of UDI which had prolonged minority rule. Victory by Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front 
had therefore made the White community vulnerable to accusations by Blacks that they 
were not ready to abandon the architecture of the undemocratic political system which had 
prolonged colonial rule. The development of such racial perceptions would naturally bring 
much scrutiny on how Whites would respond to government’s reconciliation policies in the 
nation building project.    
Political Reconciliation Policy 
The outcome of Zimbabwe’s first democratic elections exposed historic ethnic and racial 
polarisation which carried the potential of undermining community relations essential in 
creating a national identity. Martins identified the political outcome in the 1980 elections as 
a major contributory factor to the political naivety of a majority of older Whites.190 He 
remembered how his parents and many other Whites were petrified when Mugabe won the 
elections. They had hoped that Nkomo, whom they perceived as a ‘moderate’, would win 
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the elections.191 Martins believes it was the outcome of the elections which undermined the 
resolve by some Whites to be part of a non-racial nation, hence the continuation by some to 
live on their farms with very little interaction with Blacks until they were violently evicted in 
2000.192  
Therefore, to allay any fears of those who felt politically insecure under a ZANU PF 
government, Mugabe in his maiden speech on 4 March 1980 called for reconciliation and 
national unity. The speech was aimed at stimulating a national consciousness by 
encouraging Zimbabweans to think beyond racial and ethnic boundaries which had 
polarised the country for over ninety years.  Emphasising the need for reconciliation, 
Mugabe said: 
I urge you whether black or white, to join me in a new pledge, to 
forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new 
amity and together as Zimbabweans, trample upon racism, tribalism 
and regionalism.193 
To practically implement the reconciliation drive, the first cabinet of independent Zimbabwe 
did not only consist of victorious ZANU PF members but it also included individuals from 
both PF ZAPU and the white community. In an attempt to appease PF ZAPU supporters, six 
of the thirty-five cabinet seats were reserved for PF ZAPU.194 The most significant PF ZAPU 
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cabinet member was Joshua Nkomo who assumed the role of Home Affairs minister with a 
remit of controlling the police.195 
In a significant conciliatory gesture towards the White community, Mugabe appointed the 
former Rhodesian Front Finance Minister, David Smith, as the new Minister for Commerce 
and Industry, and the president of the White commercial farmers’ National Farmers Union, 
Dennis Norman, as the new Minister of Agriculture.196 The appointment of Whites into the 
cabinet reassured Whites who feared that Mugabe’s ZANU PF would implement the anti-
White rhetoric popularised during the colonial era. The immediate visible impact of 
Mugabe’s reconciliation policy on the White community was the slowing down of White 
emigration which had peaked at 1 558 in May 1980 compared to 1 278 in April of the same 
year.197 
Coloureds and Asians were also part of the reconciliation drive. Although Coloureds were 
not given any cabinet ministerial posts, they felt represented in the Government when 
Joseph Culverwell (Coloured community leader) was appointed a Senator in 1980 and 
Deputy Minister of Education and Culture between 1981 and 1988. To allay the fears of the 
Asian community, Mugabe, at an Asian organised fundraising dinner in 1984 encouraged 
Asians to maximise their business skills as members of ‘one unified nation’. Whist making 
reference to the expulsion of Ugandan Asians in 1972 he reassured them they were ‘citizens 
of the country’ and had an important part to play in the nation building project. 198 
The Matabeleland Civil Conflict (Gukurahundi) 
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Despite political initiatives to pacify PF ZAPU supporters under Mugabe’s reconciliation 
policy, it was not long before the envisaged nation building project started to be derailed by 
the re-emergence of historic politically driven ethnic tensions.199 With Mugabe’s ZANU PF 
government pursuing nation building policies based on the party’s socialist ideological 
framework of ‘absolute power and moral authority within a one party state political and 
ideological framework’, PF ZAPU and its Ndebele supporters were at risk of being accused of 
derailing any nation building processes spearheaded by a Shona dominated government.200 
The vulnerability of the Ndebele in the process of building a new nation became a reality in 
February 1982 when military weapons were discovered on properties owned by PF ZAPU. 
Responding to the discovery of the arms cache, Mugabe accused PF ZAPU of harbouring a 
pre-independence hidden agenda of wanting to dispose a Shona led government if they lost 
elections.201 
Mugabe’s treason accusations against PF ZAPU’s leadership undermined any prospects of 
finding a peaceful solution to the discovery of weapons. This was after the government 
started a coordinated and ruthless process of ending PF ZAPU’s participation in the coalition 
government. PF ZAPU leaders were arrested and detained without trial, and former Ndebele 
ZIPRA fighters were side-lined in the newly integrated Zimbabwe National Army.202  By the 
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end of February 1982, Mugabe had sacked Nkomo, removed all PF ZAPU members from the 
coalition cabinet and confiscated PF ZAPU properties.203 
The arrest and sacking of PF ZAPU leaders (a majority of whom were Ndebele) became part 
of government propaganda in stimulating awareness that the Shona would not tolerate any 
political forces which were bent on destabilising the country. An example of an ethnic 
dimension in the conflict was evident when the state controlled national newspaper, The 
Herald, reported that hundreds of people in the Shona regions of Harare and Mashonaland 
cheered and demonstrated in support of Mugabe’s sacking of Nkomo.204 The flaring up of 
ethnic suspicions and tensions subtly engineered by the state media undermined the 
sincerity of Mugabe’s reconciliation narrative in addressing the historical ethnic tensions. 
Zimbabwe, two years into independence, was on the brink of a violent political upheaval 
that was to radically determine post-colonial ethnic relations within Zimbabwe’s Black 
community.  
In protest at what they believed was deliberate persecution and polarisation of the Ndebele 
by Mugabe’s government, a group of disgruntled former ZIPRA fighters took up arms against 
the government. Although the bulk of the dissidents consisted of ex-ZIPRA fighters, 
Alexander, McGregor and Ranger note that some Ndebele opportunist civilians also joined 
the disgruntled dissidents, taking advantage of the situation to commit crimes or carry out 
personal vendettas.205 Without a clear political ideology and operating in former ZAPU 
controlled areas Alexander, McGregor and Ranger describe how the dissidents carried out 
acts of sabotage on government institutions, dams and communication and transport 
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networks.206 Civilians such as White commercial farmers, members of the Shona community 
and foreign tourists were attacked and in some cases murdered.207 
Faced with the possibility of the newly independent Zimbabwe disintegrating into political 
turmoil, Mugabe had to act decisively against insurgents and their supporters whom the 
government had identified as the Ndebele. There were two major reasons why the Ndebele 
were identified as supporters of the dissidents. These were: the dissidents had chosen a 
tribalism discourse by attacking the Shona when expressing their disgruntlement; and they 
were operating in Matabeleland or areas with a significant Ndebele population where they 
would have been guaranteed the support they needed to carry out their operations. 
To dismantle the perceived civilian dissident support network, Mugabe authorised the 
sending of the North Korean trained soldiers of the Fifth Brigade into Matabeleland province 
to ‘apply a military solution to the dissident problem’.208 The Fifth Brigade, which was only 
answerable to Mugabe, was entirely a Shona crack unit ‘with carefully chosen Ndebele 
speakers who were incorporated because of their knowledge of Matabeleland provinces 
terrain and language.’209 With knowledge inherited from the liberation struggle on guerrilla 
tactics, the army’s objective was to decisively eliminate the source of dissident support that 
had been identified as Ndebele civilians.   
The process of dismantling dissident support would therefore include ruthless and brutal 
attacks on the Ndebele community. These attacks left lasting physical and psychological 
effects on the Ndebele community. It is estimated that twenty thousand members of the 
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Ndebele community were murdered by the security forces between 1985 and 1987.210 To 
instil fear, community members would be forced to come and witness torture and murder 
so as to discourage them from supporting the dissidents. Rape, depriving people of food by 
burning granaries and closing grocery shops in rural areas and detentions without trial were 
also methods used to deter people from supporting the insurgency. To undermine Ndebele 
particularism, the Ndebele were forced to speak Shona or risk being murdered or 
tortured.211 
The attacks carried out by the Fifth Brigade on the Ndebele were known by a Shona word 
‘Gukurahundi’ translated as ‘the rain that washes away chaff from the last harvest before 
the spring’.212 To the Ndebele this meant that the harvest was the achievement of 
independence and the Ndebele were the chaff that was to be washed away before the 
spring rain which was the establishment of a one-party state in a united Zimbabwe under 
the control of a Shona government.213 The brutal suppression of dissidents and the use of a 
Shona word to describe it only served to exacerbate post-colonial ethnic tensions.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the response by the Fifth Brigade had evoked pre-colonial 
memories of the Ndebele raids on the Shona which became a hindrance in unifying an 
ethnically polarised state. Some within the Ndebele community struggled with how they 
could be active participants in nation building when the Shona led military forces were 
carrying out what they believed were punishments for their pre-colonial transgressions 
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against the Shona.214 Gukurahundi had therefore placed the country on a tribal mode which 
was to determine the construction of future relations between the Shona and the Ndebele.  
Parallel to the military campaign in Matabeleland was the continuation of a sustained 
government propaganda campaign based on a biased narrative of the liberation struggle. 
National events meant to unite the nations like Independence and Heroes day celebrations 
degenerated into ZANU PF political rallies where Mugabe and ZANU PF were presented as 
the only authentic heroes of the liberation struggle. Mugabe and ZANU PF were elevated as 
heroic liberators or nation builders whilst Ndebele dominated PF ZAPU’s contribution was 
trivialised, downplayed or denigrated.215 PF ZAPU’s leadership was being depicted as 
cowards and villains who were a threat to Zimbabwe’s hard won independence made 
possible by Mugabe’s ZANU PF.216 
With increasing Ndebele civilian casualties and with the Ndebele leadership in prison or 
under house arrest, there was need for a peaceful solution to end the Matabeleland 
insurgency. On 22 December 1987 a ‘Unity Accord’ was signed between ZANU PF and PF 
ZAPU. Under the unity agreement, the two parties merged to form a new ZANU PF party led 
by Mugabe with Nkomo assuming the party’s vice president post. However, to most 
ordinary Ndebele the ‘Unity Accord’ was a non-event since it failed to erase the bitterness 
and memories of the Fifth Brigade atrocities.217 Neither did the ‘Unity Accord’ end Shona 
dominance in the country’s socio-economic structures.  
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Post-Gukurahundi continuation of Shona dominance was not only restricted to Shona 
regions but also in Matabeleland as highlighted in 1999 by Abel Siwela, the mayor of 
Bulawayo. He bemoaned the fact that ‘the civil service and the private sectors are staffed up 
to 80% or 90% with non-residents. Out of 15 to 20 bank managers in Bulawayo only two are 
Ndebele; an environment which some Ndebele community leaders described as 
shonalisation of the region.’ 218  
The economic marginalisation of Matabeleland during the Gukurahundi civil conflict and the 
atrocities committed by the army on the Ndebele as noted by Muzondidya and Ndlovu-
Gatsheni would have undoubtedly consolidated feelings of despondency when pursuing 
economic integration processes to compete with the Shona.219  Linda, a Ndebele immigrant 
now living in Leicester claimed how under the pretext of Gukurahundi, the government 
would frustrate entrepreneurial Ndebele by requiring them to send their business plans to 
Harare for approval.220 The centralisation of business applications in Harare undermined the 
nation-building project by creating the right environment in which the Ndebele would 
develop perceptions of being discriminated against.  
The development of Ndebele perceptions that they were being economically marginalised 
could not have been avoided since a majority of their business applications were being 
handled by Shona civil servants who were subject to Gukurahundi propaganda of 
demonising the Ndebele. For Linda, her perceptions of economic discrimination became 
justified when an acquaintance working at the offices confided in her by revealing how at 
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times ‘they were instructed not to approve Ndebele business applications’.221 The rapid rise 
of Shona-owned businesses especially in transport and retail shops in Bulawayo during 
Gukurahundi validated perceptions that the government was deliberately frustrating 
potential entrepreneurial Ndebele who could have challenged Shona dominance in the 
business sector. With this ethnic disparity in business enterprise the Shona were presented 
as more entrepreneurial than the Ndebele, thus allowing historic identities and prejudices 
to be consolidated; identities and prejudices which were to be exported to the diaspora. 
Even at the University of Zimbabwe, the Ndebele felt they were not being fully incorporated 
into the Shona dominated student community. Taku who was a student in the early 1990s 
recalled how the proportional representation of the Ndebele students was ‘not a true 
reflection of Zimbabwe’s Ndebele population’.222 Without any success of being represented 
in the Student Union because of their low numbers Taku explained how a majority of them 
ended up being assimilated into the Shona student body.223 With depressed Ndebele 
visibility at the university, the Shona continued to nurture colonial developed perceptions 
that they were more inclined to pursue higher education than the Ndebele.224   
Lenny, a Zimbabwean based business executive who in the 1990s was part of a taskforce 
which was asked to identify reasons for under representation of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe’s 
economic structures, blamed the Ndebele’s response to socio-economic marginalisation.225 
He pointed out how migrating to South Africa and not pursuing higher education had always 
been the most viable option for a majority of Ndebele young men and women who were 
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seeking upward social mobility. Although he acknowledged Ndebele marginalisation during 
Gukurahundi, he was able to draw parallels with the Shona’s responses to marginalisation 
during the colonial era. Whilst the Shona were seen to be embracing education, he argued 
that for a majority of the Ndebele young generation 
…there was not so much emphasis on education attainment as a 
means of facilitating upward social mobility. On completion of Form 
Four [‘O’ level] eZansi [South Africa] was the next destination for a 
significant number. In contrast the Shona did not have the luxury of a 
country they could find solace in as they did not have a country they 
shared ancestral links with. For the Shona, education attainment and 
entrepreneurship had always been their escape route.226 
The post-colonial era political events had therefore jeopardised the implementation of a 
cohesive nation building process by facilitating the reincarnation of historical ethnic 
allegiances. Shona dominance in the country’s socio-economic and political structures had 
created the right environment that would make the Ndebele feel insecure in an 
environment in which the Shona dominated.  By being numerically superior, Shona 
dominance had subtly made the claim that they were the legitimate indigenous people of 
Zimbabwe. 
Racial Reconciliation: Economy 
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At independence, the new government inherited a well-developed economy with an annual 
growth rate averaging 3.4% during the 1980s.227 However Mazingi and Kamidza disclose 
how this well-developed economic structure still moulded by colonial racist policies was 
controlled by Whites with Blacks at the periphery of the economic structures.228 The racial 
imbalances in the economy were well represented in the distribution of wages and salaries. 
Blacks who accounted for 97.6% of the population received a disproportionate 60% of the 
wages and salaries with the rest being distributed among Whites, Coloureds and Asians who 
were less than 3% of the population.229 
This racial disparity in the distribution of wealth became a critical baseline to evaluate 
whether Zimbabwe’s independence was all about political independence for Blacks with 
insignificant economic empowerment. Success of the reconciliation discourse depended on 
the extent the economy would be transformed so as to allow Blacks to participate in the 
productive sectors of mining, farming and manufacturing. Therefore, for Zimbabwe’s post-
colonial nation building project to be meaningful for Africans, Whites had to undertake 
personal transformation by supporting any initiatives to economically empower Blacks. This 
would be an essential component in the process of liberating themselves from a sense of 
colonial superiority within the socio-economic structures. 
Regrettably, Karen Alexander alludes to the fact that the Lancaster House Constitution’s 
economic and political provisions subtly encouraged a majority of Whites not to positively 
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engage with nation building initiatives of economically empowering Blacks.230 This became 
evident when the rapid ‘Africanisation’ of the public sector could not be replicated in the 
private sector where the government had no direct influence.231 Muzondidya attributed this 
to difficulties most entrepreneurial Blacks experienced in their attempts to obtain loans 
from the White controlled banks to challenge the economic dominance of Whites.232  
Ninety years of economic marginalisation had meant that a majority of entrepreneurial 
Blacks did not have the collateral to act as protection if they wanted any bank loans to start 
large scale businesses. As a result, the productive sectors of the economy continued to be 
closed to a majority of Black entrepreneurs.233 Without the financial means to participate in 
the most productive sectors of the economy, aspiring Black entrepreneurs continued to be 
visible in the sectors of the economy which had become synonymous with Black businesses 
(identified earlier in the chapter). Regrettably, the environment allowed the subtle 
continuation of colonial constructed perceptions that Whites were indispensable to 
Zimbabwe’s economic success. 
Perceptions that Blacks could not competently run the economy were further consolidated 
when the government took over the management of twenty public enterprises spread 
across all sectors of the economy which had been successfully run during the colonial era.234 
These included the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company), 
the Grain Marketing Board, National Railways of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia Railway Lines), Air 
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Zimbabwe (Rhodesia Airlines), the Cotton Marketing Board, and Cold Storage Commission, 
among others.235 These public enterprises, especially those in agriculture, had become a 
bastion of the colonial administration and a buffer against the threatening international 
sanctions by ‘subsidising inputs and promoting access to credit facilities to White 
commercial farmers.’236 
However, against this colonial backdrop of economic success Gideon Zhou describes how 
the newly acquired state companies started to operate under ‘untenable operational 
frameworks of dilapidated infrastructure and equipment, huge debts, undercapitalization, 
skills deficits, vandalism and looting by top ranking government officials and 
politicians…operating below optimal levels, failing to service bills and facing frequent 
threats of industrial action from employees.’237 It was therefore not surprising that the 
decline of once thriving state enterprises dented the credibility of Blacks to run public or 
large corporate companies whilst inadvertently endorsing colonial constructed perceptions 
that Whites were better in managing macro businesses. For most Black participants these 
perceptions were justifiable as they would make comparisons with companies under White 
ownership such as Olivine, Lever Brothers, and Rio Tinto.  
Land ownership emerged to be the most contentious issue, symbolising the reluctance by 
some Whites to dismantle their colonial economic privileges and the accompanying 
prejudices that they were more economically competent than Blacks. Taking advantage of 
the ‘willing-buyer’ and ‘willing-seller’ principle enshrined in the Lancaster House 
Constitution, a significant number of White farmers frustrated any redistribution of land to 
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the landless Black population.238 With very few willing to sell their vast farms, a majority 
continued to hold on to their productive arable land.  As a result, most Black farmers 
continued to be trapped in subsistence or semi-commercial farming on land inherited from 
the colonial era.  
As the Black population increased, the urgency of addressing the land issue is captured by 
Muzondidya when he points out that by 1987 ‘the population in the Communal Lands had 
risen to 5.1 million and the national average population density was 36 people square km, 
up from 3.9 million and 27 in 1982. The failure by the government to deliver land…posed a 
challenge to national stability as peasants became more militant in their demands.’239  
White farmers’ abdication from an honest engagement with land redistribution gradually 
evolved into racial tensions based on perceptions of mistrust, with the potential of derailing 
nation building initiatives. The indifferent attitude of Whites towards the land reform 
programme had put them on a collision course with the landless Black population who 
believed reclaiming the land was one of the most significant missing pieces in the 
independence jigsaw puzzle. For Blacks, any post-colonial sustainable and meaningful racial 
reconciliation could not take place without a White supported land reform programme to 
economically empower the Blacks.  
With Blacks continuing to dominate the periphery of the productive sectors of the economy 
by the end of the first decade, Zimbabwe’s independence had failed to translate to Black 
economic empowerment. Whites continued to enjoy socio-economic luxuries they had been 
accustomed to during the colonial era, thus failing to release themselves from the colonial 
238 James Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997’, p.171. 
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mentality of being economically superior to Blacks. A significant number of Black 
Zimbabweans had therefore migrated with a mind-set that put entrepreneurship at the 
periphery of their integration patterns as they would not have had the opportunity to 
engage in business activities to challenge Whites.  
However, it would be naïve to conclude that continuation of a mind-set in which Whites 
were made to feel indispensable to the economic viability of post-colonial Zimbabwe could 
only be attributed to reluctance by some Whites to dismantle their colonial economic 
privileges. Herbst also identifies the Nationalist Movement as playing a part in the economic 
marginalisation of Blacks during the early years of independence. He points out how the 
Nationalist Movement’s focus on removing White rule through armed struggle negated the 
need to develop a comprehensive ideology and manpower to effectively manage the 
inherited sophisticated and efficient agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors.240 
Therefore, as a means of preventing a collapse of the inherited infrastructure and economy, 
the new government was to be indebted to the expertise of the whites to continue to run 
the economy. The result was the continuation of a mind-set among Zimbabweans that 
Whites were better administrators of the Zimbabwe’s economy.  
The perceived invaluable role of Whites in Zimbabwe’s economy was recognised by the 
Minister of Labour and Social Services, Kumbirai Kangai, in an address to White commercial 
farmers in 1980. In his attempts to discourage White emigration he expressed how he was 
amazed that after fighting so bravely during the war they were now emigrating from 
peaceful Zimbabwe by saying:  ‘…through thick and thin you persisted in carrying on and 
were able to produce substantial outputs. I am extremely concerned to hear that there are 
240 Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, p.32. 





quite a number of farmers already giving up, and many more thinking along the same 
lines…This is your home. We want you to stay.’241 
The government’s message encouraged officials of the White Commercial Farmers Union to 
tour the country reassuring their members and asking them not to emigrate.242 With Whites 
feted by the new political establishment, there was a slow process in the disengagement of 
the colonial mentality of seeing themselves as being custodians of Zimbabwe’s economy. 
The integration of Whites in the diaspora (to be discussed in chapter four) would therefore 
not escape the influence of the socio-economic privileges and prejudices developed in the 
colonial and continued to be relevant in independent Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Racial Reconciliation: Education and Health 
To redress colonial inequitable practices in education, the Zimbabwe government 
committed itself to universal accessibility to educational opportunities by abolishing primary 
school tuition. This was to allow African children from lower socio-economic backgrounds to 
attend school. However, post-colonial democratisation of the education system by making it 
accessible to all failed to dismantle the remnants of the colonial two tier education system 
characterised by elite institutions.243 Without legislation to control the building of private 
schools, standardisation of tuition fees or school development levies, inequities between 
the former Group A and B schools continued to exist.   
241 The Herald, ‘Kangai calls on farmers to stay’,  18 July 1980 p.1. 
242 Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles, p. 32. 
243 Zvobgo, Colonialism and Education in Zimbabwe, p. 95. 





Former ‘Group A’ and private schools were permitted to charge significantly higher fees 
than former ‘Group ‘B’ schools. Some of the private schools like Lomagundi College in 
Mashonaland West Province, built in 1983, were constructed on donated White owned 
farms. By virtue of changing higher fees, the schools could afford better facilities to suit the 
elite of society. As a result, the former all White ‘Group A’ government schools and the 
newly established private schools (most of them still administered by White head-teachers), 
experienced slow transformation in racial demographics of their pupils. For most of the 
1980s the schools continued to be dominated by White children who were gradually being 
joined by non-White children whose parents could afford the high tuition fees and school 
development levies. Attending these schools for most Black children became a status 
symbol which gradually evolved into a determining factor when constructing interactions 
both in Zimbabwe and in the diaspora. 
The exorbitant tuition and school development fees charged by the former ‘Group A’ 
schools or the private schools naturally precluded a majority of Black children from 
attending the schools. With Mazingi and Kamidza highlighting that a majority of Blacks’ 
income was one-tenth of that of Whites it was inevitable that a majority of Blacks could not 
afford to send their children to these exclusive private schools or former ‘Group A’ 
schools.244 The former ‘Group A’ schools and the newly established private schools had 
therefore manipulated the education system by allowing some Whites to continue with a 
separatist agenda which only allowed them to co-exist with Blacks without meaningful 
interactions to foster nation building.  
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The democratisation of education had therefore failed to dismantle colonial nurtured 
perceptions and identities that ‘everything western is good and particularly everything local 
or native is inferior…even deemed inappropriate’.245 The experiences of Timothy 
demonstrated how the impact of colonial discourses of racial purity which exalted western 
lifestyles was mainly visible within the Black community especially the emerging class of the 
Black elite. Timothy used to teach French in the 1990s at one of the few private secondary 
schools built after independence for both White and Black children from affluent families. 
As the only Black teacher at the school, he recalled how the few affluent Black parents with 
children enrolled at his school would not shy away from expressing verbally to him that 
having their children at the school was a status symbol and his presence there was ‘spoiling 
their kids’.246  
Timothy’s  experiences were reaffirmed by Panganayi who did not have the opportunity to 
attend a former White only Group ‘A’ school until 1988 when he was in sixth form; by then 
most White parents had withdrawn their children.247 For Panganayi, attending a Group ‘A’ 
school was something he had always aspired to. He recalled how these aspirations had been 
nurtured by his parents who made him believe that English was superior to the indigenous 
languages. He wished to speak English with an accent to imitate Whites; a trend which was 
common in Blacks who were attending former White only schools.248 The attempt to speak 
or act like Whites led to the popularisation of the phrase ‘nose brigade.’ The ‘nose brigade’ 
phenomenon was a product of assumptions within urban Black youths that Whites have a 
nasalised way of speaking. 
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The discontinuation of a racially segregated health system at independence also highlighted 
the lack of unwillingness by Whites to interact with Blacks as equals. Democratisation of the 
health sector facilitated the development of an environment in which the nursing profession 
gradually ceased to be a desirable alternative profession for White nurses. It would have 
been inconceivable for them to work alongside Black nurses as equals whilst looking after 
patients from communities they had historically perceived to be below them in the colonial 
social hierarchy. 
Their responses to the democratisation of the health sector according to Sharai, who 
completed her midwifery training in 1985, were threefold: resigning from government 
hospitals to work in White doctors’ surgeries; changing careers to work in White owned 
companies; or moving abroad with neighbouring South Africa being a preferred destination 
because of the Apartheid system.249 By the end of the first decade of independence Sharai 
confirmed that White nursing students and nurses in Bulawayo during the time of her 
training had virtually disappeared in State run health institutions. 250 
Racial Reconciliation: Coloureds and Asians 
Prior to independence, a majority of Coloureds would have been excused for envisaging 
more recognition as they had a maternal kindred relationship with Blacks. However, in a 
subtle way, the outcome of the Lancaster Constitution had set in motion the marginalisation 
of the Coloured and Asian communities in post-colonial Zimbabwe. This was evident when 
the communities were made to feel insecure by some politicians whose references to 
colonial privileges only succeeded in reinforcing nostalgic thinking devoid of uniting a 
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racially polarised nation. For example, in a speech on 29 October 1982, Zimbabwe’s first 
Health Minister Herbert Ushewokunze classified Coloureds and Asians as part of the 
Rhodesian White community which exploited blacks.251 Instead of assuring these 
communities that their past would not make them socially or economically disenfranchised 
in a new Zimbabwe, Ushewokunze coerced Asians and Coloureds into supporting the ruling 
party as a condition to be fully accepted as citizens of independent Zimbabwe.252 Being 
criminally labelled as co-participants in exploiting Blacks had therefore become the basis for 
marginalising Coloureds and Asians in Zimbabwe’s economic empowerment programmes.253 
Parallel to economic marginalisation was the government’s failure to address colonial racial 
prejudices by building more schools in Coloured residential areas as highlighted by Fisher.254 
The inevitable consequence was that very few children from the community were motivated 
to pursue higher educational attainment, thus creating an environment in which there was 
under-representation of Coloureds within Zimbabwe’s academic establishment and middle-
class professions. A majority of Coloureds found themselves anchored at the lower echelons 
of Zimbabwean socio-economic structures.255  
With restricted professional or economic opportunities, their socio-economic positions were 
now being threatened by the emerging Black middle class. Being placed at the periphery of 
society by Zimbabwe’s Black led government naturally forced some members of the 
Coloured community to re-evaluate and redefine their identities and relations with Blacks. 
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The nature of the relations and identities were not to be confined within Zimbabwe’s 
borders, but were to extend into the diaspora.   
The government had failed to recognise that Coloureds and Asians had priorities that 
needed to be catered for if they were to be socially or economically integrated in 
independent Zimbabwe. While Asians had always been successful retail entrepreneurs, 
Coloureds, by contrast, became more vulnerable to the impact of exclusionary government 
economic policies. Despite some within the Coloured community having historically 
occupied positions of prestige as teachers and nurses, Coloureds in post-colonial Zimbabwe 
continued to be overwhelmingly self-employed and unemployed.256  
Patrick, one of the few successful Coloured business owners to migrate from Zimbabwe, 
illustrated how, unlike Asians, members of his community did not have the capital; neither 
were they a close knit or affluent enough community to support each other in building a 
visible and strong business presence.257 As in the colonial era, a majority of individuals 
within the community continued to deal with their marginalisation by acquiring technical 
skills as electricians, motor mechanics or plumbers. These were skills that would allow them 
to be self-employed tradesmen.258 
The uncertain position of Coloureds and Asians was further complicated by failure by some 
within the Black community to accept them as fellow citizens of an independent Zimbabwe 
with equal socio-economic opportunities. The social disenfranchisement of Coloureds and 
Asians was captured in the Sunday News of August 1987.  The newspaper reported uproar 
from the mainly Black audience when two Coloured girls and an Indian girl won ‘Miss Teen’ 
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beauty contest in Bulawayo.259 Such explicit expression of racial hatred was a sign that 
Zimbabwe’s nation building project had failed to usher stimulation of a consciousness which 
encouraged Zimbabweans to think beyond racial lines. Seven years into independence, 
reverse racism by Blacks towards other minority races was emerging to be one of the 
determinants in the construction of community relations.  
Political utterances, the disparity in the treatment of the minority communities and 
incidences of society’s anti-Coloured or anti-Asian rhetoric had made it apparent that 
peaceful transition to multiparty democracy had not been followed by a clear framework of 
reconciling a nation ravaged by colonial racial injustices. Whilst a significant number of 
Whites continued to hold on to their colonial privileges, Coloureds and Asians were made to 
believe that they were in the periphery of the society with limited equal opportunities. It 
was the evolving nature of the experiences of privileges and marginalisation which became 
salient discourses in determining relations within Zimbabwe’s communities in Britain.  
National Symbols 
For a country polarised for years on racial and ethnic grounds, there was a need to create 
new visual or verbal national symbols to unite the people.  It was therefore inevitable that 
the early years of independence were marked by the successful removal of colonial 
identities. The process would involve renaming of street names, towns and cities, the 
‘Africanisation’ of the public service, and the removal of colonial statues.260 However, the 
removal of colonial symbols was not reciprocated by implementation of new national 
symbols to engrain a sense of citizenship.  As the first decade of independence progressed it 
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became apparent that the government was not in a hurry to establish recognisable national 
symbols necessary to nurture national pride. With the exception of a new national flag, 
there was little progress or emphasis in developing national symbols such as a national 
anthem or national dress.  
It was this lack of urgency in developing national symbols which resulted in the national 
anthem exclusive to Zimbabwe being used for the first time in 1994. Prior to that, the 
African National Congress’ official anthem ‘God bless Africa’ (‘Ishe komborera Africa’) during 
South Africa’s apartheid era was Zimbabwe’s national anthem. Even the introduction of the 
new national anthem failed to trigger a consciousness of a national identity as pointed out 
by Bella, a fifty-five year old Zimbabwean Asian. To stress her point she revealed that few 
Zimbabweans across the racial divide took the initiative of learning the new national anthem 
‘as it was with Ishe Komborera Africa, which was known by a majority’.261  
Without a nurtured shared sense of identity that would have been developed and 
consolidated by national symbols, multi-ethnic Zimbabweans were posed to create 
communities based on their own interpretation of what it means to be Zimbabwean (in 
independent Zimbabwe). Memories of a colonial and post-colonial environment of ethnic 
and racial prejudices, mistrust and suspicions would form the basis of these interpretations. 
Migrating without experiencing the construction of national symbols to unite Zimbabweans 
would therefore carry the potential of undermining the need to establish a cohesive 
multicultural Zimbabwean community that could be identified as a nation in the diaspora. 
Summary and Conclusion 
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Whilst the pre-colonial advent of the Ndebele incarnated tensions between the Shona and 
the Ndebele, it was the formal politicisation of ethnicity and race during the colonial and 
post-colonial eras which triggered complex and interrelated multifaceted processes on the 
construction of community interactions. Therefore, by analysing the transformation of 
Zimbabwe’s society during the different phases of the country’s history, the chapter has 
developed a narrative essential in understanding the impact of past experiences on the 
construction of contemporary interactions and identities within the Zimbabwean diaspora 
community.  
The colonial creation of ethnic named administrative boundaries and racial 
compartmentalisation of the population into three categories of Whites, Coloureds and 
Asians, and Blacks, served to stimulate a consciousness of ethnic allegiances and the 
creation of racial boundaries. To ensure there would be no transgression of racial 
boundaries or privileges, Whites as occupiers of the top threshold in the hierarchy were 
sheltered from competing with other races in the colonial socio-economic structures by 
legislation such as the Education Act (1966), the Land Tenure Act (1969), the Vagrancy Act 
(1968) and the Area Accommodation Act (1972). 
 By having privileged access to the country’s resources, Whites emerged to be the main 
contributors to the country’s economy in which a majority of Coloureds and Blacks had been 
condemned to semi-skilled or unskilled labour. The colonial discriminatory policies had 
facilitated the creation of an environment in which Whites would feel indispensable to the 
economic needs of the country; a privileged economic position which would have the 





colonial nation building project would be determined by the extent to which Whites were 
willing to relinquish their constructed economic privileges.  
The colonial racial categorisation of the population had also exposed Coloureds and Asians 
to potential marginalisation in a Black ruled independent Zimbabwe. As occupiers of the 
second position in the colonial social hierarchy, the Coloured and Asian communities were 
not as disenfranchised as Blacks. Instead, as a divide and rule tactic by the colonial 
administration, Coloureds and Asians were deliberately made to feel superior to Blacks by 
having separate and better equipped schools, and residential areas than a majority of 
Blacks. In addition, Coloureds that had a kindred relationship with Blacks were forcibly 
removed from an African environment and placed in residential homes with access to better 
facilities. In the residential homes they would be indoctrinated to align themselves with 
Whites. It was this privileged colonial position which provided justification for the 
development of perceptions within most Africans that Coloureds and Asians were 
communities who are vulnerable to shifting allegiances and therefore could not be trusted.  
This chapter has also recognised the emergence of Black Africans who were becoming 
increasingly sceptical of the relevance of their traditions or history. These were Africans who 
were beginning to entertain racial ideologies that any future African way of life or socio-
economic systems should be modelled around European socio-economic and political 
systems if upward social mobility was to be attained.  A majority of these were Christian 
converts or beneficiaries of a western education system. The development of a Black African 
middle class and emphasis on western education started the stratification of the African 





communities, but would also determine socio-economic interactions with host communities 
in the diaspora.  
The chapter also acknowledged that the processes involved in the construction of 
contemporary relations within Zimbabwe’s community cannot be solely attributed to 
tragedies of socio-economic and political policies instituted by the colonial administration. 
The Black Nationalist Movement’s leadership and the provisions of the Lancaster House 
Constitution were also essential in determining the construction of community relations. For 
example, the 1980s Matabeleland civil conflict served to confirm how the Nationalist 
Movement’s obsession with overthrowing the White minority government had resulted in 
little effort being put in to developing a nation building agenda that would have overridden 
historical ethnic tensions between the Shona and Ndebele.  
In acknowledging the multifaceted reasons for contemporary interactions between 
Zimbabwean communities, the chapter critically examined the complexity of political events 
which led to Zimbabwe’s independence. The Lancaster House Constitution undermined the 
nation building agenda by failing to provide a clear framework on how to reconcile a nation 
ravaged by colonial injustices.  
With the Constitution guaranteeing Whites’ political participation and protection of 
economic privileges, a majority of the Whites continued to enjoy the luxuries they had been 
accustomed to during the colonial period. The racial partnership embedded in the 
Constitution also set in motion processes in which post-colonial Zimbabwe would be 
described as a bifurcated society of Blacks and Whites with Coloureds and Asians being 





disengage from the colonial privileges and the perceived marginalisation of Coloureds and 
Asians set the tone of inter-racial relations in the diaspora.  
In the absence of a defined policy on what Zimbabwe’s reconciliation entailed, Zimbabwean 
communities prior to migration continued to co-exist with minimum social or political 
interactions. Without any evidence of political urgency to develop national symbols apart 
from the national flag, the first decades of independence were largely defined by failure to 
release communities from colonial memories of being superior or inferior to each other. It 
was therefore left for respective communities to interpret what it means to be 
Zimbabwean; interpretations which would be based on colonial and post-colonial 
prejudices. It was the importation of these interpretations which would ultimately 
determine the construction of relations between Zimbabwe’s multi-ethnic communities in 
Britain. 
Chapter 3 
The Impact of Colonial and Post-Colonial Identities and Prejudices on 
Interactions between Zimbabwean Immigrant Communities in Britain. 
Historiography of the different phases of Zimbabwe’s history has not shied away from 
unveiling socio-economic and political systems which were instrumental in erecting 
community boundaries riddled with ethno-racial identities and prejudices. JoAnn McGregor 
in her essay ‘The Making of Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora’ acknowledges the long term 
consequence of these historical influences on Zimbabwean immigrants by pointing out that: 
Diaspora communities should not be understood as reified groups 
with fixed essence, but as the outcome of historical, political and 
cultural processes through which the ideas of belonging come to be 
defined primarily in terms of attachment to a distant homeland and 
shared imaginaries.1  
Zimbabweans just like all immigrants in all societies migrated with identities and prejudices 
which were constructed by the social, economic and political structures in the country of 
origin. These imported identities and prejudices were to play an integral role in the 
construction of relations between multi-ethnic Zimbabwean immigrants classified into the 
following five categories: visitors, students, those with dual nationality or ancestral heritage, 
political asylum seekers and those on work-permits.2 With such distinct categorisation, the 
chapter’s comparative analysis of the impact of the imported identities and prejudices on 
the diaspora Zimbabwean communities will reveal how the complexities in the construction 
1 JoAnn McGregor ‘The Making of Zimbabwe's New Diaspora’ in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka Primorac, (eds). 
Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2010) p.6. 
2 Dominic Pasura, African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of 
Zimbabweans in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp.43-47. 
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of relations were not only determined by shared historic commonalities, but also three 
inter-related variables: the period in which migration took place; circumstances surrounding 
emigration; and age of individuals on arrival in Britain.  
In recognition of historiographical evidence that migration to Britain by Zimbabweans was 
not a post-colonial phenomenon, the chapter starts by briefly examining the construction of 
ethnic and racial relations during the colonial era; with a particular focus on the 1970s. 
Britain’s efforts to assist Black African students and the protracted political instability 
(exacerbated by the armed struggle for independence) led to a steep rise in the 
Zimbabwean immigrant population in Britain in the 1970s. The increase in the Zimbabwean 
immigrant population was revealed in the 1981 census statistics which indicated that 
between 1971 and 1981 the Zimbabwean-born residents in Britain increased by 109% from 
7 000 to 15 000.3  
The circumstances surrounding colonial migration allowed the emergence of a Zimbabwean 
community that was racially diverse. With scholarships being the most popular route used 
by those migrating to Britain, the racial demography of the growing Zimbabwean immigrant 
community was dominated by the Blacks who were the sole beneficiaries of British 
scholarships. In contrast Zimbabwe’s minority communities’ emigration usually consisted of 
young men fleeing forced conscription in the Rhodesian army. Without financial sponsorship 
from external sources a majority of those who travelled were either from: affluent families 
who could sponsor the journey; those with dual nationality; or those with family networks in 
Britain.  As a result, there was a significant and visible Black immigrant community 
3 Office for National Statistics, Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011, 
Available at  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-
characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-
non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print (Accessed on 3rd March 2014). 
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compared to Coloureds, Asians and Whites. The disproportionate racial representation of 
the colonial immigrant population allowed imported memories of colonial injustices to 
create an environment which was to restrict inter-racial interactions between the immigrant 
communities that shared different pre-emigration experiences.  
By virtue of being the largest community, discussion of Zimbabwean immigrant 
communities’ relations in Britain during the colonial era starts with the Black student 
community and then moves on to other Zimbabwe’s minority communities. To fully 
appreciate the impact of pre-emigration experiences in the construction of diaspora 
relations, circumstances surrounding emigration of each community will be discussed. 
Discussion of the reasons for migration also helps to understand why decisions to relocate 
back home during the early years of independence differed between the ethnic 
communities.  
After having explored the construction of interactions between Zimbabwean immigrant 
communities during the 1970s, the chapter will then move on to examine the impact of 
historically constructed prejudices and identities on the contemporary Zimbabwean 
communities fragmented along racial lines. Discussing the significance of homeland 
experiences in the construction of relations between contemporary Zimbabwean immigrant 
communities will unveil why the nature of interactions should not be solely explained as 
tragedies of colonial racial policies between Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians.  
Whilst it is undeniable that the imperial racist discourse fragmented Zimbabwean 
communities along racial lines, examination of diaspora relations between the Shona and 
the Ndebele also captures the failure by the post-colonial Zimbabwean government to erase 
historically constructed ethnic allegiances and prejudices within the Black community. 
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Differences in ethnic demography due to diverse immigrations patterns facilitated the 
creation of a perfect diaspora environment for the resuscitation of allegiances and 
prejudices which carried the potential of hindering interactions between the Shona and the 
Ndebele. Exploring the influence of pre-emigration variables on African ethnic relations will 
therefore illustrate why the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community should not be 
understood as a monolithic community with shared historic experiences.  
Colonial Immigrants 
The Commonwealth Secretariat and British Government decided to create opportunities for 
academically able Black Zimbabweans to study in Britain as a response to colonial 
Zimbabwe’s discriminatory and restrictive educational policies which had stifled the 
educational progression of Blacks.4 From 1969, Black Zimbabweans were granted full 
scholarships to pursue their education at nineteen British Universities and Polytechnics.5 
The impact of the scholarship scheme was immediate as approximately 1000 Black students 
left the country between 1969 and 1974.6 The 1000 beneficiaries of the scholarship 
programme were part of 60 000 Zimbabwean Blacks who were qualified for further 
education but were denied by the colonial discriminatory education policies.7 With Hakim 
Adi describing how there had been a steady increase of mainly West African students since 
the beginning of the twentieth century;8 the Black Zimbabwean students became part of an 
already established community of African students. 
4 The Times, ‘How Britain Aids Africans from Rhodesia’,  5 October 1974, p.7. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 The Times, ‘Rhodesian Student Influx is a Challenge to Government’, 26 September 1975, p.4. 
8 Hakim Adi, ‘West African Students in Britain, 1900-60: The Politics of Exile’, in David Killingray, ed., Africans in 
Britain (Ilford: Frank Cass,1994),  p. 107. 
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Black Zimbabweans’ access to British educational institutions was not only restricted to the 
recipients of the scholarships. There was also a surge of successful independent applications 
by individuals who had failed to obtain Commonwealth or British scholarships because of 
the tough competition. The increase of students arriving without any sponsorship became 
apparent in 1975 when, in less than a year, of the 1500 students arriving from Zimbabwe 
only 200 had been awarded scholarships.9 The British government was therefore forced to 
react to the influx of Black Zimbabwean students who were arriving with no scholarships, 
grants or access to external sources of income to sustain themselves. At an average cost of 
£1 000 per student a year, the British government agreed to finance studies and the 
maintenance of Black African Rhodesian students who had been offered places to study at 
British institutions but had not been granted scholarships.10 
In addition to the financial assistance, the government also implemented measures to 
facilitate access to a steady income by removing visa restrictions which would have 
prevented the students from seeking employment.11 The relaxation of visa rules allowed 
prospective students like Edison who had arrived in 1978 without a scholarship to find 
employment so as to enable them to pay tuition fees whilst earning money to meet their 
living expenses. Edison acknowledged that if it was not for the relaxation of visa rules, he 
would not have been able to fulfil his ambition of studying economics at Aberdeen 
University as his family back in Zimbabwe would not have been able to finance his studies.12 
The enrolment of the students by various education institutions dotted all over Britain 
resulted in the dispersal of the student population across the country with London having 
9 The Times, ‘Government to aid Rhodesian students’, 11 October 1975, p.2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
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the largest population. Zivanayi, one of the recipients of the scholarship in 1978 recalled 
how London had emerged as the ‘receiving city’ and temporary destination for Zimbabwean 
students who were processing their immigration status before relocating to universities or 
polytechnics that had offered them places.13  
The influx of the African students spread across Britain’s education institutions and the 
transient nature of the Zimbabwean student population in London necessitated the 
formation of the National Union of Zimbabwean Students (NUSZ). This was a national 
organisation to unify the students by coordinating support networks and social events for 
the students. One major function of the NUSZ according to Edison was to offer support to 
the students who were arriving with no extra cash needed to meet their daily living 
expenses.14  
Having inadequate funds according to Edison was an inevitable situation directly linked to 
the racist discourse in the socio-economic structures back home. He described how the 
colonial discriminatory policies made it difficult for their families to engage in viable 
commercial farming or other economic activities which would have enabled them to 
financially support their children in the diaspora.15 It was therefore inevitable that for those 
with no scholarships or government grants, the support networks established through NUSZ 
emerged to be invaluable sources of support in providing temporary accommodation and 
assisting new arrivals with advice on where and how to gain employment. The NUSZ had 
firmly established itself as a catalyst to unite the Black student community with shared pre-
13 Zivanayi, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
14 Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
15 Ibid. 
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emigration identities which had been created and nurtured by the racial policies of the 
Rhodesian government.  
The function of the support networks were not solely for providing financial or employment 
advice for the new arrivals. They were also essential for organising social events such as 
parties. Edison described the parties as the most significant social events where they would 
socialise whilst giving each other advice and reminiscing on past experiences. The students 
would also interact with other non-Zimbabwean communities (especially West African 
students) by organising or attending political meetings in which they would be sharing ‘Pan-
Africanist’ views on how Africa should be liberated.16 Participation in Pan-Africanism 
allowed the Zimbabwean student community to forge a sense of unity with people from all 
the over the world who according to William Ackah were united by the belief of dismantling 
colonial systems.17 The Zimbabwean students had therefore become part of a post-war new 
generation of African students whose political activism according to Adi was ‘strongly 
influenced by growing nationalist movements within the colonies’.18   
In explaining the significance of socialisation within and outside the Zimbabwean student 
community Edison said: 
Those already settled in Britain welcomed newcomers regardless of 
ethnicity. They showed us around places such as the Africa Centre in 
London where we had the opportunity of meeting other Africans. It was at 
these meetings where a Pan-African identity which superseded tribal 
16 Adi, ‘West African Students in Britain’,  p.107. 
17 William Ackah, ‘Pan-Africa Consciousness and Identity: Reflections of the Twentieth Century’, in Mark 
Christian, ed., Black Identity in the 20th Century Expressions of the US and UK African diaspora (London: Hansib 
Publications, 2002), pp.4 -5. 
18 Adi, ‘West African Students in Britain’, p. 107. 
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issues was promoted...The tragedies of colonial rule had made us realise 
we needed each other for moral support if our life in Britain was to be 
bearable...People could travel from all over Britain to attend a party or 
function. 
In reiterating Edison’s assertion on unity, Zivanayi explained how the Zimbabwean African 
student community shared a common binding feature embedded in the circumstances 
which had led to their emigration. To emphasise the unifying forces of circumstances 
surrounding emigration, Zivanayi explained how they did not view themselves as political 
refugees or asylum seekers, but as students who had been denied opportunities to attain 
higher education qualifications because of the oppressive nature of the colonial education 
system.19 It was therefore inevitable that the construction of their identity and interactions 
were to be influenced by memories of injustices Black Africans were experiencing under 
colonial administration back home.  
Although the student body consisted of individuals from both the Shona and the Ndebele 
communities, the political situation back home created the consequential sameness which 
would not tolerate historic ethnic tensions. Shared memories of colonial injustices 
stimulated a consciousness of the need to construct a non-tribal Zimbabwean community 
engaged in collective political activism to remove colonial rule.  
By the mid-1970s the Zimbabwean students were increasingly becoming outspoken in 
denouncing the Rhodesian government whilst being equally critical of Britain’s failure for 
not taking a tougher line against Ian Smith following his unilateral declaration of 
19 Zivanayi, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
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Independence in 1965.20 Britain’s timid response to the Rhodesian government was the 
main reason the NUZS leadership used to justify their support of the armed struggle back 
home. For Zimbabwe’s diaspora student body, Britain’s failure to use its military to force Ian 
Smith to reverse UDI had legitimised the nationalist led armed struggle as the only viable 
means of liberating Zimbabwe.21 
Driven by a policy of non-alignment to any nationalist party or ethnic community, the NUZS 
viewed itself as another Front in the Zimbabwe Liberation struggle, hence the use of 
‘Zimbabwe’ instead of ‘Rhodesia’ in its name. They recognised the hardships faced by 
Rhodesian students, especially those without grants as a ‘necessary sacrifice for themselves 
and for their country.’22 For a majority of the students, the difficulties they were facing were 
necessary since they were part of a process of attaining invaluable skills they would need in 
managing the country’s economic, political and social structures when independence was 
achieved. However, they recognised that their dream of relocating back to an independent 
Zimbabwe would be dependent on the success of the liberation struggle. Therefore, to 
increase pressure on the colonial regime so as to hasten independence, the students 
realised that they had to be actively involved in supporting the nationalist led liberation 
struggle back home. 
To support and raise public awareness of Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence, Edison 
pointed out how the students working together with the NUZS organised fundraising 
activities, rallies, protests and demonstrations marches.23 He explained how coaches would 
be hired from different cities to London where the protest marches and fund raising 
20 The Times, 5 October 1974, p.7. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Times, 26 September 1975. p.4. 
23 Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
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activities were usually held. Describing one of the NUZS organised journeys to protest 
marches in London in which he was a participant Edison said: 
Travelling by coach from Aberdeen where I was doing my economics 
degree we will be chanting slogans and singing revolutionary songs 
praising ZANU such as ZANU chete ndiyo ichatonga (ZANU alone will 
rule Zimbabwe). On arrival in London we would congregate with 
other Zimbabweans and sympathisers at the Marble Arch. From 
there we would march along Oxford Street on to Regent Street, 
singing and denouncing Ian Smith. We would finally assemble at 
Trafalgar Square where we would be addressed24  
Edison’s narration of the demonstration’s events subtly revealed the ethnic demographics 
of Zimbabwe’s student population of the 1970s. Singing Shona songs praising Shona 
dominated ZANU indicated that Shona students outnumbered those from the Ndebele 
community and supporters of the Ndebele dominated ZAPU. However, despite the ethnic 
demographics, Edison expressed that there were cordial relations between the Shona and 
the Ndebele students. He justified his claim of cordial ethnic relations by highlighting that a 
majority of the Ndebele students would join in the singing of the Shona revolutionary songs 
when they were either demonstrating or travelling to protest marches.25  
Sixty-two year old Jacob who initially migrated to Britain in 1973 before relocating back 
home in 1980 also endorsed the existence of cordial relations within the ethnically 
bifurcated student community by referring to interactions held outside the remits of the 
unifying activities held under the banner of political activism. He indicated how individuals 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
                                                          
165 
Chapter 3 
from both the Shona and Ndebele communities would interact well in social gatherings such 
as parties despite the Shona being the majority.26 As a Shona speaking student, his 
interpretation of the reason why Ndebele students were willing to interact with the Shona 
was that a significant number of Ndebele students seemed to have become resigned to the 
fact that they were the minority.27 Therefore, resuscitating historic ethnic tensions would be 
a futile exercise which would only serve to weaken their influence within the Zimbabwean 
student community whose members needed each other for moral and financial support. 
Parallel to the noticeable increase of Zimbabwe’s Black immigrant student population in 
Britain during the 1970s was the immigration of Zimbabwe’s Coloureds, Asians and Whites. 
Whilst a majority of Blacks were migrating as students, young White, Coloured and Asian 
Zimbabweans were fleeing forced enrolment for military service. Julie Kate Seirlis points out 
how, in 1976, the National Service Act prohibited White, Coloured and Asian men between 
the ages of sixteen and twenty-five from leaving the country before completing their first 
eighteen months phase of military service.28 By 1978 all White, Coloured and Asian men 
between eighteen and 38 years old were required to ‘serve 190 days per year’ in the 
military.29 It was this forced participation in the military service which naturally triggered 
emigration.   
However, Coloured emigration during colonial rule was very low in comparison to other 
races. In addition to lack of financial resources, Seirlis points out how Coloureds did not 
have dual nationality or another passport to escape colonial marginalisation or enforced 
26 Jacob, Interview, 23 January 2013. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Julie Kate Seirlis, ‘Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia, 1939–1980’, African Studies, vol. 
63 (2004), pp. 73-93. 
29 James Muzondidya cited in Julie Seirlis ‘Undoing the United Front’, pp.73-93  
                                                          
166 
Chapter 3 
participation in the military service.30  The consequence of these emigration restrictions 
according to Esther, a Coloured immigrant in 1974, was that a majority of Coloured 
immigrants in the 1970s consisted of women who were married to White British men.31 In 
most cases, their husbands would have faced persecution for crossing the racial divide by 
marrying a Coloured.32  
One of those who found herself in a position in which intermarriage was a determinant in 
her emigration was Pamela. She spoke of how in 1973 she and her husband were forced to 
emigrate.33 The decision to emigrate was in response to her husband’s sustained 
discrimination by the White community. Despite her British born husband being an engineer 
she explained how he was unable to find work and neither could they buy or rent a house in 
Whites’ only residential areas.34 The situation was untenable since her husband could also 
not live in Coloured residential areas because of rigid racial boundaries thus making 
emigration the only route to save the marriage.  
Once settled in Britain, Esther explained how Coloureds forced to emigrate by their 
intermarriage status were gradually joined by family members they financially sponsored to 
migrate and Coloured political activists who were fighting racial discrimination (especially 
for Coloureds) back home. Despite the low levels of emigration, both Esther and Pamela 
acknowledged the presence of a small Zimbabwean Coloured community in Britain by the 
end of the 1970s.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013. 
34 Ibid. 
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However, Esther admitted that because of the low levels of immigration the Coloured 
community was not as visible and vibrant as the African student community. Instead, they 
created their own support network led by Joseph Culverwell which rarely interacted or 
sought assistance from other Zimbabwean immigrant communities on immigration issues, 
employment or studying opportunities. Joseph Culverwell was the leader of a small group of 
political activists who had been made ‘prohibited immigrant in Rhodesia’ for fighting racial 
policies.35 The role Culverwell played within the Coloured community was so significant that 
‘visiting him was a ritual expected to be carried out by every Coloured arriving in Britain.’36 
Creating an exclusive Coloured network was a natural response for a community whose 
history had been punctuated by policies aimed at creating a separate identity. Pamela 
acknowledged that a significant number of Coloureds in Britain during the colonial era were 
first generation Coloureds who had been placed in residential homes where a Coloured 
consciousness was stimulated.37 With colonial racial categorisation of the population 
reinforcing their identities and prejudices toward other Zimbabwean communities, they had 
arrived in Britain with no motivation to interact with Zimbabweans outside their own 
community despite being aware of their presence.  
The diversity of Zimbabwe’s minority communities in the 1970s became more pronounced 
with the arrival of individuals from Asian and White communities. A significant number of 
Asians and Whites who emigrated in the 1970s were mainly young men in their mid-teens 
escaping conscription into the Rhodesian army.38 Unlike Coloureds, a majority of them were 
35 Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Pamela, Interview, 13h October 2013.  
38 See Josiah Brownell, ‘The Hole in Rhodesia’s Bucket: White Emigration and the End of Settler Rule’, Journal 
of Southern African Studies, vol.34 (2008), pp. 591-610; Seirlis, ‘Undoing the United Front?’, pp.73-93. 
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from affluent families who could sponsor the journey or they had family networks based in 
Britain.   
Avoiding compulsory military service by young White men had become endemic in the 
1970s. For example in 1973 half of 3000 young men eligible for military service evaded 
conscription.39 In 1978 only 570 reported for duty out of a minimum requirement of 1 
046.40  However, it would be misleading as suggested by Josiah Brownell to conclude that 
White emigration was the exclusive consequence of the liberation war or refusal to 
participate in military service. He argues that there was also a political initiative to alter 
White migration patterns by British and American governments. The British government 
engendered White emigration as a means of hastening the collapse of Ian Smith’s regime by 
denying it manpower, financial or moral support so as to force Ian Smith to negotiate for a 
political settlement.41  
Since the expansion of the Rhodesian economy after World War Two had been inextricably 
linked with immigration from Europe, there was a concerted effort by the British to ‘buy-
out’ young skilled White Rhodesians to leave Rhodesia.42 However, given the perception of 
immigration to the country’s economic or political success, the Rhodesian government 
reduced White emigration by introducing a variety of restrictions. These include: 
dramatically reducing allowances emigrants would take out of the country, restricting 
foreign travel of young men and limiting foreign schooling.43 
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Regardless of the circumstances and challenges surrounding emigration, a majority of 
Whites who migrated had dual nationality or ancestral ties in Britain. With a pre-emigration 
history of having been placed at the top of the hierarchical ladder of the colonial 
classification, a majority of them had been desensitised from seeing the need of interacting 
with other Zimbabwean communities as equals. Therefore, upon arriving in Britain they 
assimilated into the White community resulting in no recognisable community of White 
Rhodesians.  
While a majority of Whites migrating had dual nationality or ancestral ties with Britain, a 
majority of Asians were using historic family social networks to migrate on visitor’s visas. 
Although Chirayil Thumbayil Kannan notes how the foundations of migration from South 
Asia to Britain were laid down before the Second World War with the arrival of seaman,44 it 
was the post-war rapid growth of British Asian society that facilitated the establishment of 
migrant networks utilised by Zimbabwean Asians.  Since a majority of Zimbabwean Asians 
were of Indian origin, Bhavesh, who migrated in 1973, revealed how migrant networks 
provided by extended family members played a fundamental role in young Zimbabwean 
Asian emigration.45 With the majority of Zimbabwean Asians migrating to Britain in the 
1970s categorised as young males in their late teens, family networking was invaluable in 
facilitating a smooth transition into life in Britain. The family members would offer 
accommodation whilst assisting the new arrivals to find colleges in which to enrol so as to 
regularise their immigration status.46 
44 Chirayil Thumbayil Kannan, Cultural Adaptation of Asian Immigrants: First and Second Generation 
(Greenford: The Author, 1978), p.34.   
45 Bhavesh, Interview, 9 September 2013. 
46 Ibid. 
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However, Bhavesh also pointed out that despite assistance from family members, migrating 
on a visitor’s visa was risky as there was always the potential of being denied entry into 
Britain.47 To minimise the threat of deportation a sizeable number of Asians had to migrate 
via a European country where they had the option of staying for several days or weeks 
before proceeding to Britain. They believed arriving from a European country would allow 
them to be perceived as tourists who were on a tour of Europe; thus diminishing the 
chances of being denied entry into the country. Once they obtained a visitor’s visa it was 
easier to enrol at university or college so as to obtain a student visa. Attaining a student visa 
had been realised as the most viable option which guaranteed a longer stay in Britain whilst 
legally seeking employment.  
Bhavesh, who was in his mid-teens when he migrated, was one of those who had to stay 
briefly in a third country before proceeding to Britain.48 He made a stopover in Switzerland 
where he had relatives who could offer him temporary accommodation. Without the 
privilege of accessing British scholarships as Africans, he had to follow the example of other 
Asians by enrolling at a Higher Education Institution so as to obtain a student visa. He 
enrolled at Hatfield Polytechnic north of London where he was able to simultaneously study 
for a business qualification whilst being employed as a casual worker in shops or factories.  
He admitted that the lack of supervision by the Home Office enabled him to exceed the 
stipulated twenty hours he was permitted to work as a foreign student.49 
The steady increase of the Zimbabwean Asian and Coloured immigrant population in Britain 
did not translate to the construction of improved interactions with the Black student 
47 Bhavesh, Interview, 9 September 2013. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.  
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community. This was apparent in political activism. This was because relations between the 
communities continued to be determined by the racial categorisation of the population back 
home. Despite the experiences of colonial Zimbabwe’s discriminatory racial policies, there 
was universal agreement among the participants that there was no significant participation 
by either Asians or Coloureds in Black led Zimbabwe’s diaspora politics of the 1970s. For 
Edison this was not something Black students worried about since the Coloured community 
were not active participants in the nationalist armed struggled back home. Edison’s 
response confirmed Seirlis’ argument that for many Blacks, Coloureds, by virtue of being 
second in the colonial hierarchical classification of the population, were perceived as 
beneficiaries and willing collaborators of the White regime and therefore could not be 
trusted in the liberation struggle.50  
The lack of motivation to join the Black diaspora community in protests against colonial rule 
could not solely be attributed to the racial perceptions embedded in the hierarchical 
categorisation of the population back home. The participants also revealed how it was also 
inextricably linked with different circumstances which led to emigration. Abdi, an Asian who 
migrated in the mid-1970s, spoke of how Coloureds and Asians felt discriminated against as 
they were not eligible to apply for scholarships or grants accessible to Blacks; neither were 
they beneficiaries of relaxed student visa rules which would have allowed them to work 
unlimited hours a week like Black students who had no scholarships.51 As a result, Abdi 
expressed the view that Asian and Coloured communities felt they had different aims and 
50 Seirlis, ‘Undoing the United Front?’, pp.73-03. 
51 Abdi, Interview, 17 June 2013. 
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attitudes to those of Black African students; a position which made them not see the need 
of being co-participants in political activism with the Black students.52 
The consequences of the differences and perceived unfairness in the nature of migration 
between Blacks, Coloureds and Asians became apparent at Zimbabwe’s independence in 
1980 when a significant number of Blacks decided to migrate back to Zimbabwe. Zivanayi 
identified three main groups of Black students who relocated as soon as Zimbabwe attained 
independence. Firstly, there were those who had completed their degrees and therefore felt 
the need to go back home and develop the country. The second group consisted of 
individuals who had their British Council grants terminated or were required to return to 
Zimbabwe. Individuals who accepted relocation funds being offered by the British 
government constituted the third group. A majority of those in the third group would have 
completed their studies and would be eager to utilise their British qualifications in 
rebuilding a new Zimbabwe.   
However, the Black participants established how it would be naïve to conclude that all Black 
Zimbabwean students relocated back to Zimbabwe when the country attained 
independence. There were those like Edison and Zivanayi who found themselves settling 
permanently in Britain despite having harboured ambitions of going back home after 
completion of their studies. Whilst the desire to complete their studies would have been the 
initial reason for postponing their relocation in 1980, both of them identified what they 
perceived as irreversible deterioration of the socio-economic and political situation in 
Zimbabwe during the first decade of independence as significant factors that made them 
settle permanently. 
52 Ibid. 
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The civil conflict in Matabeleland in the 1980s was identified by Edison as a major factor 
which made a significant number of Black Zimbabwean students postpone plans to go back 
home.53 He pointed out how British media reports of attacks by government forces on the 
Ndebele civilians made him and others in the diaspora begin to question if Mugabe’s 
reconciliation initiative in 1980 was only aimed at Whites and not at other communities. 
With civil wars in regional neighbouring states of Mozambique and Angola, there was a 
natural development of perceptions that Zimbabwe might be heading towards the same 
direction of internal political upheaval if there was no peaceful resolution to end the 
Matabeleland insurgency. Edison further highlighted that the uncertainty in the political or 
security stability of the new state was not helped by threats posed by the South African 
Defence Forces (SADF).54 Peter Stiff’s volume Cry Zimbabwe unveils how the SADF was not 
only supporting the dissidents in Matabeleland, but was also involved in several bombings 
targeting South African National Congress activists based in Zimbabwe.55 
The signs of the gradual decline of the economy during the first decade of independence 
which resulted in slow employment creation further destroyed the confidence to relocate 
back home. As explained by James Muzondidya, a GDP growth rate of 1.3 per cent could not 
create enough jobs for the 3.3 per cent average growth in population; neither could it keep 
pace with approximately 100,000 school leavers by 1985. Economic decline became 
apparent in 1991 when average growth fell from 4 per cent to 0.4 percent.56 It was 
therefore not surprising that for the Zimbabwean students the decision to live permanently 
53 Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Peter Stiff, Cry Zimbabwe: Independence Twenty Years On (Johannesburg: Galogo, 2000), pp.59-74. 
56 James Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1987’, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (eds), A 
History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), p. 154. 
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in Britain emerged to be the only sensible option for a better quality of life which they 
believed could no longer be guaranteed in Zimbabwe.    
However, the perceived deterioration of the political and economic climate back home, 
which had triggered decisions to stay permanently in Britain, failed to diminish the colonial 
nurtured strong association with Zimbabwe. Zivanayi remembered how, in the early 1980s, 
when the euphoria of independence was still high, the diaspora community would meet at 
the embassy in London to celebrate Zimbabwe’s Independence.57 As for Edison, despite his 
eligibility to attain British citizenship he resolved not to become a British citizen; a decision 
which he demonstrated by continuing to have a Zimbabwean passport with an ‘indefinite-
stay’ immigration status.58 
Whilst a majority of Blacks were returning home to rebuild a new non-racial Zimbabwe, a 
significant number of Asians and Coloureds chose to adopt a cautious ‘wait and see’ 
attitude. Conscious of their privileged position over Blacks in colonial Zimbabwe, Abdi 
pointed out that at independence it was inevitable for both Coloureds and Asians to be 
cautious of Zimbabwe’s independence as they were not sure what independence would 
mean for them.59 Their anxiety over how they would be treated in a post-colonial Zimbabwe 
was further heightened when they were not represented at the Lancaster House 
negotiations which had led to Zimbabwe’s independence. It was only after Mugabe’s 
maiden reconciliation speech of March 1980 that Coloureds and Asians felt encouraged to 
relocate back to Zimbabwe.60 However, Abdi admitted that the positive impact of the 
reconciliation speech was limited within the Asian immigrant community. This was because: 
57 Zivanayi, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
58 Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
59 Abdi, Interview, 17 June 2013. 
60 Ibid. 
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there were a significant number within the Asian community who embraced the 
reconciliation speech with some scepticism. They continued to maintain a cautious attitude 
as they observed the political developments back home.  
Justifying the cautious approach, Abdi spoke of how the ‘Africanisation’ policy in East Africa 
had led Zimbabwean Asians to develop perceptions of mistrust of African governments.61 
The perceptions had been reinforced by the fact that Zimbabwe’s Asian immigration of the 
1970s had coincided with the arrival of expelled Asians from East Africa.62 It was only after 
1981, when Asians encouraged by what they perceived as non-interference with Asian 
businesses by the government, started migrating back to Zimbabwe in greater numbers. 
Guarantees of safety of Asian businesses encouraged a significant number of those who 
relocated to continue with the entrepreneurial identity of Zimbabwean Asians by 
establishing businesses on arrival. For example, Bhavesh, who relocated in 1988 and settled 
in the Midlands city of Gweru did not use his British attained teaching qualification to find 
work in Zimbabwean schools but instead established an engineering company in the city.  
On the contrary, the Coloureds who relocated back to Zimbabwe in 1980 like Esther 
migrated with a genuine belief that their mixed heritage would facilitate economic or 
political empowerment in a Black led government. They assumed they would not face 
obstacles in seeking employment in both the public and private sectors. It was therefore not 
surprising that on arrival in Zimbabwe, Esther took advantage of a shortage of teachers 
following the democratisation of education by seeking employment in a former White only 
Group ‘A’ school in Harare.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Valerie Marett, Immigrants Settling in the City (Leicester: Leicester University Press.  1989), p.13. 
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Although Zimbabwe’s independence had ushered in a reversal of colonial migration trends, 
the newly independent country was about to experience new forms of migration affecting 
all racial communities. The transformation of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political 
structures in building a new nation-state created new challenges for Zimbabwe’s 
multicultural communities, triggering waves of post-colonial migration out of the country. 
Post-colonial Immigrants 
Since 1980, Zimbabwe has experienced three waves of post-colonial emigration; the 1980s, 
1990s and post-2000.63 The patterns and circumstances of migration varied between the 
racial communities. A majority of Whites and to a lesser extent Coloureds used the ancestral 
route whilst a majority of Blacks used student, work-permit and political refugee routes. As 
for Asians, a significant number utilised family networks that had already been established 
with other Asians of Indian descent settled in Britain. Despite the varied ways used to 
migrate, socio-economic and political events triggered the post-colonial exodus during the 
identified three phases of emigration. 
Failure to adjust to changes in the political environment resulted in an estimated 50 000 to 
60 000 Whites leaving the country between 1980 and 1984.64 With both South Africa and 
Britain absorbing the bulk of the White migrants, Britain was usually the first choice 
destination for those with British passports or those who had access to ancestral visas. 
However, from the late 1980s, as pointed out by Daniel Tevera and Jonathan Crush, White 
emigration significantly declined partly because those who wanted to migrate for political 
63 See for example: Alice Bloch, ‘Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’, Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol.40 (2006), pp.67-87; Daniel Tevera and Jonathan Crush, The New Brain Drain from 
Zimbabwe (Cape Town: Idasa, 2003);  Josephine Lucy Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The 
Decolonisation of White identity in Zimbabwe (Canberra: ANU E Press), 2010. 
64 Alice Bloch, ‘Emigration from Zimbabwe pp.67-87.  
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reasons had gone, leaving behind individuals who had accepted the political changes.65 
Most of those who remained resided in urban areas as professional, business and trades 
people with a small but powerful and economically significant community of commercial 
farmers.66 
The 1990s emigration was a direct result of the economic hardships brought about by the 
implementation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported 
Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Implementation of ESAP was 
necessitated by the government’s 1980s policies to establish a socialist and egalitarian state 
by ‘promoting rural development….achieving a more equitable distribution of the 
land….improving and extending the basic socio-economic infrastructure in the communal 
areas.’67 This massive expenditure on social services, not matched by an increase in tax 
revenues, resulted in the government incurring an ever increasing financial burden which 
gradually led to economic decline. 
Faced with increasing national debt and a declining economy, the Zimbabwean government 
in 1990 launched economic reforms under the guidelines of the World Bank and the IMF. 
The government was instructed to liberalise the economy through: devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar, removal of subsidies on essential consumer products and cutting back 
government expenditure in social services.68 These economic reforms caused untold 
suffering among the Zimbabwean middle and working classes as they faced rapid decline of 
real wages due to removal of price control and consumer subsidies. With the Zimbabwean 
economy shrinking by 30%, a significant number of middle class Zimbabweans adopted 
65 Tevera and Crush, The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe pp.6-7. 
66 Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: p. 9. 
67 Diana Auret, A Decade of Development 1980-1990 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1990), p. 10. 
68James Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1880-1997’, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, A History from the 
Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, p.189. 
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emigration as a strategy of escaping poverty. Britain’s 2001 census statistics indicated that a 
significant number of those who migrated in the 1990s settled in Britain. Zimbabweans’ 
migration to Britain resulted in the population of Zimbabwean born residents in England, 
which in the 1981 census was recorded at 15 000, rising by 136% to 47 000 in the decade 
1991 to 2001 according to the 2001 census figures.69 
However, the pre-emigration background of the participants presented clear evidence that 
not all who migrated to Britain in the 1990s were economic middle class immigrants from 
the Black, Coloured or Asian communities. There was also emigration of young Zimbabwean 
Whites with ancestral links with Britain. This was a diverse group of younger generation 
Whites who wanted a break in their studies or to take a holiday. They would have 
completed either their ‘O’ and ‘A’ Levels, university studies or professional courses. Britain 
was the obvious destination for those with ancestral links with the country as they could be 
assured of family assistance in accommodation or advice on how to get temporary 
employment. 
Martins, who migrated in 1990, was one of those young Zimbabweans with British ancestral 
links who decided to temporarily settle in Britain for one year as an adventure after 
completing his course in motor mechanics. He planned to work for a year raising funds to 
‘travel the world’ before going back to Zimbabwe.70 However, like most young White 
Zimbabweans, his stay became permanent after realising that Zimbabwe’s economy was on 
the decline. Martins described how the decision to stay in Britain was supported by his 
Zimbabwean based parents who were witnessing what he described as ‘the disappearing 
69Office for National Statistics Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011, 
Available at  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-
characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-
non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print (Accessed on 3rd March 2014). 
70 Martins, Interview, 17 January 2013. 
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job opportunities for young White Zimbabweans’.71 Taking advantage of his paternal Welsh 
heritage, he was able to renounce his Zimbabwean citizenship in 1992 to become a British 
citizen.   
Post-millennium emigration was to a large extent a result of the demise of the economy 
following the seizure of white owned farms and the imposition of international economic 
sanctions by the USA and the European Union and their allies which included Canada and 
Australia.72 The imposition of economic sanctions was not only a response to the violent 
eviction of White farmers from their land, but was also induced by what the West perceived 
as government sanctioned persecution of political opponents. The farm evictions and 
persecution of political opponents started in 2000 when Zimbabweans rejected a new 
constitution proposed by the Government which would have given it powers to 
compulsorily seize land from Whites without compensation unless it came from the former 
colonial master, Britain.73 Mugabe’s referendum defeat acted as a wakeup call for the need 
to curb political opposition which he accused of being financially sponsored by White 
farmers and Western governments who were against land redistribution and Black 
economic empowerment.  
Britain’s political recognition of victims of farm invasions and political violence resulted in 
the country becoming the first choice destination of political asylum seekers who could 
financially afford to travel. Although claiming political asylum emerged to be an easy option 
for most Black Zimbabweans migrating to Britain, the reality was that a majority of them 
71 Ibid. 
72 Heather Chingono, ‘Zimbabwe Sanctions: An analysis of the “Lingo” Guiding the Perceptions of the 
Sanctioners and the Sanctionees’, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 4 (2010), 
pp.66-74.  
73 Ibid. 
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were not victims of political persecution but were middle class economic immigrants fleeing 
the demise of the Zimbabwean economy.74  
David, who migrated in 2001, admitted that he was one of those who utilised political 
asylum as an escape route from the imminent economic meltdown.75 This was after 
realising that his income’s purchasing power of basic items like food had been eroded by the 
rapid increase of inflation. For him, migrating to Britain was the only way to escape poverty; 
a decision which he has never regretted especially after the virtual collapse of the economy 
in 2008 when annual inflation was over 230 million percent.76  
With Britain being perceived as a sanctuary for political asylum seekers and economic 
immigrants, there was an inevitable rise of a diverse Zimbabwean community in Britain. An 
influx of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain was reflected in the decade 2001 to 2011 when 
Zimbabwean born residents increased by a further 151%.77 Although post-2000 migration 
was undertaken by all racial communities, the scale of White emigration following the farm 
seizures was extraordinary. At the start of the land invasions in 2000 there were 
approximately 4 500 White commercial farmers utilising eleven million hectares of arable 
land.78 By 2008, the number had been reduced to 500.79  
The experience of not being able to protect their businesses or properties did not only 
highlight their vulnerability to Zimbabwe’s nationalist violent attempts to resolve colonial 
74 Alice Bloch, ‘Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’, Social Policy and Administration, vol.40 
(2006), p.67-87.   
75 David, Interview,13 January 2013. 
76 Brian Raftopoulos, ‘The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008’, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo A History From the Pre-
Colonial Period to 2008, p. 220. 
77Office for National Statistics Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011, 
Available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-
characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-
non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print (Accessed on 3rd March 2014) 
78Raftopoulos, ‘The Crisis in Zimbabwe’, p. 216. 
79 Ibid. 
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injustices, but it also triggered a spiral of downward social mobility. Without the protection 
of the government, the rapid decline of their standard of living could not be halted since 
their claims to be citizens of Zimbabwe had been severely undermined. This was a 
community in which a majority of its members were either born in Rhodesia or in other 
African colonies and had no personal attachment to Britain except through memories of 
ancestral links.80  
As a community caught up in a web of downward social mobility following seizure of their 
farms, White Zimbabweans’ choice of destination was primarily influenced by the need to 
settle in a country where they would be socially and economically integrated. In addition to 
Britain, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Nigeria 
were destinations of the evicted farmers.81 Martin Baumann’s definition of the term ‘exile’ 
as being ‘resonant with ideas of forced emigration’ imposed upon individuals or groups82 
could be used to describe the immigrant status of a majority of post-millennium White 
Zimbabwean immigrants. After the farm evictions ‘automatic right of domicile and the 
inalienable right to a home on the basis of having been born in the country’ could no longer 
be guaranteed.83  
Although there is no official data of the age at White Zimbabwean immigrants were forced 
to leave Zimbabwe from 2000, Robert, who migrated in 2002 aged 52, expressed that most 
of those who emigrated were over the age of 45.84  He went on to describe how the violent 
circumstances surrounding their emigration had made a majority of them arrive in Britain 
80 Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles, p.9. 
81 Lloyd Sachikonye, Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society (Harare: Weaver Press, 2012), 
pp.121.  
82 Martin Baumann ‘Exile’ in Kim Knott and Sean McLoughlin, eds, Diasporas Concepts in Intersections 
Identities (London: Zed Books, 2010), p. 19. 
83 Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles, p. 190. 
84 Robert, Interview, 13 November 2013. 
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with virtually ’nothing’ except proud memories of a resilient and united White Rhodesian 
community that had sustained ‘Rhodesia’ during UDI despite economic sanctions and 
nationalist led armed struggle. These were memories which were to influence the 
construction of the community’s identity in the diaspora.   
Robert, who had remained in Zimbabwe until 2002, categorised a majority of Whites who 
remained in the country when he migrated as: ruling ZANU PF supporters who had become 
part of the political system; those who could not migrate because they could not trace their 
ancestral ties with Britain; and those who had convinced themselves that they had no 
relevant skills or finance to start a new life in a foreign land. He identified individuals who 
had no confidence that they would be able to cope abroad as members of the farming 
community who had lost everything during the farm invasions. With their skills limited to 
farming, Robert reckoned it would have been difficult for the older generation farmers to 
adapt to the employment demands of Britain.85  
These older generation White Zimbabwean immigrants (just like other Zimbabwean 
communities) started constructing interactions influenced by imported prejudices, identities 
or memories of unresolved conflicts constructed during pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial phases of Zimbabwe’s history. The homeland influences were not to be restricted to 
race relations. Examining relations within the Black community also unveiled the extent to 
which historically constructed ethnic allegiances and identities were reincarnated in the 
diaspora.  
Black Immigrant Community 
85 Ibid. 
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Construction of relations within the contemporary Black community in Britain cannot be 
fully understood in isolation from the legacies of ethnic identities constructed during the 
phases of Zimbabwe’s history. The pre-colonial settlement of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe 
marked the start of the development of diverse historical memories based on ethnic 
particularism. The violent pre-colonial nature of Shona-Ndebele relations preceding the 
colonisation of Zimbabwe triggered that consciousness of ethnic particularism which 
evolved into being a determining factor in the construction of relations between the two 
African communities. Although, the colonisation of Zimbabwe and the ethnic tensions 
within the Nationalist Movement (discussed in Chapter Two) provided a conducive 
environment for the nurturing of pre-colonial tribal allegiances, it was the Matabeleland civil 
conflict (Gukurahundi) of the 1980s which emerged to be the most emotive and potent 
factor in constructing diaspora relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. 
The Shona dominated government’s indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force on the 
Ndebele community in response to the Matabeleland insurgency (Gukurahundi) allowed the 
construction of bitter memories which were to be reincarnated in the diaspora. Mabuza, a 
Ndebele immigrant who migrated in March 2003, revealed the extent of the traumatic 
experiences the Ndebele went through by pointing out that nearly ‘every’ Ndebele family in 
the diaspora either had a family member killed or tortured by the Zimbabwean security 
forces.86 On a personal level, he emotionally recalled how his cousin was ‘murdered’ by the 
government soldiers in front of his young children after being suspected (without any 
evidence) that he was a dissident.87 Migrating with such memories of personal tragedies 
naturally undermined the establishment of cordial relations with the Shona to the point that 
86 Mabuza, Interview, 9 June 2013. 
87 Ibid. 
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Mabuza admitted that a majority of Ndebele immigrants found themselves disassociating 
from the Shona community.  
Mabuza’s assertion that memories of Gukurahundi have been the most significant factors in 
influencing how the Ndebele construct their relations with the Shona became apparent 
during the interview process. Although the Ndebele interviewees did not explicitly condone 
the use of historic memories in disassociating themselves from the Shona, they were all 
unanimous in identifying Gukurahundi atrocities as a plausible reason which the Ndebele in 
the diaspora can use to pursue a separatist agenda. Memories of Gukurahundi trauma 
arising from marginality or discrimination had become a potent force which Delanty 
identifies as being crucial in ‘communal identity’.88    
Participants’ reference to Gukurahundi as a justifiable excuse to instigate separatism 
trivialised the fact that a majority of the interviewees could not have personally experienced 
the atrocities perceived to have been carried out by government security forces. This was 
because of the eleven Ndebele interviewees residing in Britain only three were over 45 
years old in 2013 which means they would have been old enough to either remember or to 
have experienced the atrocities. The rest of the interviewees would have been too young to 
remember or have experienced the events of the conflict. The identification of Gukurahundi 
as a reason to justify a separatist agenda by individuals who did not experience it revealed 
the extent to which the events of the conflict have been passed from generation to 
generation.  
This trend of ensuring that Gukurahundi will always be part of Ndebele history is being 
perpetuated by immigrant Ndebele parents like Zanele who emigrated in 2002. She 
88 Gerard Delanty, Community (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 162. 
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admitted that she is part of a group of Ndebele parents in Britain who believe that it is their 
duty (just as it was for their parents) to tell their children of the persecution the Ndebele 
experienced under the hands of the Shona security forces.89 Her resolve to ensure that 
Gukurahundi atrocities should always be entrenched in Ndebele history negates the fact 
that her only personal experience of the conflict took place when she was barely ten years 
old. This was when her family was forced to flee their home from the city of Gweru to 
Ndebele dominated Bulawayo city in the middle of the night ’without shoes.’90 With most 
atrocities being committed in Matabeleland rural areas and fewer in urban areas, Zanele 
acknowledged that the bulk of the Gukurahundi information she knows was based on what 
she was told by family and community elders.91 
Timothy, a Zimbabwean academic based in Britain also used the example of a former 
Ndebele work colleague to confirm the extent Gukurahundi is inextricably linked with the 
Ndebele diaspora community.92 He explained how a former work colleague now resident in 
Britain would not shy away from publicly declaring how he generally did not like interacting 
with the Shona. His dislike of the Shona according to Timothy was driven by the belief that 
forging close links with the Shona community would be betraying his father who was 
murdered by security forces during Gukurahundi. Therefore, as a way of dealing with the 
tragic loss of his father, he not only disassociated himself from the Shona diaspora 
community, but also felt obliged to constantly remind his son growing up in Britain that ‘his 
grandfather whom he did not see was killed by the Shona.’93  
89 Zanele, Interview, 2 March 2013. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Timothy, Interview, 10 May 2013. 
93 Ibid. 
                                                          
186 
Chapter 3 
The attitude of Timothy’s former work colleague represents those whose memories of 
Gukurahundi are based on convictions that it was an ethnic conflict in which the Shona 
through the government security forces committed acts of atrocities on the Ndebele. These 
memories were naturally constructed when at the height of the conflict the government 
security forces forced the Ndebele to speak Shona or risk being murdered or tortured.94 
Language had therefore emerged to be a weapon of war as it not only undermined Ndebele 
identity, but was also used as an emblem of loyalty to the Shona dominated Zimbabwean 
government. 
It was this use of language as a weapon of war that emerged to be a significant catalyst in 
affirming perceptions that it was an ethnic conflict; perceptions which were to be imported 
into the diaspora. The older Ndebele participants’ evaluation of the Gukurahundi served to 
confirm how individuals within the Ndebele immigrant community still harbour memories of 
government sponsored genocide of the Ndebele identity through the use of language. With 
such anti-Shona attitudes (based on language) it was therefore not surprising for Jonah, a 
Ndebele immigrant in his sixties, to describe how the ethnic attachment to Gukurahundi by 
Ndebele immigrants has evolved to be the same or even ‘worse than racism’ as it has given 
them justification not to interact with the diaspora Shona community.95  
The adult Ndebele participants were also aware that whilst the Ndebele were being forced 
to speak and teach Shona to their children there was no incentive for the Shona to learn 
Ndebele. This was partly because there was no deliberate effort by the government after 
independence to end the colonial education system of teaching languages. Ndebele 
continued to be exclusively taught in Matabeleland and parts of the Midland province 
94 See Chapter Two. 
95 Jonah, Interview, 28 February 2013. 
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where there was a strong Ndebele presence, whilst Shona was being taught in the Shona 
dominated provinces of Mashonaland, Masvingo, Manicaland and parts of Midlands.  
 The lack of Shona interest in learning Ndebele was apparent by the fact that, of the twenty-
five Shona interviewed, only four spoke or had limited understanding of Ndebele beyond 
greetings. The Shona individuals who spoke Ndebele like Sharai had made an individual 
choice of learning the language when they were either students at tertiary colleges in 
Bulawayo or were employed in the city as teachers or nurses.96 Sharai had done her nursing 
training in Bulawayo in the 1980s and on completion decided to live in the city until she 
emigrated in 2002.  
Zanele as a Ndebele immigrant admitted that the failure to speak Ndebele by a majority of 
the Shona immigrants naturally restricts interaction.97 This is because: the majority within 
the Ndebele immigrant community find it difficult to forge intimate interactions with a 
Shona diaspora community which historically had shown no interest in learning their 
language.98 For the Ndebele, Gukurahundi had made language become what John Edwards 
describes as an emblem of groupness ‘a symbol of psychosocial point’ underpinning shared 
connotations.99 
Passing memories of Gukurahundi atrocities from generation to generation has been 
undermining the creation of a young Ndebele diaspora community whose relations with the 
Shona should not be determined by memories of the unresolved conflict tensions. There 
have been incidents in Britain where young generation Ndebele youths have been rebuked 
by their peers for forging intimate friendships with the Shona. Jabulani spoke of how his 
96 Sharai Interview 14 March 2013. 
97 Zanele Interview 2 March 2013. 
98 Ibid. 
99 John Edwards, Language and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 55. 
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twenty year old daughter was ‘demonised’ by some of her Ndebele friends for having a 
Shona as her best friend.100 The experience of Jabulani’s daughter reinforces the slow 
process of building relations which would ultimately encourage intimate social interactions 
between the Shona and the Ndebele diaspora communities.   
The testimony of Natalie, a twenty-one year old Zimbabwean student in Leicester, also 
exposed the generational impact of unresolved ethnic tensions on young Zimbabweans with 
dual Shona-Ndebele heritage.101 Having a Ndebele mother and a Shona father made her 
realise how attitudes of young Zimbabweans on both sides of the ethnic divide are still 
determined by historically constructed negative stereotypes. As someone with dual Shona 
and Ndebele heritage, Natalie experienced what she referred to as ‘banter’ with derogatory 
ethnic undertones based on historic events. Her Shona friends would often point out that 
Zimbabwe ‘belongs to us’, implying that her Ndebele side of the family are foreigners who 
migrated from South Africa.102 Her ability to speak both Shona and Ndebele also courted 
backlash from some of her Ndebele friends who would often rebuke her for speaking Shona; 
a language they described as sounding disgusting.103  
Exhibiting ethnic identities within the diaspora, younger generation Zimbabweans proved to 
Natalie the influential role older generation Zimbabweans are playing in sustaining the 
historic ethnic divide. She recalled how during family or community gatherings, discussions 
would usually turn to historic tribal conflicts, thus making it unavoidable for the younger 
generation present not to be aware of the historic ethnic tensions.104 Without any 
willingness to let go of the ethnic identity indoctrination by both young and older 
100 Jabulani, Interview,18 February 2013.  
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generations, she is convinced that relations will not significantly improve within the 
foreseeable future. 
Allowing memories of Gukurahundi to influence construction of relations within the 
different generations of the Ndebele community has inevitably had a negative impact on 
diaspora inter-ethnic marriages. Ralph, an unmarried Ndebele immigrant in his early thirties 
admitted that there are a significant number of Ndebele families who consciously 
discourage intermarriage with the Shona (especially when it involves a Ndebele lady).105 He 
identified the reason as being driven by fears based on traditional Zimbabwean marriage 
practices in which a married woman is required to assimilate into her husband’s family. He 
pointed out that since the Ndebele woman marrying into a Shona family will be expected to 
adopt her husband’s surname and speak Shona, the Ndebele parents’ fear is based on 
assumptions that she will inevitably lose most if not all of her Ndebele identity.106 He 
described how the residue of a Ndebele identity will be restricted to speaking of Shona with 
a Ndebele accent or having a Ndebele first name; a situation which most diaspora Ndebele 
families find difficult to comprehend mainly because of Gukurahundi.107  
With very little intermarriage between the two ethnic communities, Zanele admitted that it 
will be a slow process healing the emotional wounds caused by historical conflicts, 
especially Gukurahundi.108 Despite her acknowledgment of the importance of intermarriage 
in healing the wounds of Gukurahundi, she believed that intermarriage in the diaspora will 
continue to be stifled as long as Ndebele parents like hers continue to indoctrinate their 
105 Ralph, Interview,13 May 2013. 
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108 Zanele Interview 2 March 2013. 
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children to construct relationships with the Shona through the lenses of Gukurahundi 
atrocities. 109 
Regrettably, Jabulani, as a former Ndebele political activist in Leicester, admitted that 
organisations like Mthwakazi have been capitalising on Ndebele bitterness of Gukurahundi 
by also actively encouraging disengagement from the Shona. Jabulani described Mthwakazi 
as a ‘divisive Ndebele separatist political organisation campaigning for the creation of an 
autonomous Ndebele state in Matabeleland’.110 According to Jabulani, the organisation in 
the 2000s had a ‘very active Leicester branch’ which once invited him to take an active role 
in organising the commemoration of ‘Mzilikazi Day’ in Leicester.111 He declined the 
invitation on the pretext that celebration of the founder of the Ndebele community would 
not only consolidate ethnic particularism, but would also promote tribal animosity without 
healing the wounds of Gukurahundi. 
However, it would be misleading to conclude that individuals within the Ndebele 
community are the only ones using memories of unresolved Gukurahundi conflicts to fan 
tribalism within Zimbabwe’s diaspora Black community. There are also individuals within the 
Shona community who are not interested in pursuing a reconciliation agenda with the 
Ndebele. These are people whose perceptions and memories of Gukurahundi were 
constructed by Zimbabwe’s state controlled media propaganda of the 1980s which blamed 
Ndebele politicians and some Ndebele civilians for instigating and sustaining political 
instability in Matabeleland. It is this recollection of 1980s state propaganda which has 
encouraged Shona speaking immigrants like David to trivialise the impact of Gukurahundi on 
109 Ibid. 
110 Jabulani, Interview, 18 February 2013. 
111 Ibid. 
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the Ndebele. They are convinced that the Government’s response to the disturbance was 
the only way to deal with a group of ‘armed bandits who were using guerrilla tactics’.112  
In defence of the government response to the conflict, David argued that the security 
forces’ response was nothing to do with tribalism as claimed by some members of the 
diaspora Ndebele community.113 For him, it was a necessary and appropriate reaction to 
political instability which had been started by a group of Ndebele dominated ‘dissidents’ 
who were using guerrilla tactics to: 
...murder the Shona and to disrupt the economy. As a result it would 
have been natural that the security forces would face difficulties in 
distinguishing Ndebele civilians who were mingling with the 
dissidents. The Ndebele should remember that the soldiers fighting 
the dissidents were former guerrilla fighters during the liberation 
and were acquainted with guerrilla tactics of depending on civilians 
for support. Therefore, there is no reason why the Shona or the 
government should feel obliged to apologise to the Ndebele civilians 
neither should the Ndebele keep on holding to memories of 
Gukurahundi to justify their separatist attitude. Gukurahundi is an 
unfortunate part of our history and should be left as that.’114 
Such comments by individuals within the Shona community on how they perceive 
Gukurahundi has been a hindrance in establishing a cohesive Zimbabwean Black immigrant 
community. Most members of the Shona community are either oblivious to the atrocities of 
112 David Interview 13 January 2013. 
113 Ibid. 
114 David, Interview, 13 January 2013. 
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Gukurahundi or they blame the Ndebele for bringing the atrocities upon themselves. 
Without a consensus on the interpretation of Gukurahundi, interactions between the Shona 
and Ndebele in the diaspora will always be engineered by unresolved conflicts of suspicion 
and mistrust with no internal or external motivation to end the historic hostilities.  
The ethnic demography of Zimbabwe’s Black immigrant community in Britain has been 
another contributory factor inhibiting the construction of cordial inter-tribal interactions by 
creating the right environment to trigger resuscitation of historic memories of ethnic 
conflicts, allegiances and prejudices. Although there is no specific ethnic data for different 
groups of Zimbabweans in the UK, a study of Zimbabwean immigrants by Alice Bloch found 
that most respondents were Shona. According to her findings, nearly three quarters spoke 
Shona fluently; a third spoke fluent Ndebele, while twelve per cent spoke both languages.115 
Her findings justified the ‘Office of National Statistics’ (ONS) decision to print a Shona 
Census Form in the 2011 UK Census.116 By printing a Shona translated form, the ONS had 
inadvertently stimulated a consciousness that the Shona are the majority Zimbabwean 
immigrant community and therefore deserve official recognition. The Ndebele had been 
unwittingly made invisible within Zimbabwe’s diaspora Black community. 
The differences in ethnic demographics within Zimbabwe’s Black immigrant community in 
Britain can be traced back to Ndebele migration trends linked to ancestral links between the 
Ndebele and South Africa. With the pioneers of the Ndebele kingdom having migrated from 
the Zulu nation of South Africa, South Africa had always been a natural and viable 
115 Alice Bloch ‘Zimbabweans in Britain: Transnational Activities and Capabilities’, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, vol. 34 (2008), pp. 287-305.  
116 Office of National Statistics, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/the-2011-
census/collecting-the-information/the-national-campaign/written-translation-support-in-the-2011-census.pdf. 
(Accessed 02/08/15). 
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destination for a majority of individuals from the Ndebele community.117 Ancestral heritage 
with South Africa as suggested by Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera meant the Ndebele 
could easily assimilate into the Zulu community because of the similarities in language, 
history and some aspects of traditions with the Zulus of South Africa.118 Although South 
Africa had always been the preferred destination for a majority of the Ndebele, it would be 
misleading to conclude that there was no Shona immigration into South Africa. The 
proximity of South Africa to Zimbabwe also encouraged individuals from the Shona 
community to migrate to South Africa. Labour recruitment in South African gold mines 
during colonial era initially triggered both Ndebele and Shona emigration.119 
Whilst a combination of proximity and historical ties with South Africa had always ensured a 
higher Ndebele immigration rate into South Africa, participants’ migration trends unveiled 
how Britain had always been an alternative and viable first choice destination for a 
significant number of middle class Shona professionals who could finance long-distance 
travel. Shona migration to Britain became more pronounced from the mid-1990s to the 
early 2000s when a significant number took advantage of organised recruitment of 
Zimbabwean professionals by UK based Employment Agencies who needed nurses, 
engineers, social workers and teachers.120  
JoAnn McGregor explains how the Agencies enticed the professionals (especially in the 
health sector) by holding periodic recruitment drives in Zimbabwe’s public venues such as 
117 Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera, Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival (Pretoria: The Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa, 2010), p. 69. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Pasura, African Transnational Diasporas, 2014, p.38. 
120 JoAnn McGregor, ‘Professional Relocating: Zimbabwean Nurses and Family in Britain’, Geographical Paper 
No. 178, University of Reading (2006), p. 6. 
                                                          
194 
Chapter 3 
hotels between late 1992 and 2002 in Harare.121 Taking advantage of the recruitment drive 
was Sharai, a Zimbabwean trained nurse who migrated at the beginning of 2002 after being 
issued with a work permit. On arrival in Britain, Sharai undertook an adaptation course at a 
Leicestershire Nursing Home so as to be able to work as a qualified nurse. When asked to 
comment on the ethnic representation of those undertaking the adaption courses, Sharai 
admitted that she encountered very few Ndebele nurses.122 The fewer number of Ndebele 
nurses on adaptation courses proved the extent to which the Shona, unlike the Ndebele, 
had positively embraced opportunities of migrating to Britain. 
The recruitment drive for Zimbabwean nurses to fill vacancies in the health sector was also 
complemented by a surge of Zimbabweans applying for nurse training at British Universities. 
The British government before 2002 had unwittingly encouraged foreign applications for 
nurse training by allowing international students access to non-refundable grants and 
bursaries.123 It was therefore inevitable that Zimbabweans would seize the opportunity to 
study in Britain whilst having some financial stability. They could apply for nursing places 
whilst in Zimbabwe and then travel to Britain once they had been invited for interviews. 
Prior to 2002 this was the main migration route used by a majority of potential student 
nurses since Zimbabweans did not face immigration restrictions which required them to 
apply for a British visa before travelling. Memory’s experience demonstrated how on arrival, 
they could obtain a holiday visa which would allow them to stay for six months.124 During 
that time they could attend the interviews and, when successful, they would apply for 
121 Ibid. 
122 Sharai, Interview, 14 March 2013. 
123 McGregor, ‘Professional Relocating,, p. 9. 
124 Memory, Interview, 27 November 2013. 
                                                          
195 
Chapter 3 
student visas. If unsuccessful, they would have enough time to apply to other Universities or 
enrol onto a different course.  
There was consensus among the Black participants that the Shona were the first to utilise 
the student-nurse route to migrate to Britain unlike the Ndebele. The dominance of the 
Shona students training as nurses was reiterated by Memory, a Shona nursing student at De 
Montfort University (DMU) from January 2000 to 2003. She could only recall four Ndebele 
out of over forty Zimbabwean students in her year group.125 The high number of individuals 
from the Shona community enrolled at DMU created the perfect environment for the 
establishment of migrant networks which triggered a rapid rise of the Shona population in 
Leicester. This was because married students like Memory arranged for their spouses and 
children to join them. In the case of Memory, her husband and children joined her in 2000 
and 2002 respectively. Apart from organising migration of her immediate family, she also 
sent student nurse application forms to her two brothers and a cousin to come and join her 
in 2000 and 2001 respectively.126 It was this form of chain migration prevalent within the 
settled Shona nursing student community that naturally helped the rapid increase of the 
Shona community in Leicester, especially in educational institutions. 
The Shona interviewees presented clear evidence that visible presence of the Shona at 
Britain’s universities in the early 2000s was used to resuscitate historically constructed 
prejudices that the Ndebele had never been as motivated as the Shona in the pursuit of 
higher professional or academic qualifications.127 They would express the historic arrogance 
and prejudice toward the Ndebele during the interview process with comments like 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See Chapter Two.  
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mandex128 haadidi kudzidza (Ndebele do not want to learn) to explain the low 
representation of the Ndebele immigrants in higher education (especially in nursing) at the 
turn of the millennium.  
However, these comments trivialised the fact that once the Ndebele immigrants regularised 
their immigration status, they also pursued education as the most useful tool in attaining 
social mobility. This was clearly evident when, out of the eleven UK based Ndebele 
interviewed, eight had acquired a UK professional or academic qualification after they had 
regularised their immigration status. Of the three who had not attained a British 
qualification, two had Zimbabwean professional qualifications and the remaining one was 
still waiting for the decision on his political asylum application. With this high percentage of 
Ndebele enrolling for further education the derogatory comments by the Shona served to 
confirm their historic arrogance engrained in their numerical superiority over the Ndebele.  
Changes in Zimbabwe’s landscape following the formation of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) political party in 1999 under the leadership of Trade Unionist Morgan 
Tsvangirai marked the beginning of changes in the ethnic demography of Zimbabwe’s 
immigrant population in Britain. The results of the parliamentary elections results in 2000 
did not only herald the start of a significant challenge to Mugabe’s government by the MDC, 
but also triggered Ndebele community migration. This was because the 2000 parliamentary 
elections served to confirm that just as it was in the 1980s, Matabeleland provinces were 
still anti-Mugabe’s government. This was apparent when, of the twenty-three parliamentary 
128 Derogatory name used by the Shona referring to the Ndebele. 
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seats in Ndebele dominated Bulawayo and Matabeleland provinces, MDC won all of them 
except two.129  
With memories of Gukurahundi still embedded in the lives of the Ndebele, the political gains 
by the MDC encouraged them to migrate to Britain as political asylum seekers since the 
British government recognised that the political violence in Zimbabwe was being sanctioned 
by the Zimbabwean government.130 Although claiming political asylum in Britain was an 
easy option for both the Shona (who were supporters of MDC) and the Ndebele, Zanele 
admitted that Ndebele asylum seekers had greater confidence in using the asylum route as 
a means of escaping the collapse of the economy in Zimbabwe.131 As the minority within the 
Black Zimbabwean community they were encouraged by assumptions that the British 
government would be more sympathetic to their political asylum applications.132 Unlike 
potential political Shona migrants, the Ndebele immigrants could use their support of the 
MDC to claim that they would always be vulnerable to Mugabe’s government persecution 
just as in the 1980s civil conflict.133  
The diverse immigration circumstances between the two communities were apparent 
within the research’s participants. Of the eight Shona who had political refugee immigration 
status, only two had used seeking political asylum as a first option when they arrived. The 
other six only adopted the asylum political route when there were changes in their 
immigration status following the expiry of their six month visitor or student visas. This was 
129 Africa Watch, ‘Recent Data, Statistics and Indicators Zimbabwe 2000 Parliamentary Election Results’, 
African Security Review, Vol. 14 (2005), pp.59-63. 
130 Alice Bloch, ‘ Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’, Social Policy and Administration, vol.40 
(2006), pp.67-87. 
131 Zanele, Interview, 2 March 2013 . 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
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contrary to Ndebele interviewees as all but one used political asylum as their first option or 
they would have joined their spouses or families who used the political asylum route.    
The increase in the number of Ndebele asylum seekers coincided with the implementation 
of the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999. The Act introduced the dispersal policy which 
empowered the UK Border Agency to relocate asylum seekers from London and the South 
East of England to cities and towns in northern England where there was affordable 
accommodation.134 With a criterion of dispersing political asylum seekers to urban areas 
with cheap housing, Leicester, with relatively cheap accommodation in St Mathew and 
Highfields, was designated a dispersal area for Zimbabwean asylum seekers135. Although 
there might not be statistical verification of Zimbabwean political asylum seekers dispersed 
to Leicester on arrival, data gathered at the end of May 2004 by the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS) identified Zimbabwean asylum seekers as second only to Somalis on 
the list of asylum seekers needing assistance.136   
The inevitable consequence of the dispersal policy was the rapid ethnic transformation of 
the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community in dispersal cities like Leicester which were 
once dominated by the Shona. The ethnic transformation of the diaspora community 
inadvertently created the right environment for the reincarnation of historical memories of 
unresolved conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele. The source of the reincarnation of 
these historical memories was the realisation by a significant number of the Ndebele new 
arrivals that the Shona were: already settled in employment; engaged in higher education, 
134 Patricia Hynes and Rosemary Sales, ‘New Communities: Asylum Seekers and Dispersal’, in Alice Bloch and 
John Solomos, eds, Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 39. 
135 Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), ‘Current Situation’ Available at 
http://www.icar.org.uk/9971/leicester/current-situation.html (Accessed on 4 March 2012). ICAR is 
Runnymede Trust based academic research and information organisation. 
136 Ibid  
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with nursing and social work being the most popular courses; or holding leadership 
positions in social organisations such as churches or community support networks.137  
As a Ndebele asylum seeker in 2002, Zanele admitted that the apparent realisation by the 
Ndebele of a Shona immigrant community perceived to be settled in Britain’s socio-
economic structures led to the construction of jealousy driven perceptions that they would 
always play ‘catch up’ with Shona immigrants; just as in Zimbabwe. A combination of British 
government dispersal policy and the diverse immigration trends between the Shona and the 
Ndebele had therefore inadvertently triggered a resuscitation of ethnic prejudices.  
The new Ndebele settlers were arriving with memories of how their minority status had 
always prejudiced them in assuming leadership roles as reflected in the Unity Agreement of 
December 1987.138 The Unity agreement had instead subtly created perceptions that the 
Ndebele should not expect to assume elected leadership positions in organisations where 
the Shona dominate. It was therefore inevitable that on arrival in Britain, there were 
individuals within the Ndebele community who were determined to assert their influence 
on the Zimbabwean Black community. They were confident of success in cities where they 
believed their population was increasing to the level that it will be possible to challenge 
Shona dominance. 
Leicester, as one of the cities which started to experience the rapid transformation in its 
ethnic demographics following an influx of Ndebele asylum seekers from 2001, could not be 
spared the resuscitation of a Black Zimbabwean community that would be demarcated by 
ethnicity. Sharai who witnessed the rapid changes in the ethnic demographics of 
Zimbabwe’s Leicester community explained how the increasing presence of a large Ndebele 
137 Zanele, Interview, 2 March 2013  
138 See Chapter Two. 
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community in the city naturally attracted other Ndebele individuals from all over Britain.139 
As the Ndebele population increased in the city, it did not take long for some members of 
the Shona community to develop perceptions that the Ndebele were determined to assert 
their influence by pursuing a separatist agenda without fear of Shona reprisals.  
Jabulani, a political activist within Leicester’s Ndebele community admitted that an increase 
in the Ndebele population gave them the confidence to initiate a separatist agenda since it 
activated shared historical or traditional commonalities namely, Gukurahundi and 
language.140 These commonalities emerged to be unifying focal points which enabled the 
Ndebele to establish social networks to challenge the Shona. For example, Jabulani gave an 
example of how he and a few other members of the Ndebele community in Leicester 
established a Burial Society to financially assist or give support to bereaved members of the 
community. Although he claimed that the Burial Society was open to all Zimbabweans, he 
admitted that as a Ndebele run support network, it was inevitably dominated by the 
Ndebele.141   
Happison, a Derby based Shona community worker who lived in Leicester from 2000 to 
2006, also reaffirmed the negative impact on community relations following the rapid 
increase of the Ndebele population in Leicester.142 As someone who used to be involved in 
Leicester’s community activities, he recalled moments when consensus on certain issues 
would be difficult to obtain. Disagreements would arise on trivial issues such as assembling 
football teams for sporting activities resulting in the establishment of teams with an ethnic 
139 Sharai, Interview, 21 March 2013. 
140 Jabulani, interview,18 January 2013. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Happison, Interview, 23 January 3013  
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identity.143 The experiences by Jabulani and Happison therefore served to unravel the 
extent to which the rapid ethnic transformation of Leicester’s Black community had evolved 
into a hindrance in establishing cordial diaspora interactions between the Shona and the 
Ndebele as it invoked historic memories of prejudices, tensions and ethnic allegiances. 
The development of Shona perceptions that a significant number of the Ndebele in Leicester 
are anti-Shona were not only triggered by an increase in the number of exclusive Ndebele 
organised social events or support networks, but also by the Ndebele’s use of ethnicity to 
influence leadership positions in organisations previously dominated by the Shona. Mathew, 
a former secretary of a Leicester based Zimbabwe support network organisation explained 
how the election process to choose leaders had to adapt to changes in the ethnic 
demographics of the organisation’s membership.144 As the membership became more 
diverse, his position and that of the Shona chairman became untenable; a situation which 
forced both of them to resign. He pointed out that changes in the leadership structure were 
instigated by some Ndebele members in the organisation who were demanding a tribal 
balance in the leadership structure to reflect what they perceived as the superior numerical 
position of the Ndebele in Leicester. 145  
The influence of ethnicity in leadership issues as was the case in Zimbabweans’ Leicester 
organisations were also experienced in Derby. Despite the Shona being the majority within 
Zimbabwe’s Derby community, Jacob who had been living in the city since 2002, admitted a 
gradual rise of ethnic conflicts within some Shona run community organisations. He 
explained how the situation arose when the Ndebele realised that their population in the 
143 Ibid  
144 Mathew, Interview, 3 February 2013  
145 Ibid  
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city was increasing. As the population increased, Jacob claimed that the Ndebele were 
reluctant to participate in Shona led community organisations even when the Shona agreed 
to incorporate them in the leadership structures.146 As a result, the Ndebele, according to 
Jacob, have not been visible in community activities led by the Shona. Ndebele lack of 
interest in Shona organised activities was described by Jacob as an attitude which does not 
only trivialise the fact that the Shona led organisations were being ‘competently run’, but it 
also undermined ’democratically run institutions’.147  
The reincarnation of ethnic tensions within Zimbabwe’s Black immigrant communities 
experiencing ethnic transformation has also been compounded by ethnically constructed 
political allegiances. The source of the contemporary political allegiances can be traced back 
to the split of the main opposition political party, the MDC into two factions in 2005. One 
faction was led by Shona speaking Morgan Tsvangirai and the other by Ndebele speaking 
Welshman Ncube. Panganayi, as a former MDC committee member of the UK branch in 
Reading, revealed how the majority of MDC supporters in Britain responded to the split by 
using their ethnicity to choose which group to align with.148 This became apparent when a 
majority of Shona speaking supporters (including him) aligned with Tsvangirai with Ndebele 
supporters aligning with Ncube. For the Ndebele, the MDC split provided a remote chance 
that they would destabilise the political dominance of the Shona; a wish which Paurosi, a 
former Shona war veteran described as ‘wishful thinking which would never happen.’149 The 
use of ethnicity in defining the allegiances within the MDC had indirectly mirrored the ethnic 
split of the nationalist movement during the colonial era.     
146 Jacob, Interview, 23 January 2013. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Panganayi, Interview, 24 March 2013. 
149 Paurosi, Interview, 2 July 2013. 
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Community tensions attributed to political allegiances have not been restricted to ethnic 
factionalism within the opposition MDC party, but have also extended to intense and 
acrimonious rivalry between Mugabe’s ZANU PF and MDC diaspora supporters. Memories 
of the post-2000 clamp down of political activism by the Zimbabwean government has led 
to a vocal and visible diaspora group of opposition supporters who are not only anti-
Mugabe, but also pursue an agenda of ostracising ZANU PF sympathisers. 
In cities like Leicester, where there is a high population of Zimbabweans, MDC sympathisers 
or anti-Mugabe supporters are in control of the majority of community support Associations 
since most of them would have used the political asylum route to settle in Britain. Nyasha, a 
political refugee and a member of one these community Associations since settling in 
Leicester in 2010, accused the association’s leadership of reincarnating the memories of 
animosity between the two major political parties in Zimbabwe.150 She described how the 
leaders have made it an exclusive Association for MDC supporters by denouncing Mugabe 
and his supporters ‘a situation which has made ZANU PF supporters in Leicester feel 
intimidated to be associated with the Association.’151  
After attending five fortnightly public meetings as an observer, the extent to which the 
Association had evolved into an anti-Mugabe movement became apparent. The structure of 
the meeting rarely changed. The proceedings would always start with Christian song(s) and 
a prayer, followed by an interactive address with the audience by the Chairman or a 
member of the leadership team. It was during the address that Zimbabwe’s political issues 
were brought up which ranged from reports of unsubstantiated political violence, collapse 
of the economy, growing poverty and the need to change the government in Zimbabwe. 
150 Nyasha, Interview, 8 April 2013. 
151 Ibid. 
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Political references negated the fact that the Association was to be perceived as apolitical 
with the aim of not only helping asylum seekers, but any Zimbabwean who might require 
assistance. The meeting would end with socialisation of the members and guests whilst 
eating Zimbabwe’s staple food of sadza (thickened porridge made from maize meal), meat-
stew and green vegetables.  
The impact of homeland developed ethnic prejudices in determining community relations in 
cities like Leicester has not been reciprocated in urban areas where there was no significant 
ethnic transformation to challenge the dominance of the Shona. Using the example of 
Stevenage, Mathew explained that, during the time he lived in the town between 2004 and 
2009, the Shona dominated community had managed to construct a cohesive and united 
Zimbabwean Black community. He explained how organised community social activities 
such as sporting events and the establishment of networks to support community members 
in bereavement were invaluable in uniting the Stevenage Zimbabwean community.  
Mathew identified the unity of Zimbabwean Black immigrants as one of the major reasons 
why Stevenage Town Council allowed the community to have access to facilities at a 
community centre.152 He acknowledged that during the time he lived in the town, the 
availability of the community centre enhanced community cohesiveness by making it easier 
to hold community meetings and organise social events such as church services, parties or 
weddings.  If it was not for the cohesiveness of the Zimbabwean community, Mathew was 
convinced that Stevenage Town Council would not have continued to be twinned with 
Zimbabwe’s Kadoma City; a partnership which started in 1989. 153  
152 Mathew, Interview, 3 February 2013. 
153 Ibid. 
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Mathew was also convinced that the ethnic demographics of the Zimbabwean community in 
Stevenage in which the Shona were the dominant group was the most plausible reason for 
the construction of a cohesive Zimbabwean community. He justified his conviction by 
highlighting that the Zimbabwean community in Stevenage was fortunate in that there was 
one predominant ethnic group; the Shona.154 As a result there were no detrimental tribal 
conflicts. The minority Ndebele who could also speak fluent Shona were willing participants 
in Shona organised events as there was no opportunity or need to promote ethnic 
differences.155 
Mathew’s assertion served to confirm that Shona dominance in urban areas like Stevenage 
would have created pseudo community relations which offered a false sense of cordial 
ethnic relations. The Ndebele would have reluctantly accepted the fact that if they wanted 
to exclude themselves from the Shona, they would find it difficult to access community 
support networks dominated by the Shona. The creation of such pseudo community 
relations justified why some individuals within the Ndebele community would have 
migrated to cities like Leicester where there was a significant Ndebele population.  
Migrating to areas with a large Ndebele was necessitated by the fact that there were some 
within the Ndebele community who needed to gain confidence in constructing communities 
to challenge the Shona dominance. For a majority of individuals within the Ndebele 
community, constructing a united and visible community would be the most effective way in 
dealing with historic memories that the Shona will always use their dominance (as it was in 
Zimbabwe)  to impose their will on them. To emphasise this point, Panganayi, a Shona who 
resides in Reading, gave an example of an incident which occurred at one of the 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
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Zimbabwean Days of Fellowship organised by his Church for the predominantly Black 
members.156 The ‘Days of Fellowship’ held at least four times a year aimed to socialise and 
fundraise for Zimbabwean projects whilst holding church services the way it is done back 
home; especially by singing songs in vernacular languages.157  
It was the need to recreate a Zimbabwean feel to the services which triggered tensions 
between the Shona and the Ndebele at one of those meetings in 2005. Panganayi described 
how the Ndebele took advantage of their increasing numbers to verbally express their 
displeasure when Shona songs were dominating song services. To avoid future disruption of 
the Day’s proceedings, Panganayi pointed out that the organisers of subsequent ‘Days of 
Fellowship’ had to ensure that both communities were equally or proportionally 
represented in all Church services, with English being used as the medium of 
communication when addressing the congregation. Despite the positive response to 
Ndebele protests, Panganayi was convinced that such protests and subsequent changes 
would not have occurred in the early 2000s when the Ndebele were significantly in the 
minority. 158 
The incident in Panganayi’s church revealed that the Black Zimbabwean Christian 
community in Britain was not immune to ethnic identities or tensions which had the 
potential of hindering interactions between the Shona and the Ndebele. Ethnic identities in 
the churches frequented by Zimbabweans became apparent when the increasing number of 
Zimbabwean immigrants started to undergo rapid ethnic transformation at the turn of the 
new millennium. As the Zimbabwean immigrant population increased, there was a 
156 Panganayi, , Interview, 24 March 2013. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
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spontaneous growth of diaspora congregations whose ethnic demographics were an 
extension of the churches in Zimbabwe.159 Just like in Zimbabwe, the diaspora Zimbabwean 
Home Grown Pentecostal Churches founded by Shona clergy continued to be dominated by 
members from the Shona community.160 Examples of these Shona dominated Home Grown 
Churches include Family of God, Forward in Faith Mission International, African Apostolic 
Faith, Johanne Masowe Gospel of God Church, and Apostolic Faith Mission.  
The Traditional Churches’ congregations have also not been spared Zimbabwe’s ethnic 
demographics. While Home Grown Church congregants’ ethnic identities are reflective of 
the ethnicity of the founding leaders,  the diaspora demographics in the Traditional 
Churches such as the Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventist, Church of England, Roman 
Catholic or Methodist can be traced back to spread of Christianity during the early years of 
colonial rule. Although Chengetai Zvobgo points out that missionary operations commenced 
in full force after the defeat of the Shona and Ndebele following the uprising of 1896-97, it is 
important to note that the impact of Ndebele’s initial resistance to Christianity and the 
colonial process of colonising Mashonaland first cannot be ignored when seeking to 
understand the diverse (diaspora) ethnic representation in a majority of Traditional 
Churches.161  
For example, due to Ndebele resistance to Christianity in the nineteenth century and the 
Ndebele uprising of 1893, Zvobgo identifies the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church as one 
of the few churches involved in pioneer missionary activities in Matabeleland. The Church 
159 Dominic Pasura ‘Religious Transnationalism: The Case of Zimbabwean Catholics in Britain‘, Journal of 
Religion in Africa, vol. 42 (2012), pp. 26-53. 
160 See Chapter Two. 
161 Chengetai J M Zvobgo, A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 
1996), p. 67. 
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consolidated its presence in the region by opening Solusi Mission School in 1894.162 
Although the Ndebele rebellion of 1894 and a severe famine disrupted the evangelistic 
work, the SDA missionaries were able to organise a church in 1902; evidence of the Church’s 
progress in its evangelistic work. By 1933 an SDA school had been established at Solusi 
Mission which over the years expanded into one of the largest church run private 
educational institutions in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland region. It is this early presence of the 
SDA Church in Matabeleland which explains why a significant number of the Ndebele both 
in Zimbabwe and Britain are members of the Church.  
Similarly, the trend in the construction of ethnic identities in Churches like SDA which had 
an early presence in Matabeleland was replicated in the majority of Traditional Churches 
involved in establishing mission stations in Shona dominated regions of Mashonaland and 
Manicaland during the early stages of colonial rule. Examples of Churches actively involved 
in the Shona regions during the first decade of colonial rule included Roman Catholic, 
Wesleyan Methodists, American Methodist Episcopal, Anglicans, Dutch Reformed and 
Salvation Amy.163  As a result of their early presence in the regions, these churches have 
always had a strong Shona presence; a presence which has extended to diaspora 
congregations.  
For example, the Roman Catholic Church in Britain has exhibited the historical dominance of 
the Shona community in its congregations by holding diaspora ‘Mass Services’ in Shona and 
rarely in Ndebele.164 The services are held across the country in urban centres where there 
is a strong Zimbabwean immigrant population like London, Leicester, Birmingham and 
162 Ibid, p. 11. 
163 Ibid, pp. 1-81. 
164 John, Interview, 24 March 2013. 
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Slough. Zivanayi and John, who are both members of the Roman Catholic Church, admitted 
that having Shona ‘Mass Services’ which cater for the dominant Shona congregants has 
naturally excluded or stifled Ndebele participation. By having services in Shona, the use of 
language has reincarnated memories of the influence of linguistic differences in enforcing 
Shona-Ndebele demarcations. This is because: Ndebele participation in the Shona services 
according to John (who attends services in Slough) have been restricted to members of the 
Ndebele community who are fluent in Shona whilst the rest would feel comfortable 
attending English services.165  
The Black participants also reveal an insecure diaspora community which is riddled with 
historically constructed mistrust and jealousy that is not influenced by ethnicity.  This 
became apparent when a majority of them admitted reluctance to share sensitive personal 
issues such as immigration status to other Black Zimbabweans before regularisation of 
immigration status. Mathew identified this lack of trust as the main reason why a majority 
of Black Zimbabweans who had not legalised their stay in Britain would refrain from 
socialising with other Zimbabweans.166 This was largely because of known incidences in 
which individuals were reported to immigration officials for working illegally by people they 
thought they trusted. The emergence of diaspora mistrust between the first generation 
arrivals could not be understood outside the context of political events in both the colonial 
and post-colonial eras.  
As demonstrated in chapter two, the nationalist movement’s brutal methods of soliciting 
support from the masses and repressive and authoritarian governance of the Rhodesian 
government had created a mind-set of fear and mistrust between Black Zimbabweans. The 
165 Ibid. 
166 Mathew, Interview, 3 February 2013. 
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advent of independence also failed to desensitise Black Zimbabweans from a culture of 
being tolerant of each other as the  government continued to employ  coercive tactics to 
‘elicit civilian compliance’ by ruthlessly suppressing political opposition, striking workers and 
students, or civil society.167 Migrating with memories of violence against each other would 
have naturally constructed a Black Zimbabwean diaspora community which found it difficult 
to escape the influences of the undesirable environment of insecurity when among other 
Black Zimbabweans.  
Parallel to mistrust and suspicions within the community were feelings of jealousy driven by 
historical influences of linking education with social mobility. The cultural import into the 
diaspora of the significance of education in the lives of Black Zimbabweans inadvertently 
started the process of dismantling historic social class identities. This was because: Britain’s 
education sector had provided all Zimbabweans, regardless of social class background, with 
opportunities to achieve social parity with those who were above them in Zimbabwe’s social 
structure. Kudzi, a 35 year old radiography student in Bradford who arrived in Britain with 
no professional qualification identified ‘Access into Nursing’ and ‘Foundation Degree’ as the 
most popular routes used by those who had been perceived to be less academically gifted 
to attain academic oriented qualifications or university degrees.168 With educational 
opportunities provided by the foundation courses, upward social mobility in the diaspora 
was no longer the privilege of deskilled professional Zimbabweans or those who migrated 
on student visas.  
167James Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1987’ in Raftopoulos and Mlambo A History from the 
Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, p.154. 
168 Kudzi, Interview, 1 April 2013. 
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However, for the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community with a pre-emigration history of 
idolising social upward mobility through education, Britain’s educational opportunities 
attracted jealousy driven ridicule from Zimbabweans who had migrated as professionals. 
Identification of former class or school mates who were perceived to be academically weak 
or incompetent to attain a university degree or professional qualification made some within 
the Zimbabwean community question whether entry qualifications at some British 
universities are rigorous enough. Questioning the integrity of the enrolment requirements 
at some British universities facilitated the emergence of theories to explain how they would 
have succeeded in their studies.  
There are those like Brenda, a Zimbabwean trained nurse living in Luton, who was 
convinced that some of her compatriots only succeeded by asking or paying trusted friends 
and relatives to write their assignments.169 Her conviction was a result of having worked 
with British trained Zimbabwean nurses who she knew had failed their ‘O’ Levels back 
home. The other theory had been embraced by individuals like Hains who accused some 
Black Zimbabweans of fraudulently obtaining academic certificates so as to meet the 
minimum entry requirements for certain university courses.170 The conviction of a Coventry 
University trained Zimbabwean nurse, Sibusiso Nyoni in October 2014 for faking her 
Zimbabwean ‘O’ Level certificate, strengthened the argument of fraudulent activities by 
desperate Zimbabweans wanting to use education to attain social mobility.171 
It is undeniable that examination of the emerging contemporary Black Zimbabwean 
immigrant population has unveiled a community riddled with historically driven ethnic 
169 Brenda, Interview, 23 October 2014. 
170 Hains Interview 10 March 2013. 
171 NEWZIMBABWE.COM NEWS, ‘Nurse banned in UK over fake Zim O'Levels’, 9 October 2014. 
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particularism, political allegiances, mistrust and jealousy. However, with each racial 
Zimbabwean community migrating with different historical experiences, the examination of 
White, Coloured and Asian communities will establish the extent of the influence of 
imported memories on the respective Zimbabwe’s minority communities. 
The White Immigrant Community 
Migrating either as holders of dual nationality or on ancestral visas resulted in White 
immigrants being unevenly dispersed across Britain. This was because on arrival in Britain a 
majority of them chose to settle in areas where they had family or ancestral ties. As a result, 
virtual social networking emerged as an invaluable tool in forging a sense of a collective 
identity for the dispersed community. The Rhodesian in the UK, a Facebook account was 
created in 2010 to stimulate consciousness of a community identity based on past 
experiences. With a membership of 3 210 (as of 21th June 2015), the social network site has 
firmly established itself as an invaluable point of contact for the White community. 
Since its inception, the virtual community has evolved into a support network providing 
moral and welfare support, and advice on immigration and employment for a majority of 
White Zimbabwean immigrants who would have gone through the trauma of downward 
social mobility after being forced to emigrate by changes in Zimbabwe’s political system or 
loss of farms. The Facebook support network has firmly established itself as a potential ally 
to individuals described by John Rex to have arrived within migrant minority communities 
without strong or extended families.172 A posting by a member of the Facebook virtual 
community summed up the ethos of mutual assistance: 
172 John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multi-Culturalism  
and Political Integration (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) p. 151.  
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…well I’m on a mission again for my oldies - not only Byo peeps but 
the ones who have found themselves in the UK and need support. 
This is a huge upheaval for them and yes have a ‘haven’ but in a 
strange place away from family and friends and to be honest it’s 
scary! I need people to contact me who will ‘adopt’ these people - 
it’s not about money but guidance and support until they find their 
feet.173   
By appealing for assistance for those in ‘Byo’ (Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second largest city), 
the writer brought out a perspective that the virtual community is not only about assisting 
those in Britain, but is also concerned about the welfare of White pensioners in Zimbabwe.  
Commenting on the support mechanism of Zimbabwean based White pensioners, Alison, an 
active member of the virtual community, identified the pensioners as those who could not 
emigrate because of financial constraints or failure to obtain ancestral visas.174 To ensure 
sustainable and transparent management and coordination of supporting those in 
Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Pensioners Support Fund (ZPSF) was set up by members of the 
virtual community (Rhodesian in the UK, Facebook). The racial bias of the pensioner support 
network was highlighted in the ZPSF beneficiaries’ partial list published on the Rhodesian in 
the UK, Facebook account in June 2013. An analysis of the surnames on the partial list 
showed that of the 447 beneficiaries, only seven were Blacks.175 The Black recipients of 
assistance were identified by Alison as most likely to be former domestic workers of the 
173 Quote on ‘Rhodesian in the UK’ Facebook site available at, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/48794364540/ (Accessed 21st February 2014).    
174 Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013. 
175 Rhodesian in the UK Facebook site available at 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/48794364540/10151508568784541/ (Accessed 21st February 2014).  
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White immigrants who were left with no means of supporting themselves following the 
farm evictions or when their White employers voluntarily migrated.176  
Three groups of White Zimbabwean immigrants were identified by the participants as being 
in need of assistance from White Zimbabweans already settled in Britain. The support they 
received from the Facebook virtual community would range from financial assistance, 
providing temporary accommodation, being signposted to employment opportunities, and 
advice on immigration issues. The first group consisted of individuals or families who would 
have arrived with depleted financial resources after being evicted from their farms or would 
have been victimised to the point of abandoning their businesses.  
The other diaspora group needing assistance was composed of those who migrated when 
they were in their late fifties and were approaching retirement age. They would have lived a 
comfortable life before being forced to migrate.  As a result, a majority of them needed 
assistance because of a variety of interrelated reasons. These included: not being 
psychologically motivated to find employment because of the violent circumstances 
surrounding their emigration or experiencing health problems which could not permit them 
to work in physically demanding menial jobs.  
The third group consisted of those who had no transferrable professional qualifications or 
skills to find suitable employment. Since a majority of older generation White Zimbabweans 
who were economically active prior to migration were over forty, they would have 
considered themselves too old for the British labour market.  
Having a support ethos has allowed the virtual community to establish a network described 
by Vilna Francine Bashi as being made up of kinship, friendship and shared community 
176 Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013  
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origin.177 To affirm Bashi’s assertion, Alison explained how the appeals by the Facebook 
community often encouraged members to assist strangers who were only linked to the 
community by circumstances that had forced them to migrate. She gave an example of how 
the virtual community once rallied to purchase an air ticket for a White Zimbabwean living 
in South Africa who had been left stranded after being robbed of his money and travelling 
documents when on a visit in Britain. On a personal level she also recalled how appeals 
posted on Facebook encouraged her to give ‘free temporary accommodation’ to a White 
Zimbabwean immigrant for two weeks whilst he sought ways of establishing himself. By 
volunteering to assist a stranger, Alison claimed it was testimony that the Facebook virtual 
community had become a sanctuary of White Zimbabweans who were experiencing the 
trauma of forced migration from a country they once called ‘home’.178 
With a majority of Whites having been forced to migrate by political or economic 
circumstances, the Facebook virtual community had also been used as a platform to express 
anger and bitterness toward the Zimbabwean and British governments. Historic memories 
of the events leading to Zimbabwe’s independence and the violent seizure of their farms 
had been the source of the bitterness. A comment below by one of the members 
responding to an announcement by the Zimbabwean parliament in 2013 that the ‘country is 
broke’ sums up this bitterness. The member’s response was: 
 …sad but true they have screwed the country into the ground as we 
said they would when the British handed it to them on a plate to 
177 Vilna Francine Bashi, Survival of the Knitted Immigrant Social Networks in a Stratified World, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 18. 
178 Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013. 
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destroy. The British had to because there was NO WAY in a hell they 
would EVER come close to winning it in a war situation. 
The comment also seemed to endorse the assertion that there are some individuals within 
the White immigrant community who still entertain thoughts that the independence of 
Zimbabwe could not have been possible without the compromise and participation of the 
White leadership (following Britain’s persuasion) at the Lancaster House negotiations. It is 
this consciousness of the role Whites perceive they played in Zimbabwe’s independence 
which Alison identified as the source of their anger towards the British government. There is 
a strong conviction within the community that Britain should have militarily intervened to 
protect White farmers from farm seizures. By not militarily intervening, a majority of Whites 
feel they were ‘sold out, dumped and betrayed’’ by the British.179 
The perceived inactivity by the British has only served to reinforce perceptions that the 
Lancaster House agreement was based on under the table shenanigans which were not 
about the long term interests of the White community in Zimbabwe. Alison claimed that 
since Zimbabwe’s independence, the White community had been subjected to an anti-
colonial nationalist ideology of ‘terrorising Whites whilst disregarding the fact that Blacks in 
Zimbabwe during the colonial era were enjoying a better standard of life than those in 
neighbouring states ruled by Black governments.’180 The anti-White rhetoric was evident 
when the Black Nationalist movement, especially the ruling ZANU (PF) party, continued with 
slogans which ostracised Whites as Zimbabwean citizens. Examples of the slogans included: 
‘down with Whites’ (pasi nevarungu) or describing Whites with the slogan ‘plunderers of 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
                                                          
217 
Chapter 3 
black wealth’ (vapembivepfumi).181 Therefore, for most Whites, the farm invasions at the 
turn of the millennium were the conclusion of a process which started after the signing of 
the Lancaster House Constitution; a process of undermining Whites’ claims to be citizens of 
post-colonial Zimbabwe. 
Despite the perceived inactivity by the British government to stop the farm invasions, Alison 
explained that there are some within the White community who have not lost hope of 
pressurising the British government to facilitate their return to their ’homes’. She identified 
the most prominent White Zimbabwean protesters as those who have been active 
participants in a multiracial ‘Zimbabwe Vigil’ which takes place every Saturday from 14:00 to 
18:00 outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London. The multicultural vigil which started in 
2002 is part of a protest against Mugabe’s government whose policies of perceived ‘gross 
violations of human rights’ have been deemed to be the source of post-millennium mass 
exodus of Zimbabweans cutting across all racial groups and social classes.182 
Outside the Facebook virtual community, events have also been organised to promote 
physical interaction within Zimbabwe’s White immigrant community. The ‘July-Braai’ is an 
annual event held in Derby, usually during the last weekend of July. Alison explained that 
the choice of Derby to annually host the event has been influenced by the uneven dispersal 
of the White population across Britain. Its central location provides a fairer and easy 
commute for the dispersed population. On the Rhodesian Pioneer Club (RPC) website, the 
2014 event was advertised (see below) as a family event which caters for both children and 
adults whilst fundraising for the Zimbabwe Pensioners Support Fund. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Dominic Pasura, ‘Zimbabwean Transnational Diaspora Politics in Britain’, in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka 
Primorac (Eds), Zimbabwes New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 108-111. 
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Figure Five: July Braai Advert  
 
Source: http://www.rhodesianspioneerclub.co.uk/default.shtml  
To create a Zimbabwean feel to the occasion, the stalls are stocked with South African food 
(which resembles food consumed in Zimbabwe) and products with a Rhodesian theme.  
With approximately 1 000 individuals attending the event on a Saturday, Alison who had 
been attending the event for ten years, explained how the July Braai has established itself as 
the largest gathering of White Zimbabweans from all over Britain. The occasion provides the 
opportunity for adults with similar historic backgrounds to establish new friendship 
networks as they reminisce about the past.183 As the largest gathering of White 
Zimbabweans in Britain, the RPC has also utilised the occasion to fundraise for ‘Rhodesians 
183 Ibid. 
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pensioners’ who have no access to any form of pensions because of political events or the 
demise of the economy in Zimbabwe. Some of these, according to Alison, would not have 
stayed long enough in the UK to apply for permanent residency immigration status to have 
access to British government benefits.184 
One major characteristic of both the Facebook community and the RPC organised ‘July 
Braai’ event has been the reincarnation of a colonial identity. On the Facebook community, 
this is reflected by: the uses of the colonial name, ‘Rhodesia’ and its flag; postings of the 
colonial national anthem; and postings of photographs of the Rhodesian army with 
attachments celebrating victories over the nationalist liberation fighters. The adoption of 
the name Rhodesia by the organisers of the ‘July-Braai’ and the use of the Rhodesian Coat of 







Figure Six: Rhodesian Coat of Arms 
184 Ibid. 




Source: http://www.rhodesianspioneerclub.co.uk/default.shtml (First visited 7th March 
2014) 
 
To ensure the growth and survival of a Zimbabwean White immigrant community, the 
organisers of social events like the July Braai actively encourage attendees to invite any new 
arrivals. Robert, who migrated in 2002 when the Zimbabwean economy was in a steep 
decline, spoke of how he was surprised when he received a letter from an ‘ex-White 
Rhodesian inviting him to the July Braai.’185 What surprised him was that he had not given 
his contact details to anyone except a few friends he knew from back home. His conclusion 
was that the Zimbabwean White community already settled in Britain was actively seeking 
new arrivals with the aim of creating a database which would naturally evolve into the basis 
of co-operation and cohesion of the Zimbabwean White community; essential ingredients in 
the sustenance of an active community.186   
Reincarnation of the colonial identity by active White Zimbabwean immigrants has had a 
major impact on the racial demographics of both the ‘July-Braai’ event and the Facebook 
virtual community. The colonial identity reactivates colonial memories of racial boundaries 
185 Robert, Interview, 13 November 2013. 
186 Ibid. 
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which were ushered in by the colonial racial categorisation of the population. Promotional 
videos of the 2014 ‘July-Braai’ on the RPC website portray it as an exclusive gathering of 
Whites. Similarly, of the 1,902 members on the Rhodesian in UK Facebook virtual 
community (as of March 2014), eleven could be identified as being non-White. Elizabeth, a 
White Zimbabwean who migrated in 2004, identified the failure to dismantle colonial racial 
boundaries as the major reason why she was discouraged from inviting her Zimbabwean 
Coloured friend to the ‘July-Braai.’ She was advised that her Coloured friend would ‘feel out 
of place’ as she would have no shared historical experiences with the majority of the event 
attendees. 187 
The colonial identity also constructed an imaginary boundary which restricts interaction 
with those from the Black community. This was reflected in a lack of awareness among the 
Black interviewees of an active and strong support and social network of White 
Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain. John, a Black Zimbabwean immigrant residing in Slough 
since 2002 summed up the nature of interaction between Black and White Zimbabwean 
immigrants by explaining how interaction with White Zimbabweans usually occurred in 
public places like supermarkets where he would have been overheard speaking in Shona.188 
The interaction would only be restricted to a brief conversation without any exchange of 
personal details such as name or contact details.189 
Although Alison admitted that the July-Braai event conveyed a message of being exclusively 
for Whites, she refuted the accusations that the decision to use the name Rhodesia and its 
emblems was a deliberate resuscitation of colonial identities aimed at provoking non-White 
187 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013. 
188 John, Interview, 24 March 2013. 
189 Ibid. 
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Zimbabweans.190 In justifying her claim, she argued that it would have been naïve to ignore 
the fact that Zimbabwe used to be called Rhodesia. For her, the use of the name Rhodesia 
was and is still an essential component in stimulating a shared historical identity of a multi-
racial community which was once known as Rhodesian. She stressed her point by 
highlighting the fact that ‘once upon a time there were people of all races who lived in 
Rhodesia and therefore there are Rhodesians…therefore that Rhodesian identity is not a 
racial White identity but it is recognition of those who lived in Rhodesia…Black or White.’191 
Outside the confines of Zimbabwean White social events, Mary, a Black Zimbabwean who 
migrated in 2002 and settled in Cambridge, spoke of how on two separate occasions she 
encountered Zimbabwean Whites clinging to Rhodesian identities and memories.192 Her 
first incident involved a visit to a widowed White ex-Rhodesian soldier in his late seventies 
who was being looked after by her Church. She revealed how surprised she was to witness 
the extent to which he had gone to maintain a colonial identity in his house by ‘displaying 
Rhodesian flags and plaques on the wall, with nothing to show that he had embraced 
Zimbabwe’s independence despite having lived in post-colonial Zimbabwe’.193  
Her second experience was in 2010 with a White Zimbabwean lady in her forties who had 
failed to accept the reality of the permanent demise of Whites’ colonial privileges over 
Blacks. Although the White lady would have been a young girl during the colonial area, Mary 
was ‘shocked’ with her ‘colonial mentality that Black women should work for Whites for 
virtually nothing.’194 Mary’s realisation of this colonial attitude happened when she and her 
Black Zimbabwean friend were offered ‘valueless Zimbabwean dollars’ to babysit and iron 
190 Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Mary, Interview, 13 October 2013.  
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. 
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her clothes.195 For Mary, her experiences served to highlight the extent to which the 
colonial mentality is still embedded in the lives of some Whites who are naturally finding it 
difficult to let go of colonial memories. These are memories that make them believe that 
they are still superior to Blacks. 
However, it would be misleading to conclude that all ex-White Zimbabwean immigrants 
endorse a colonial identity. Events like the ‘July-Braai’ have been the source of exposing 
divisions on the extent to which historical memories have influenced the construction of a 
Zimbabwean White immigrant community. After attending two ‘July Braai’ events, Elizabeth 
made a decision never to attend again. This was after realising that she had nothing in 
common with the majority of the attendees. She could not condone explicit and subtle 
racist rhetoric based on past experiences. These imported racist memories were usually 
expressed during role plays as the participants attempted to recreate life in colonial 
Zimbabwe.196 Describing the racist themed role plays, Terry, who also migrated in 2004, said 
participants would pretend they were African domestic maids by blackening their faces and 
dressing like a maid ‘imitating a Shona accent and go on to entertain themselves by saying 
racist jokes about Black maids…creating much amusement among the onlookers.’197  
The basis of the racist rhetoric according to Elizabeth’s assessment was embedded in the 
fact that a majority of the attendees had either not envisaged life under a Black government 
or had harboured bitterness of losing their property during the farm invasions. As a result, 
Elizabeth claimed they are still clinging to memories of their historical privileges and racial 
prejudices as a coping mechanism in dealing with the shock of downward social mobility.198 
195 Ibid.  
196 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013. 
197 Terry, Interview, 14 November 2013. 
198 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013. 
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Elizabeth’s comment served to highlight that the influence of past memories on the White 
community’s construction of identities and relations with other Zimbabweans has been a 
complex process of interrelated factors which include the diverse circumstances which led 
to migration. 
The behaviour of the diaspora White community was testimony of continual avoidance by 
many Whites after independence of what David McDermott Hughes describes as ‘a full 
reckoning with society and their minority status’ despite the gradual decline of all White 
neighbourhoods.199  Whilst a few liberals would have crossed the racial boundaries by 
inviting Blacks into their social circles such as restaurants or sport clubs, the majority had 
continued to maintain their identity especially on farms or any out of city location.200 It was 
therefore inevitable that within the White older generation diaspora community there were 
individuals who would have migrated without taking any initiative to cross the racial divide 
by either attending social events where Blacks dominated such as a football match in Black 
residential areas or learning indigenous languages.  
Without any historic interactions outside the remit of employer and employee, constructing 
relations with members of the Black community was not going to be initiated by a majority 
of older generation Zimbabwean Whites in the diaspora. It was therefore not surprising, 
according to Martins, that a majority of White immigrants in Britain found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to let go of their colonial identities.201 In this self-imposed diaspora isolation, 
Whites’ fixation on a Zimbabwean identity was on environmental terms mainly climate, 
wildlife or farm life.  
199 David McDermott Hughes, Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 6. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
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Young Zimbabwean Whites who were born towards the end of the liberation struggle or in 
independent Zimbabwe add another dimension to the complex process of historical 
influences on the construction of a Zimbabwean diaspora White community. These are 
individuals with no recollection of colonial lifestyle or propaganda to persuade them to 
adopt a colonial identity or to relate to what goes on at Rhodesian themed events such as 
‘July Braai’. Neither do they bother to join the virtual community on Facebook.  Twenty-four 
year old Terry and twenty-six year old Jessica both born in independent Zimbabwe recalled 
how after attending the July Braai with their parents they vowed not to return because of 
the racist rhetoric.202  Kenneth, who migrated in 2001 when he was eighteen, also admitted 
that the Rhodesian themed events never appealed to him despite his parents being regular 
attendees.203 
The views of these young White Zimbabweans are a product of growing up in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe attending multi-racial schools. Their memories of Zimbabwe will therefore be 
based on a multiracial society with no official racial boundaries to determine a person’s 
position in society. With friends across the racial divide, there is awareness that associating 
with groups or events with visible links to colonial Rhodesia might jeopardise the friendships 
established prior to migration. With regard to the farm invasion, although they sympathise 
with those who lost farms, their association with Blacks and learning colonial history have 
provided some rationale as to why the invasions occurred. For those like Terry, there is 
general acceptance that the farm invasions would have been avoided if Whites had 
embraced the land reform programme of the 1980s.204  
202 Terry 1 November 2013; Kenneth, Interview, 9 January 2014. 
203 Kenneth, Interview. 
204 Terry, Interview, 14 November 2013. 
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Kenneth also explained how rejection of a colonial identity by young White Zimbabweans 
has made them feel comfortable with participating in the multi-racial Zimbabwe Music 
Festival (ZIMFEST) held in London.205 ZIMFEST has emerged to be one of the largest single 
annual summer events bringing Zimbabweans across the cultural or racial spectrum in 
celebrating Zimbabwe’s music, sports, food or arts.206 The use of Zimbabwean flags and the 
participation of musicians across racial or tribal lines have provided a platform where post-
colonial Zimbabwe’s memories and experiences are celebrated by Zimbabweans from 
different racial or ethnic backgrounds.  
Despite the attempts of social events like ZIMFEST in bringing young Zimbabweans together, 
the experience of Jessica shows how naïve it is to conclude that there are generally cordial 
relations between young Zimbabweans of different racial backgrounds.207 Twenty-six year 
old Jessica revealed how she has been finding it difficult to establish friendships with Black 
Zimbabweans of her generation, blaming the nature of relations back home.208 Despite 
having had Black friends at school she described the friendship as ‘superficial’ since she 
could not recall inviting her supposedly Black friends to her house. Neither could she 
remember being invited to the homes of her so-called Black friends. It seemed the type of 
friendship they developed seemed to be a continuation of colonial racial boundaries. 
Without any imported memories or experiences of relations outside Zimbabwe’s school 
environment, Jessica believed there would be no basis or incentive to establish intimate 
interracial relations in the diaspora. 209 
205 Kenneth, Interview, 9 January 2014. 
206 JoAnn McGregor, ‘Associational Links with Home among Zimbabweans in the UK: Reflections on Long 
Distance Nationalisms’, Global Network, vol. 9 (2009), pp. 185-208. 
207 Jessica, Interview, 26 November 2013. 
208 Ibid. 
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The presence of ‘twice migrants’ within Zimbabwe’s White immigrant community has 
further complicated the influence of historical memories on the construction of community 
interactions. Experiences of Gareth and Elizabeth as twice immigrants unveiled how 
circumstances surrounding their migration determined the extent to which they would 
embrace a Rhodesian identity. 
 Gareth, who was born in South Africa in the 1940s, but raised in Zimbabwe, is an ex-
Rhodesian policeman who was not comfortable with Ian Smith’s racial policies. He left 
Zimbabwe in 1978 to take up employment in Swaziland’s police as a consultant. However, 
when Zimbabwe became independent he abandoned plans of relocating back to Zimbabwe 
as he was not certain what would happen to Whites when the Lancaster House Constitution 
agreement expired in 1990. Although he admitted he always felt safe and welcome 
whenever he visited his parents, he identified the post-colonial nationalist rhetoric as the 
main reason why he developed perceptions that Zimbabwe might be unsafe for the White 
population.210 Driven by perceptions of fear of the unknown he decided not to re-join his 
parents who still lived in Zimbabwe but instead migrated and settled in Cyprus where he 
stayed until 2010 before deciding to use his Irish heritage to relocate to Britain. The main 
reason why he migrated to Britain was for his daughter’s education who was at secondary 
school. 
Upon settling in Britain, Gareth realised that the circumstances which had forced him to 
leave Zimbabwe in 1978 inhibited him from establishing close relations with other White 
Zimbabwean immigrants of his generation.211 He was aware that a majority of White 
Zimbabwean immigrants who had reactivated a colonial identity were doing so as a 
210 Gareth, Interview, 28 November 2014. 
211 Ibid. 
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compensatory behaviour in dealing with the bitterness following the loss of their socio-
economic privileged status at independence in 1980 or loss of their farms. Although Gareth 
sympathises with those who had lost their farms, he admitted that his experiences have 
made it difficult for him to comprehend the bitterness being exhibited by his White 
compatriots to the extent of reactivating a colonial identity. Unlike a majority of them, he 
had voluntarily left Zimbabwe to live in Swaziland in 1978 because he did not approve of Ian 
Smith’s policies and neither was he personally affected by post-colonial policies which 
culminated in the eviction of Whites from their farms. Relocating to Europe was a voluntary 
choice based on ‘unfounded fears at that time.’212 Therefore for him, adoption of a colonial 
identity moulded along racial lines would go against the principles of a creating a non-racial 
Zimbabwe which had forced him to emigrate to Swaziland in 1978. 
 As a result of the differences in historical experiences with a significant number of White 
Zimbabweans, Gareth did not see the need to actively identify himself with Rhodesian 
groups on internet social networks since he had little in common with them. He also 
acknowledged that he would not bother to attend any social events organised by the 
diaspora White Zimbabweans if he became aware of their colonial identity.213 It was 
therefore not surprising that without the influence of White Zimbabweans, Gareth’s 
memories of Zimbabwe were not influenced by colonial privileges but by how much he 
‘misses the land, wildlife, weather and people.’214 Without having reincarnated a colonial 
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community as he wished Zimbabweans should be more united to the extent of ‘meeting as a 
community of friends in pubs.’215  
Gareth’s attitude as a ‘twice migrant’ in regards to establishing interactions with other 
White Zimbabweans in Britain contrasts with that of Alison who migrated in 1999. Alison 
had initially left Zimbabwe for South Africa in 1981 as part of a contingent of Whites who 
did not feel safe in a black led country. As a newly married wife in 1981, Alison believed her 
fears were justified since her new husband and her father had been in the Rhodesian army 
and therefore were vulnerable to Black hostility. Her fears became a reality when her 
husband failed to secure employment; a situation she believed was exacerbated by her 
husband’s involvement in the Rhodesian army. She blamed this on the ‘independence 
euphoria’ which had made people with certain historical backgrounds like her husband feel 
neither safe nor have the confidence of starting a comfortable life in a new Zimbabwe.216 It 
was therefore inevitable that emigration for the newly married couple was the only way to 
escape what they perceived as selective persecution of Whites. Although the initial plan was 
to use her ancestral ties to settle in Britain, they found living in apartheid South Africa the 
best option because of the presence of a large White Zimbabwean community which had 
been disillusioned by Zimbabwe’s independence.  Assisted by apartheid policies and a 
community of former White Zimbabweans, Alison and her husband were able to settle 
comfortably in South Africa until 1999 when she decided to migrate to Britain following the 
collapse of her marriage.  
Prior to migrating to Britain, the White Community of Zimbabweans who shared the same 
historical experiences had been an integral part of her life both in Zimbabwe and South 
215 Ibid. 
216 Alison, Interview,  15  November 2013. 
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Africa. With memories of the importance of community support networks in her life, it was 
therefore inevitable that upon settling in Britain she made an effort to seek out other White 
Zimbabweans. Her efforts were made easier during the early 2000s by the influx of White 
farmers who had been evicted from their land. She described how her endeavours of 
identifying with other White Zimbabweans initially started by word of mouth, gradually 
evolving into social internet networking. She identified the initial success of networking 
White Zimbabweans as the reasons why there is ‘a structured Zimbabwean community of 
Whites unlike in South Africa where White Zimbabweans were assimilating themselves and 
becoming South Africans’217 She acknowledged that the ‘mind-set’ of ex-White 
Zimbabweans of wanting to maintain their identity invigorated her to ensure that the 
networking should evolve into networks to support (mainly) White Zimbabweans in both 
Britain and Zimbabwe.    
Coloured Immigrant Community 
By the late 1980s, a majority of Coloureds had concluded that they had been over optimistic 
in envisaging more recognition under a Black government. Fisher alludes to the fact that a 
majority of Coloureds would have hoped that their kindred relationship with Blacks would 
facilitate better treatment which would allow upward social mobility.218 However, as the 
first decade of independence progressed, it started to dawn on the community that 
prospects of upward social mobility would not be realised. The realisation happened after 
missing out on economic empowerment initiatives such as land distribution.219 
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With the Zimbabwean economy starting to deteriorate from the 1990s, Coloured individuals 
who could prove their claim to British ancestral ties embraced emigration as an escape 
route from what they perceived as deliberate economic marginalisation by the government. 
Without a strong or widespread network of Coloured businesses or individuals in managerial 
positions in the private or public sectors, the government’s discriminatory economic 
indigenisation to empower Blacks condemned a large number of Coloureds to stagnant or 
downward social mobility when the economy started to deteriorate in the 1990s. By the 
mid-1990s, emigration had therefore become the viable route out of that cycle of 
condemned poverty.  
The urgency to flee Zimbabwe by those who could claim their ancestral heritage was further 
heightened by rumours of anti-Coloured rhetoric attributed to Mugabe. Pamela recalled 
how Mugabe was accused of threatening Coloured claims to Zimbabwean citizenship by 
saying ‘you Coloured people go to England to your fathers.’220Although the rumours were 
unproven, Pamela expressed that most Coloureds had no reason not to believe that 
Mugabe had uttered the statement. For most of them, the economic marginalisation of 
Coloureds was enough evidence to prove that Mugabe’s government was using their mixed 
heritage to place the Coloured community at the periphery of society. It was this social and 
economic disenfranchisement of Coloureds which according to Pamela forced a significant 
number of them to rethink their connection with Zimbabwe. 
By the turn of the millennium there was a small settled coloured community in Britain 
assisting emigration of family members and friends from Zimbabwe. The result of assisted 
migration was the development of a Coloured community in urban areas where there was a 
220 Pamela interview, 13 October 2013. 
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high concentration of pioneer immigrants who migrated in the 1970s. Milton Keynes 
emerged to be one of those urban areas outside London which experienced a rapid increase 
of Zimbabwean Coloureds after 2000. A majority of the new arrivals in Milton Keynes had 
been drawn by the presence of pioneer immigrants as they would have been guaranteed 
invaluable assistance in settling in an unfamiliar environment. Although Pamela agreed that 
the presence of pioneer Coloureds in Milton Keynes in the 1990s triggered an influx of new 
arrivals, she also regrettably admitted that the influx had created an ‘enclave of mixed race 
with limited interaction with other Zimbabweans’.221  
Although Milton Keynes was identified as having the largest concentration of Coloureds, the 
participants (as shown in bibliography) presented clear evidence that there were some 
members of the community spread across Britain. To ensure there was effective interaction 
that allowed the maintenance of imported Coloured consciousness, different 
communication ways had to be explored. With Panikos Panayi pointing out how 
communication networks have allowed migrants’ ethnicity to be perpetuated in modern 
societies as they would facilitate the sharing of experiences,222 it was inevitable that the 
internet emerged to be influential in establishing a cohesive diaspora Coloured community.  
The role of the internet in the formation of diasporic Zimbabwean Coloured interactions 
was recognised by Clayton Peel. Through websites such as ‘goffal.com’, Peel explains how 
Coloureds during the early years of the 2000s were able to mobilise themselves as a 
community.223 The website became an important forum for coping with homesickness, 
sharing job hunting and social concerns, or commenting on the deterioration of the political 
221 Ibid. 
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and socio-economic situation back home in Zimbabwe.224 In addition to fostering 
community interactions, the websites also promoted a racial discourse by promoting the 
notion of charity initiatives that targeted Coloureds still resident in Zimbabwe.225 Pamela 
confirmed diaspora sponsored charity work targeting Coloureds in Zimbabwe when she 
highlighted how the community financially assisted a lady to start home-schooling for 
academically gifted Coloured children who could not afford hiring tutors for extra tuition.226  
The creation of a cohesive and close knit Coloured community cannot be solely attributed to 
the guarantees of support from pioneer immigrants (as the case in Milton Keynes) or 
through internet interactions. The process of preserving Coloured consciousness in the 
diaspora can also be traced back to the colonial era when exclusive Coloured foster homes 
were established as vehicles of transmitting commonality bonds essential in constructing a 
coloured identity. The progressive development of the commonality bonds during the 
different phases of Zimbabwe’s history naturally enforced familiar community boundaries 
and emotional commitments which were to be reincarnated in Britain. As one of the 
minority communities within Zimbabwe’s demographics, interactions could not be 
established outside the remits of the historic consciousness of the need to protect their 
identity. Limiting interactions with other Zimbabweans would therefore be regarded as 
essential in protecting collective identities and values which had always separated them 
from other Zimbabweans. 
Despite the influence of past experiences in protecting a diaspora Coloured identity, there 
were inter-generational variations on the extent these experiences determined interactions 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid, p. 238. 
226 Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.  
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with other Zimbabweans. Acknowledging the impact of inter-generational dynamics on 
community identity was Hughes, a Zimbabwean Coloured who migrated in 2002. He 
described how the older generation’s failure to ‘let go of the past’ had been the main reason 
why there has been very limited interaction between the Coloured community and other 
Zimbabwean immigrants.227 The promotion of a separatist attitude based on historical 
memories by the older generation had been described by Esther as being ‘narrow minded’. 
She explained how she had been ostracised by some members in her community for 
‘playing White’, just because she had refused to prescribe to their separatist philosophy that 
is entrenched in historical experiences.228  
Spurred by racial prejudices nurtured during the colonial segregation of the population, it 
was an inevitable outcome that David Mason’s use of the generic term ‘Black’ to identify 
‘people who are not White’ would be rejected by some older generation Zimbabwean 
coloured individuals.229 Pamela, who spoke of being rebuked by other Coloureds for 
describing herself as Black, admitted that for most Coloureds adopting the term ‘Black’ 
challenged the conditioning process some of them went through when they were being 
indoctrinated to believe that they were superior to Black Africans.230 Unfortunately for her, 
identifying herself with the Black community was unavoidable since all of her siblings are 
Black. She described herself as one of the few Zimbabwean Coloureds who had to make a 
conscious decision of adopting a dual identity by maintaining relations with the only family 
members they knew since birth; their maternal Black family.231 
227 Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
228 Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013. 
229 David Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 16-
17. 
230Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.   
231Ibid. 
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Leo Lucassen’s assertion that intermarriage can dismantle racial boundaries did not 
resonate with older generation Coloured immigrants’ attitude towards Blacks.232 This 
became apparent when historically constructed Coloureds’ separatist attitude discouraged 
intermarriage, especially when it involved Blacks. It was therefore not surprising, according 
to Pamela, that strong resistance to marrying Blacks in Britain was closely linked to the 
development of racial superiority attitudes (over Blacks) during the colonial era’s 
hierarchical compartmentalisation of the population.233 She acknowledged that the colonial 
classification of the population in which Coloureds were being conditioned to align with 
Whites had instead led to acceptance or tolerance of relationships between Coloureds and 
Whites.234  
However, despite the conditioned alignment to Whites, Pamela recognised that historical 
racial prejudices have resulted in small numbers of intermarriages between Coloureds and 
White Zimbabweans. In affirming Pamela’s observation, Esther admitted that her two sons 
are not only part of a small group of ‘fairer skinned’ young generation Coloureds who have 
chosen to marry outside the community, but they have also chosen to marry Whites who 
are not Zimbabweans.235 
Despite the encouragement to maintain exclusive Coloured boundaries by the majority of 
older generation Coloureds, Simon, a Coloured immigrant in his late twenties stated that 
the younger generation occasionally broke down the barriers of interactions when they 
hosted social events such as parties.236 Those invited to these parties could be individuals 
232Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 
1850, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005),  p. 137. 
233 Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013. 
234 See Chapter Two. 
235 Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.  
236 Simon, Interview, 17 September 2013. 
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who would have interacted with the Coloured community prior to migration. These 
normally consisted of former schoolmates who tend to empathise with the Coloured way of 
life. However, outside these social gatherings, Simon admitted there was very little 
meaningful inter-personal interaction with other Zimbabweans.237 
However, it is important to acknowledge that not all members of the Coloured older 
generation when they migrated had a separatist philosophy. Hughes, a practising Christian, 
admitted that being a member of a religious organisation facilitates more interaction with 
Zimbabweans outside the Coloured community. Like most Coloured Christians, his church 
and not his Coloured community had become the source of welfare and moral support.238 
This was because, in the absence of proximate families, diaspora congregations would not 
only be sources of spiritual solace, but also invaluable in providing material and welfare 
support.239 The development of a diaspora Christian fellowship between Coloureds and 
other Zimbabweans was usually evident in the Traditional Churches and not in Zimbabwean 
Home Grown Churches. This was because traditional Churches have multiracial 
congregations unlike Home Grown Churches which are dominated by Black 
Zimbabweans.240 
The absence of Coloureds in the Home Grown Churches reinforces Gerard Delanty’s point 
that in many transnational communities there is always a dominant ethnic group.241 
Coloureds’ interaction with other Zimbabweans in the diaspora would therefore be 
influenced by what Nims refers to as historic consciousness of their minority status within 
237 Ibid. 
238 Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
239 Dominic Pasura, ‘Religious Transnationalism: The case of Zimbabwean Catholics in Britain’, Journal Religion 
in Africa, Vol. 42 (2012), pp.26-53. 
240 Christopher Roy Zembe, ‘A Comparative Study on the Integration of Culturally Diverse Zimbabwean and 
Somali Communities in Leicester’ (unpublished De Montfort University MA Dissertation, 2012), pp. 76-79. 
241 Gerard Delanty, Community (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 159. 
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Zimbabwe’s population structures.242 For most Coloureds in the diaspora, limiting 
interactions with other Zimbabweans (even in a religious environment) was essential in 
maintaining historic boundaries which had always separated them from Black, Asian and 
White Zimbabweans.  
Hughes also described how the nature of migration to Britain had played a significant role in 
consolidating Coloureds’ historic minority status within the Zimbabwean diaspora 
community. Unlike a significant number of Black immigrants who used the asylum and 
working or student visa routes, Coloureds, like most Whites used the ancestral visa 
option.243 However, in comparison to Whites, Hughes explained how Coloureds faced 
prohibitive challenges when the British government tightened the use of ancestral rights. 
Prospective Coloured immigrants were required to produce proof of their ancestral rights 
such as death or marriage certificate.244 Obtaining these documents proved to be difficult 
because most of the Coloured children were a result of illicit relations between White men 
and Black women.245 As a result, most Coloureds born during colonial rule like Anita found it 
impossible to emigrate because they did not have any documents which proved that their 
fathers were British.246 
With regard to relations with the Zimbabwean Asian immigrant community, Pamela 
admitted that the level of interaction between the two communities remained very minimal 
as it mirrors the level of interactions in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Lack of 
interaction with Asians suggests that Coloureds still harbour memories of Asians’ negativity 
242 Nims, ‘The Goffal Speaks’, p.53. 
243 Hughes, 4 November 2013.   
244 Ibid. 
245 John Pape, ‘Black and White: The ”Perils of Sex” in Colonial Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies 
vol. 16, (1990), pp. 699-720. 
246 Anita, Interview, 26 July 2013. 
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triggered by what Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson describe as perceptions that Coloureds 
are a representation of a cultural abyss which can be seen as too Europeanised.247 As a 
result, older generation Coloureds’ had no historical point of reference which would have 
encouraged associating with Asians in the diaspora.    
Asian Immigrant Community 
Kasim, an ex- Zimbabwean Asian businessman living in Britain since 2002 explained how the 
Asian experience of East Africa’s ‘Africanisation’ policy created uncertainty for Zimbabwean 
Asians living in Zimbabwe when the country became independent in 1980.248 With a colonial 
history of being perceived as exploiting Africans in their businesses, they were not sure how 
the Black Zimbabwean government would react to their identity engrained in their 
businesses. It was therefore inevitable that at independence, according to Kasim, a 
significant number of Asian business owners like him had packed their bags ready to flee 
Zimbabwe.249 
 It was only after the reconciliation speech by Mugabe in 1980 that Asians were given a 
sense of security that their businesses were safe from any nationalisation under Black 
economic empowerment initiatives. Asians embraced the political message of reconciliation 
which ensured the safety of their businesses by remaining in the country, running their 
businesses just as they did during the colonial era. With very little Asian emigration in the 
1980s, the affluent Asian community started developing Asian enclaves in most cities. The 
most prominent Asian enclaves have been the Belvedere and Ridgeview suburbs in Harare, 
which affluent Asians transformed into an upmarket residential area.  
247 Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968), p. 286. 
248 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
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The resolve by Asians to create post-colonial Asian enclaves was illustrated by Gutu, a 
retired senior official in Zimbabwe’s civil service. He explained how in 1989 the need to 
create Asian enclaves forced a work colleague to relocate from Belvedere to a more multi-
racial affluent suburb of Mt. Pleasant in Harare. This was after sustained persuasive and at 
times aggressive pressure from his affluent Asian neighbours to relocate. This was evident 
when, in addition to being paid a substantial amount of money above the market price for 
his house, he was also given a retail shop in Harare and a smaller house in Gweru (one of 
Zimbabwe’s cities).250 The aggressive methods used by some Asians in pursuit of an 
isolationist agenda formed the basis on which they would interact with other Zimbabweans 
in the diaspora when they started emigrating.   
The slowdown of Zimbabwe’s economy in the 1990s triggered the first significant wave of 
post-colonial Asian emigration. Kasim, who owned a marketing consultancy firm, identified 
Asian professionals as forming the majority of those from the Asian community who 
emigrated in the 1990s. Britain, Australia, Canada and United States of America were the 
preferred destination of the professionals living the country.251 Whilst professional Asians 
were migrating, those who owned businesses like Kasim decided to stay, adopting a ‘wait 
and see attitude’, with some of them describing themselves as ‘permanent tourists.’252 
 It was not until post-2000 that Asians from all social classes started to migrate in greater 
numbers following threats by liberation war veterans on Asian businesses. Tim Butcher 
writing in The Telegraph revealed how  ‘The Liberation War Veterans Association’ which had 
been actively involved in seizing White owned farms warned Zimbabwean Asian business 
250 Gutu, Interview, 3 August 2013.  
251 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
252 Ibid. 
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people that nothing will stop them from reclaiming commercial national interests from 
them if ‘they do not stop looting the economy’.253 The threats and the expulsion naturally 
heightened the anxiety of the Zimbabwean Asian business community since they mirrored 
the rhetoric which preceded the expulsion of Asians in Uganda in the 1970s. 
Facing an uncertain future, Zimbabwean Asians were left with two options. They either had 
to scale back their businesses or emigrate. While most chose to stay by adopting a ‘wait and 
see attitude’, Kasim explained how Britain emerged as one of the preferred destinations for 
those who decided to emigrate. With significant South Asian communities of Indian descent 
already established in Britain, historic family ties were utilised to facilitate migration. For 
those without traceable family links in Britain like Kasim, they were able to migrate using 
marriage or accompanying spouse visas if their wives were British citizens or had family in 
Britain. The other group of post-millennium emigrants consisted of those who migrated 
during the colonial era and had managed to stay long enough to attain British citizenship. 
Bhavesh who lived in Britain from 1975 to 1988 was part of that small group who were able 
to use their British citizenship acquired during colonial rule to relocate back to Britain.254 
Reliance on family support resulted in Zimbabwean Asians being dispersed across Britain, 
settling in cities where their families were already established with a high concentration of 
Asians. The major urban areas to host the post-millennium Zimbabwean Asian immigrants 
outside London included Leicester, Luton and Slough. However, failure to live in close 
proximity to each other has resulted in Zimbabwean Asians failing to establish a 
recognisable community identity like that of Ugandan Asians settling in Leicester from the 
253 The Telegraph, 25 April 2002. 
254 Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.  
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1970s.255 Constructing identities to trigger interactions with other communities would 
therefore be based on what John Edwards  describes as personal classification ‘markers’ 
regarded as essential to respective individuals.256 Bhavesh, a Zimbabwean Asian teacher and 
former business owner, identified historical experiences, religion and language as the key 
classification markers Zimbabwean Asians used to construct identities essential in forging 
interactions.257 
However, allowing these identifiable commonalities to evolve into social aggregates 
facilitating interaction naturally excluded a large proportion of non-Asian Zimbabweans who 
are mainly Christians, and do not speak Gujarati or subscribe to the caste system. This was 
because the reactivation of generic Asian identities facilitated interactions which were 
leading to assimilation into Asian communities they share commonalities with; a process 
described by Abdi, a Zimbabwean Asian immigrant in the 1970s as a major catalyst in 
excluding themselves from other Zimbabweans. He identified the shared commonalities as 
the main reason why former Asian Zimbabweans residing in Leicester who are at least 40% 
of his golf club’s membership are still perpetuating racial segregation by actively 
marginalising themselves from the rest of the Zimbabwean community.258 
Whilst Zimbabwean Hindu and Sikh communities used family ties, language or caste to forge 
interactions, Muslims on the other hand used their religion as a major determinant in 
facilitating the assimilation process. With a majority of Zimbabwean Asian Muslims 
belonging to the Sunni sect, Kasim as a practising Sunni Muslim admitted that there had 
been widespread assimilation into the Sunni Muslim community in cities like Leicester 
255 Joanna Herbert, Negotiating Boundaries in the City (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 15-21. 
256 Edwards, Language and Identity,  p. 16. 
257 Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013. 
258 Abdi, Interview, 17 June 2013. 
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where there is a large concentration of Sunni Muslims.259 The influence of religion in 
constructing diaspora identities affirmed Stopes-Roe and Cochrane’s assertion in which they 
highlight how religious affiliation is an important component in the identity of minority 
groups.260 
However, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that the interaction processes 
leading to assimilation solely depended on similarities of caste, religion or language. 
Historical experiences in countries of origin were also influential in assisting Zimbabwean 
Asians to identify Asian groupings that they can establish intimate interactions with. 
Bhavesh emphasised the importance of these past experiences by highlighting how a 
significant number of post-millennium Zimbabwean Asians found it difficult to establish 
close relations with Asians from East Africa.261  
Unlike Zimbabwean Asians whose migration to Zimbabwe became noticeable at the turn of 
the twentieth century, documentation of the migration history of South Asians to East Africa 
reveals a rapid increase of the population from the mid-nineteenth century. For example, in 
the period 1880 to 1920 the population increased from 6 000 to 54 000.262 As a result, the 
East African Indian population was not only larger than that of Zimbabwe, but its members 
had also constructed a collective identity rooted in the history of East Africa. It is this 
collective identity which had been cited by Bhavesh as the main hindrance in forging 
intimate relations with those from East Africa. Instead, contemporary Zimbabwean Asian 
immigrants have found it easier to interact with Asians from the Southern African countries 
259 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
260 Mary Stopes-Roe and Raymond Cochrane, Citizens of the Country: The Asian-British (Clevedon: Multilingual 
Matters, 1990), p.2. 
261 Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013. 
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of Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa because of shared historical experiences and 
memories.263  
These regional historic memories can be traced back to interpersonal ties of kinship and 
friendship established by first generation immigrants in Southern Africa. The creation of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by 
Ian Smith in 1965 indirectly consolidated historic ties. With business opportunities being 
stifled by the Rhodesian government, a significant number of Asians migrated to Zambia and 
Malawi when the two countries became independent in 1964. As a result, Zambia and 
Malawi had always had a larger Asian population in comparison to Zimbabwe, a situation 
exacerbated by Zimbabwe’s early prevention of Indian immigration.264 However, despite the 
regional disparity in population distribution, historic kinship ties continued to be reinforced 
by inter-marriage and business activities between the regional communities; interactions 
which did not cease in post-colonial Zimbabwe. It was therefore inevitable that the historic 
kinship and friendship would be resuscitated in Britain. 
Summary and Conclusion 
By examining the construction of relations within the multicultural Zimbabwean immigrant 
community in both the colonial and post-colonial eras, the chapter has established how the 
quest for a cohesive Zimbabwean immigrant community in Britain has been hindered by 
memories of unresolved conflicts of historic experiences. The historic, political and 
economic processes which permeated the different phases of Zimbabwe’s history 
263 Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013. 
264 Dotson and Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi, p. 53. 
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formulated ideas of belonging whose outcome has been the construction of ethnic and 
racial attachments (and allegiances) based on memories of shared historical experiences. 
Although Black Students in the 1970s forged a united identity not determined by historic 
ethnic identities, other races formed their own communities with minimum inter-racial 
interactions. A lack of inter-racial interactions was not only reflective of the interpersonal 
relations constructed under the racial classification of Zimbabwe’s population, but also of 
diverse circumstances which led to emigration.  
Whilst it is undeniable that the colonial hierarchical categorisation of the population created 
perfect conditions for the construction of racial prejudices, the contribution of post-colonial 
events cannot be omitted when examining interactions within Zimbabwe’s diaspora 
communities in Britain.  It was post-colonial emigration which unravelled a Zimbabwean 
immigrant community fragmented along ethnic and racial lines as memories of unresolved 
historic conflicts were resurrected in the construction of diaspora relations. Within the Black 
community Gukurahundi emerged to be the dominant factor in restricting interactions 
between Shona and Ndebele immigrants.  
Although the periods of immigration might have been different, a majority of post-colonial 
Zimbabwean White immigrants are united by bitterness caused by circumstances which 
forced them to migrate. Cherished memories of colonial privileges and the nature of 
migration have been instrumental in developing a united White diaspora community with a 
colonial identity. Reincarnation of a colonial identity which is evident in the use of the 
colonial name Rhodesia and its emblems on the Facebook virtual community and at social 
events had created interaction barriers with non-White communities. 
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The impact of imported historical memories has also been a significant determinant on how 
the contemporary Coloured immigrant community construct their interactions. Memories of 
the stimulation of Coloured consciousness during the colonial era and of perceptions of 
marginalisation in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe increased the resolve to 
construct a united diaspora Coloured community with its own support network. It is the 
harbouring of memories of past experiences of marginalisation and prejudices especially 
within the older generation which had placed limits on the extent to which the diaspora 
Coloured community should interact with other Zimbabweans.  
Whilst Coloureds’ construction of interactions was been influenced by imported memories 
of experiences as mixed-race Zimbabweans, for Asians it has been influenced by 
commonalities with non-Zimbabwean Asians. Being a diverse community separated by 
religion, caste, language and historic family ties, reincarnation of historically constructed 
social commonalities instigated assimilation into Asian communities with whom they share 
the same identity markers. The assimilation process did not only undermine interactions 
with other Zimbabweans but, more significantly, it made the Zimbabwean Asian community 
invisible. As a result, just as it was in Zimbabwe, interaction with other Zimbabweans was 
usually within the confines of a work or business environment.  
Despite the influence of historical experiences in the construction of identities and 
interactions, a majority of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain are still comfortable to 
introduce themselves to new acquaintances as Zimbabweans. Their identity with Zimbabwe 
is mainly based on cherished memories of their homeland. These memories include physical 
features (climate and tourist attractions) and social features (food, drinks and family 
connections). However, memories of the tragedies of colonial and post-colonial socio-
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economic and political structures devoid of nation building have erected racial barriers 
restricting interactions based on shared cultural heritage.  
The chapter has developed an argument showing how imported historical prejudices and 
identities constructed during the phases of Zimbabwe’s history erected imagined ethnic and 
racial boundaries which placed limits on interracial or ethnic interactions. The ultimate 
consequence has been the creation of separate insular Zimbabwean immigrant 
communities of Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians which rarely organise or participate in 
interracial events. As the fragmented Zimbabwean communities used their historically 
constructed identities and prejudices to construct relations with other Zimbabweans in 
Britain, a comparative analysis between Zimbabwe’s ethnic groups (to be examined in the 
next chapter) will unveil diverse and complex socio-economic integration patterns whose 
influences can be traced back to pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial experiences.    
 
Chapter 4 
Homeland Influences on the Dynamics of Zimbabwean Communities’ 
Economic and Social Integration in Britain.  
The significance of migrants’ interaction with the host society’s social and economic 
structures has been recognised by academics such as Leo Lucassen in his comparative study 
of Britain, France and Germany. In his volume The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and 
New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850, he uses the Irish, Poles, Turks and West Indians as 
case studies to demonstrate the evolving nature of integration process across time and 
geographical space. In the British case, he examines the integration processes of the Irish in 
the nineteenth century and West Indians after World War Two.1  
Lucassen’s examination of West Indians unveils a post-war gradual shift of anti-immigrant 
discourse away from earlier immigrant groups of European descent to non-European 
immigrants (of which the West Indians were part). The rapid increase of non-European 
immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, South Asia and Africa 
at the end of World War Two facilitated the construction of an environment in which colour 
or racism emerged to be a significant barrier to successful integration of the new arrivals. 
Lucassen captures the new phase in Britain’s immigration and integration dynamics by 
pointing out how the post-war influx of Black Caribbeans triggered violent and racist 
reactions in some British cities.2  
Whilst colour would have emerged to be a determinant of post-war socio-economic 
integration of non-Europeans, this chapter’s focus on Zimbabwean immigrants’ integration 
tackles the question of whether historical socialisation or pre-emigration imperial and post-
1 Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850, 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005). 
2 Ibid p.125. 
 





colonial influences have also emerged as contributory factors to the evolving integration 
patterns of post-war immigrants. As former subjects of the British (just like West Indians), 
Zimbabwean immigrants are suited for use in the case study to determine how pre-
emigration influences hinder or promote successful integration. After having been socialised 
in British economic, social and cultural norms, analysis of historic socialisation provides 
scope in attempting to understand Zimbabweans’ integration processes. Lucassen’s 
assertion that the nature of immigrants’ integration is influenced by socialisation in 
countries of origin has therefore made it imperative that the discussion of Zimbabwean 
communities’ integration patterns in Britain cannot be done outside the context of pre-
emigration homeland experiences.3  
For the chapter’s arguments to complement current academic debates on the evolutionary 
nature of integration since World War Two it is essential to start by defining the concept of 
integration. By defining integration the chapter will be unveiling key indicators which 
measure whether immigrants are being successfully integrated into the host society’s 
economic and social structures. In the case of Zimbabwean immigrants, identification of 
integration’s key indicators facilitates the development of arguments which show an 
inextricable link between homeland influences and socio-economic integration of multi-
ethnic Zimbabwean communities.    
 
Defining Integration 
3Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat, pp. 18-19. 
 





Despite the significance of integration on immigrant communities’ social or economic 
development, there is no consensus on its definition among migration historians, social 
scientists or politicians. Patrick Ireland identifies the ‘multifaceted and dynamic’ nature of 
the integration phenomenon as posing complex challenges when attempting to identify 
characteristics of an integrated immigrant community.4 In recognition of the complex 
debates in defining integration, Lucassen provides a broad definition of the term by 
identifying key players involved in migrants’ interaction with host society’s economic and 
social structures. He describes the term as a multifaceted process in which ‘all people, 
migrants as well as non-migrants find their place in society.’5  
Defining integration as a multifaceted process involving both immigrants and the indigenous 
community affirms Jenny Phillimore’s assertion that successful integration is not solely 
dependent on the migrants but also on the extent the host society is ‘open and inclusive’ 
towards immigrants’ socio-economic improvements and movement towards parity with the 
indigenous population.6  The receptiveness of the host community in facilitating the 
successful integration of migrants can only be gauged by what Ireland describes as 
integration ‘quantitative indicators’.7 He identifies employment, educational attainment 
(linked to social mobility) and cultural adaption as significant examples of quantitative 
indicators needed to assess migrant communities’ socio-economic integration.8 
4 Patrick Ireland, ‘New Ways of Understanding Migrant Integration in Europe’, in Assaad E Azzi et al, Identity 
and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (Chichester: Blackwell, 2011 ), 
p.132.  
5Lucassen, Immigrant Threat,  p.18. 
6Jenny Phillimore, ‘Restrictionalism Versus Liberalism: The Rapture Between Rapture and Integration in the 
European Union’  in Carlton Howson and Momodou Sallah, eds,  Europe’s Established and Emerging Immigrant 
Communites: Assimilationsm, Multiculturalism or Integration (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books Ltd, 2009),  
p.51 Check title of article. 
7 Ireland, ‘New Ways of Understanding Migrant Integration in Europe’, p. 117. 
8 Ibid. 





These indicators became integral components in assessing the integration processes of the 
post-war influx of immigrants from former British colonies in the West Indies, India, Pakistan 
and Africa. What had started as an active recruitment drive of foreign labour from the 
Caribbean and South Asia during the post-war economic boom was to mutate into a 
phenomenon challenging Britain’s ability to manage a population that was increasingly 
becoming racially diverse.  This was because the new arrivals, as pointed out by Lucassen, 
were seen as problematic because of their different ‘skin colour and the social and cultural 
characteristics’ alien to Europeans.9 It was therefore an expected outcome, as argued by Zig 
Layton-Henry, that the non-European immigrants were considered to be inferior to 
European immigrant communities which had dominated Britain’s pre-1945 immigration 
landscape.10  
With the host society confronted with racial prejudices, discrimination or negative 
stereotypes, it became imperative for the integration policy discussions to come up with 
solutions on how to present the post-war non-European immigrants with opportunities that 
would allow them to either attain upward social mobility or blend into the host society.  The 
outcome sought by the integration discussions was in recognition of growing resentment 
towards what was perceived as a ‘massive and ongoing invasion of Blacks.’11 The 
resentment as described by Lucassen had evolved into racial conflicts and discrimination on 
the labour, housing and marriage market.12  
9 Lucassen, Immigrant Threat, p.3. 
10 Zig Layton-Henry The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, ‘Race’ and ‘Race' Relations in Post-War Britain 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992),  p. 28. 
11 Lucassen, Immigrant Threat, p. 125. 
12Ibid. 





The 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting-Hill did not only testify to the rise in racial 
tensions in Britain, but also the influence of Right Wing anti-immigrant movements such as 
the National Front.13 With changing demography, the integration debates would therefore 
be driven by fear that if the new arrivals were not fully incorporated they would exist as 
‘unassimilable segments’ characterised by criminality or poverty; an environment which 
would inspire the creation of Right Wing anti-immigrant movements by native 
communities.14  
With migration scholars such as David J Griffiths, Sarah Hackett and Alice Bloch recognising 
the continuous permanent settlement of non-Europeans in Britain throughout the post-war 
decades of the twentieth century right into the new-millennium,15 migration and integration 
debates had to evolve to accommodate the new arrivals. Unlike their non-European 
predecessors who had arrived in the first two decades after World War Two, the more 
recent arrivals (of which Zimbabweans are part) settled at a time when British society had 
been significantly transformed to become multicultural.  
As ethnically diverse non-European immigrant communities continued to increase in Britain 
during the course of the twentieth century, the indigenous population would have become 
accustomed to the permanent presence of people of ‘colour’ or those with different 
outward physical appearances than Europeans. Being accustomed to the permanent 
presence of non-Europeans facilitated the transformation of the integration debates to 
13 Ibid, p. 1. 
14 Ibid . 
15 See for example: Alice Bloch, ‘Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’, Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 40 (2006), pp. 67-87; David J Griffiths, ‘Fragmentation and Consolidation: The Contrasting 
Cases of Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.13 (2000), pp.281-302; Sarah 
Hackett, Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: The Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and Germany 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). 





include (in addition to racism) issues related to immigrants’ imported educational or 
professional qualifications and proficiency in the English language; and religious or cultural 
differences with the indigenous population. The rapid increase of the Zimbabweans in 
Britain from the 1990s illustrated in the introductory chapter meant that contemporary 
Zimbabwean immigrants were therefore arriving at a time when integration debates had 
evolved to accommodate cultural or social diversity of the immigrants.  
Aims of the Chapter 
Using the participants’ diaspora experiences and chapter two’s analysis of the 
transformation of the Zimbabwean society during the colonial and post-colonial phases of 
Zimbabwe’s history, the chapter’s overarching aim is to uncover and explore homeland 
influences which had an impact on contemporary Zimbabwean immigrants’ integration 
patterns. With Zimbabweans arriving in Britain with diverging ethnic, social and economic 
profiles which were developed and nurtured throughout the phases of Zimbabwe’s history, 
it was inevitable that the imported prejudices, identities and experiences would aid the 
construction of different economic and social integration pathways.  By focusing on 
employment, educational attainment and cultural adaption as integration indicators, the 
chapter will identify and engage historic social and economic systems which first generation 
Zimbabweans found themselves replicating in the diaspora as they mapped out their 
integration processes.  
Migrating as communities with diverse socio-economic profiles historically constructed 
along ethnic lines necessitated a comparative analysis of integration patterns between 





impact of the historic experiences on each ethnic community.  Three components provided 
the framework for the evaluation.  
The first component was the identification of ethnic communities that became 
disenfranchised when they failed to effectively engage with Britain’s economic or social 
structures which would have facilitated noticeable rapid social mobility. The second 
component involved the identification of communities in which a majority of their members 
were able to pursue integration processes that allowed them to be positively engaged with 
the host society’s social and economic structures. The third component was related to 
identification of specific historic influences that had an impact on Zimbabweans’ social 
integration.  
Although the chapter will recognise how homeland influences played a major role in 
determining the socio-economic integration of Black, White and Coloured Zimbabweans, 
examination of the economic integration of Zimbabwean Asians will unveil the extent to 
which post-war South Asian immigration to Britain impacted negatively on the 
entrepreneurship of Asians from Zimbabwe. This was because as a small community of late 
arrivals compared to other South East Asians, first generation Zimbabwean Asians were not 
keen to establish businesses that would be perceived to be competing with established non-
Zimbabwean Asian businesses. 
In order to comprehend the historical influences on the processes of Zimbabweans’ 
integration in Britain, the chapter will in two sections separately explore economic and 
social integration. The economic integration section will concentrate on employment 





extent to which Zimbabweans used pre-emigration experiences to facilitate positive 
interactions with Britain’s economic structures. The section will also establish how deskilling 
that had dismantled imported social class identities motivated Black Zimbabweans to 
reactivate homeland experiences or memories in selecting integration processes which had 
the potential of triggering upward social mobility. The aim was to gain qualifications that 
would facilitate movement up the social ladder so as to reclaim lost middle class status. 
By including self-employment in the employment discussion, the economic section will 
further affirm the complexity of historical influences on Zimbabwean immigrants’ economic 
integration processes not recognised by most emerging academic work. The literature of 
Zimbabweans’ self-employment in Britain provides a general overview towards the issue by 
restricting the debate to two perspectives.16 One side of the debate explores the reasons 
why some Zimbabweans decided to be entrepreneurial whilst the other side focuses on 
different types and the nature of entrepreneurial activities. However, the debates fail to 
reveal how homeland influences developed in both the colonial and post-colonial eras have 
had an impact on the nature and success of the diaspora businesses. The chapter’s 
examination of historical influences will therefore provide alternative arguments which do 
not seek to romanticise diaspora Zimbabweans’ self-employment. Instead, unveiling the 
nature of the business and ethnic diversity of those in self-employment or business will 
demonstrate the extent to which homeland influences negatively impacted upon 
entrepreneurialism in Britain.     
16  See for example: Beacon Mbiba, ‘Beyond Abject Spaces: Enterprising Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain’, 
African Diaspora, Vol. 4 (2011), pp.  50-75; Dominic Pasura, African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured 









Since the process of constructing social interactions with the natives of the host country 
cannot be done in isolation to historic socialisation of the immigrants, the social integration 
section will engage language, religion and intermarriage as indicators of Zimbabweans’ 
social integration. Examination of these social integration indicators will not only unravel 
the impact of historical socialisation on preserving community or individual identity markers 
in the diaspora , but it also assesses the receptiveness of Britain to the influx of twenty-first 
century immigrants with different cultural backgrounds. 
Whilst pre-emigration exposure to western civilisation made a majority of first generation 
Zimbabwean immigrants not deal with problems of disentangling issues related to language 
or religion in their integration processes, the section will establish why historically 
constructed community identities and prejudices placed barriers on two major aspects of 
social integration: intermarriage and construction of effective interactions with the 
indigenous population.  
With a majority of contemporary first generation Zimbabwean immigrants arriving after 
they had experienced the neo-colonial monumental and tragic collapse of Zimbabwe’s 
society they had not envisaged at independence, integration patterns for a majority of them 
were to reflect the pessimism they had in their country.  For most of them, pre-emigration 
experiences had made Britain a safe haven from Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political 
problems. Circumstances surrounding emigration had therefore made it critical for 





‘high degree of integration’17 which would allow them to interact positively with Britain’s 
economic and social structures.  
Economic Integration 
Mark-Anthony Falzon’s assertion that any research into migration and integration should 
include a look at processes of economic integration,18 affirms the importance of social 
mobility as a key outcome which evaluates immigrants’ participation in host society’s 
economic structures.  With a majority of first generation Zimbabweans having had to adopt 
emigration as an escape route out of condemned poverty following the deterioration of the 
Zimbabwean economy from the 1990s,19 it became imperative to adopt integration 
processes that would trigger upward social mobility.  
Examination of employment and education to gauge Zimbabweans’ economic integration 
facilitated the engagement of historic socio-economic systems which have been replicated 
in the diaspora. The discussion on how historical influences on education and employment 
have been significant components in Zimbabweans’ economic integration processes will be 
based on migrants who arrived after they had completed their secondary education. At the 
time of migration they would either have been in employment or old enough to enrol at a 
tertiary college or university. These are individuals whose pre-emigration socio-economic 
experiences would have influenced them to embrace education as a plausible route to 
successful economic integration. On the contrary, the nine who migrated when they were in 
primary or secondary school admitted they were too young when they left Zimbabwe to 
17 Gerard Delanty, Community (London: Routledge, 2003), p.161. 
18 Mark-Anthony Falzon ‘Passage from India: Trajectories of Economic Integration in London and 
Mediterranean Europe’, in Leo Lucassen, David Feldman and Jochen Oltmer (Eds), Paths of Integration: 
Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)   (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p.158. 
19 See Chapter Three. 





have memories that would influence their economic integration. Instead a combination of 
job prospects, peer influence and, parents’ expectations (based on pre-emigration 
socialisation), were the most significant determinant factors in choosing ways to be 
economically integrated.  
Education 
The level of education has been singled out by both migration historians and social scientists 
as crucial to the overall migrants’ economic integration as it allows access to better 
employment or life opportunities.20 However, despite the importance of education to 
economic integration it will be naïve to generalise its role on immigrants’ integration 
processes during the initial stages of settling in their adopted country. This is because: the 
level of education obtained in their home country as alluded by Borja Martinovic, Frank van 
Tubergen and Ineke Maas puts immigrants in a position which determines the extent to 
which they will successfully interact with host society’s economic and social structures.21 
This was the case for Zimbabwean immigrants. Drawing from the economic integration 
experiences of the participants, the pre-emigration levels of educational or professional 
qualifications determined whether the new migrants would either be deskilled or 
successfully integrate in Britain’s labour market after verification of their Zimbabwean 
attained qualifications. 
A skills audit of forty-one of the interviewees presented clear evidence of diverse levels of 
educational or professional qualifications. The participants’ statistics excluded four 
20 See for example: Hackett, ‘Foreigners, minorities and integration’, p. 155;  Phillimore, ‘Restrictionalism 
Versus Liberalism’, pp.53-54. 
21 Borja Martinovic, Frank van Tubergen, Ineke Maas, ‘Changes in Immigrants’ Social Integration during the 
Stay in the Host Country: The case of Non-Western Immigrants in the Netherlands’ Social Science Research, 
Vol. 38 (2009), pp. 870–882. 





individuals who had permanently settled in Britain before Zimbabwe’s independence in 
1980 (two Blacks, one Asian and One Coloured); nine of the younger generation who arrived 
in Britain when they were still in either primary or secondary school (six Blacks, two Whites 
and one Asian); and five resident in Zimbabwe (three Blacks, one Coloureds and one Asian).  
Statistical evidence of the forty-one older generation interviewees shown in Figure Seven 
below illustrates Blacks as a Zimbabwean community which arrived with the highest 
proportion of individuals possessing higher educational qualifications of either a University 
Degree or Tertiary Diploma qualification. However, despite possessing qualifications that 
would have entitled them middle class status when they first settled in Britain, a majority of 
the respondents found themselves struggling to be competitive on the labour market 
because of deskilling. 












Of the twenty-three out of twenty-eight adult Black interviewees who had arrived in Britain 
with a professional qualification or a university degree level, only three were able to find 
work which corresponded with their qualification. Two of the three who found work in their 
profession were Zimbabwean trained nurses who had to undertake the adaptation courses 
so as to be allowed to work as qualified nurses in Britain. The remaining one was a Human 
Resources Manager back in Zimbabwe who was able to find work as an employee manager 
of a multinational company based in Britain. It was this deskilling which reactivated 
homeland influences needed to facilitate successful economic integration by making choices 
related to the attainment of British academic or professional qualifications. 
The participants’ deskilling was a common trend among other Zimbabwean immigrants 
settled across Britain; an issue Alice Bloch affirms. She points out how most professionally 
trained Zimbabweans (just like the participants), some educated up to degree level, found 
themselves in menial jobs as care assistants in NHS or residential homes, or as factory or 
warehouse operatives when they first settled in Britain.22 By working in these low status 
jobs, the deskilled Zimbabweans were forced to work side by side with fellow Zimbabweans 
who would have been below them in Zimbabwe’s social hierarchy. Erasing these imported 
social class differences became an essential component in determining how Black 
Zimbabweans would reincarnate homeland memories or experiences to approach their 
economic integration.   
With the way of life in Zimbabwe still engrained in the memories of first generation 
Zimbabweans, it was an expected response from David to describe the deskilling experience 
22  Alice Bloch, ‘Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives’, Social Policy and Administration, vol.40 
(2006), p. 78. 





during initial stages of economic integration as ‘traumatic and humiliating’.23 He had 
migrated as a holder of Higher National Diploma in accountancy. Prior to migration, he had 
firmly established himself within Zimbabwe’s middle class after rising through his company’s 
structure into a managerial position.24 His comments served to highlight the extent to which 
historic idolisation of middle class status was entrenched within the Black immigrant 
community. As already established in chapter two, social class stratification of Africans had 
emerged in the colonial era (following the creation of an African middle class community) 
and continued to be a key component of identity among Blacks in post-colonial Zimbabwe.25  
A majority of Black Zimbabweans had therefore migrated with a mind-set of wanting to 
continue being conspicuously different from other Zimbabweans they perceived to be 
below them in the pre-emigration social hierarchy. It was this pre-emigration developed 
mind-set that would be significant in influencing Black Zimbabweans’ economic integration 
patterns. Their aim was to be positively engaged with Britain’s economic structures so as to 
trigger upward social mobility that facilitates attainment of middle class status.  
Whilst deskilling would have facilitated the dismantling of imported social class 
distinctiveness, both the deskilled members of the middle class community and those who 
migrated as occupiers of the lower echelons of Zimbabwe’s hierarchical society viewed 
education attainment as means of climbing up the social and economic ladder to attain that 
middle class status. The universal acceptance by Black immigrants of linking education with 
meritocracy was not a spontaneous illogical reaction to disadvantages and discrimination to 
Britain’s economic or social sectors embedded in their deskilling. Instead it was rooted in 
23 David, Interview, 13 January 2013. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Chapter Two. 





homeland influences that had been developed and nurtured in both the colonial and post-
colonial eras. The colonial era’s socio-economic systems (which were not fully eradicated 
during the first thirty years of independence)26 had irrevocably set in motion the 
construction of identities and prejudices which cannot be ignored when exploring the role 
education played in economic integration patterns of contemporary first generation Black 
Zimbabwean immigrants that differentiates them from other Zimbabweans. 
Chapter two’s discussion unravelled how the advent of western education to complement 
the colonial capitalist system had started the process of conditioning Black Africans to 
believe that educational attainment was not only a symbol of status, but also a viable route 
out of poverty. The post-colonial government’s policy of ‘education for all’ which was 
deliberately targeting Blacks further consolidated the community’s perceptions of 
associating educational attainment with upward mobility.27  It was this historically nurtured 
inclination to pursue education success which would inevitably play a pivotal role in the 
economic integration of the contemporary first generation Black Zimbabwean diaspora 
community in Britain with different social class background.   
The participants presented clear evidence on how the impact of imported homeland 
influences on the adoption of education as a plausible route to successful economic 
integration was not uniform across the multi-racial Zimbabwean immigrant community. 
Comparisons between the forty-one adults who had been the focus of this particular study 
unveiled clear evidence of the extent Black Zimbabwean immigrants outpaced other 
26 See Chapter Two. 
27 Gibbs Kanyongo, ‘Zimbabwe’s Public Education System Reforms: Successes and Challenges’, International 
Education Journal, Vol. 6 (2005), pp.65-74. 
 





communities in embracing education as an essential process that leads to successful 
economic integration.  
The significance of education in the lives of the diaspora Blacks illustrated in Table Seven, 
showed 75% of the Black first generation interviewees attaining a new or higher British 
academic qualifications within ten years of settling in the country compared to 33% Whites, 
25% Coloureds and none within the Asian community. Of the twenty-one Blacks who 
attained British qualifications, nineteen had arrived with either a university degree or 
professional qualification. The high rate of upgrading qualifications or retraining by Blacks 
was therefore clear testimony of imported historic influences on seeing education as an 
escape route out of the lower echelons of British society; integration processes not shared 
by the majority of individuals from other ethnic communities.   
Table 7: Distribution of Interviewees who attained British qualification within ten years of 
arrival by race  























Blacks 10 8 2 1 7 75 
Whites 0 2 0 0 4 33 
Coloureds 0 1 0 0 4 25 
Asians 0 0 0 0 3 0 
*Nursing Diploma in Higher Education **Statistics include those who would have migrated with 






The age profile of the interviewees who attained a British qualification within ten years of 
arriving in Britain illustrated in Table Eight further demonstrated the diverse impact of 
homeland influences on the adoption of education as a catalyst to successful economic 
integration between the ethnic communities. Blacks in comparison to other ethnic 
communities had the largest proportion of mature students who had embarked on 
academic or professional progression. These were individuals who had grown up in colonial 
or early years of post- colonial rule when education was still being perceived as Blacks’ only 
plausible route out of poverty. Their motivation to pursue higher educational or 
professional qualifications in the diaspora was therefore embedded in their pre-emigration 
memories and experiences of linking education and social mobility. This explains why, unlike 
other races, first generation Black Zimbabweans’ trend in embracing education as a means 
of facilitating successful economic integration was not restricted to the younger generation 
but it was an experience embraced by all age groups, young and old.  
Table 8: Age of Interviewees who Attained British University Qualification within Ten 
Years of Arrival 
 Age Range (Years) 
 20-29 30-39 40-49 +50 
Race of 
Interviewees 
    
Blacks 1 11 8 2 
Whites 1 0 1 0 
Coloureds 1 0 0 0 
Asians 0 0 0 0 







With fifty-year old Elizabeth being the only White participant over forty years enrolling in 
further education, the statistical evidence in Table Eight reveals how older generation White 
Zimbabweans had placed educational attainment at the periphery of their diaspora 
economic integration patterns. Elizabeth regards herself as one of the few ‘over forties’ 
White Zimbabweans who decided to enrol for a university degree despite facing opposition 
from other White Zimbabweans of her generation who could not understand why she was 
going back to school when she was approaching fifty years.28  
Elizabeth admitted that the apparent trivialising of education by older generation White 
Zimbabweans in the diaspora should not be understood outside the context of their pre-
emigration privileged lifestyle that characterised the colonial era.29 This was when a 
majority of them (unlike Blacks) would not have experienced social or economic 
marginalisation which would have encouraged them to attain higher educational or 
professional qualifications. By virtue of occupying the pinnacle of Rhodesia’s socio-economic 
structures, they would have been accustomed to an environment in which they would move 
up the country’s economic structures without having to put much emphasis on higher 
academic or professional qualification attainment.30 Even after independence, the failure to 
be honest participants in the redistribution of resources meant that a majority of Whites 
continued to enjoy a colonial lifestyle embedded within the historical socio-economic 
privileges.31 
With a background of pre-emigration socio-economic privileges, a significant number of 
older generation White Zimbabweans in Britain migrated without being nurtured by a 
28 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.                      
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Chapter Two. 





cultural attribute that elevated educational attainment. It was therefore an expected 
outcome according to Elizabeth that once settled in Britain, most members of her 
generation failed to develop a new mind-set that would have motivated them to enrol in 
Further Education so as attain qualifications which would have made them competitive on 
the British labour market.32  
There was universal agreement among the older White participants that the inevitable 
consequence of not harbouring an incentive to pursue educational attainment was stagnant 
or little upward social mobility for most White Zimbabwean immigrants of the older 
generation. It was the slow upward social mobility which Timothy, a Black Zimbabwean 
academic, singled out as the source of jealousy and resentment by Whites towards the Black 
community who had attained better educational or professional qualifications. He recalled 
how his former White colleagues in the teaching profession avoided or stopped 
communicating with him after he had told them he was an academic teaching at one of the 
country’s leading universities.33 
 It would be misleading though to conclude that the inherited colonial lifestyle of socio-
economic privileges was the sole reason why older White Zimbabweans immigrants were 
not motivated to pursue education as an alternate route to successful economic integration. 
The White participants also gave an insight into how the post-colonial violent seizure of 
their properties at the turn of the new millennium (that triggered their exodus from 
Zimbabwe) was a significant homeland event that discouraged the older generation from 
adopting educational attainment as an essential component of economic integration 
32 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.                       
33 Timothy, Interview, 10 May 2013. 





processes. Alison describes how the economic integration patterns of a majority of older 
White Zimbabweans, especially ex-Zimbabwean farmers, were instead driven by a 
consciousness of the loss of their businesses or properties which had robbed their children 
of their inheritance.34 The losses experienced by the White farmers are made clear in the 
Table Nine below. 
Table 9: Financial losses of a sample of evicted White farmers 
Loss Total in $US Million) Average per Respondent in 
$US (Thousand) 
Moveable Property 190 445 
Crops 74 177 
Property Burnt 43 102 
Earnings 677 1 621 
Livestock 68 164 
Medical Expenses 3.3 808 
Legal Expenses 2.6 6 408 
Total 1 066 2 530 
Source: Lloyd Sachikonye, Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society 
(Harare: Weaver Press, 2012), p. 122 
 
Alison explained how the violent circumstances surrounding their emigration made it 
inevitable for many White farmers to arrive with no savings or enough financial security to 
retain the quality of life they had been used to prior to migration.35 As an economically 
disadvantaged immigrant community in financial distress, their immediate need according 
to her was not to attain British academic or professional qualifications but to seek 
34 Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013. 
35 Ibid. 





appropriate accommodation and basic needs for their families.36 She described how it was 
perceived as ‘selfish’ and ‘foolish’ pursuing personal gains of academic attainment at the 
expense of providing the best quality of life for their children. Instead, she explained how a 
significant number of White parents felt more comfortable in seeking employment as skilled 
or unskilled personnel so as to ensure that they provided the best possible upbringing for 
their children to enable them to interact positively with Britain’s social and economic 
structures.37 
Also affirming the unselfish placement of their children’s economic integration over their 
own was Gareth, a parent in his late sixties with a daughter at university in Leicestershire. 
He identified financially sponsoring their children’s university tuition fees or living expenses 
as the best gift White Zimbabweans evicted from their properties would give to their 
children.38 Britain’s immigration laws also made the financial assistance for further 
education justifiable since most of them would not have been eligible to pay home tuition 
fees; a status which they would only attain after being granted ‘Leave to Remain’ in the 
country after the expiry of five years in Britain.39   
A survey of the Coloured participants also presented clear evidence (shown in Table Eight) 
on how educational and professional progression was not embraced by older generation 
members of the community resident in the diaspora. The failure to pursue educational 
attainment in the diaspora was engrained in the identities constructed during the colonial 
and post-colonial eras. Prior to emigration, a majority of the Coloured community’s diaspora 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Gareth, Interview, 28 November 2013. 
39 Gov.Uk, Settlement: Refugee or Humanitarian Protection Available at https://www.gov.uk/settlement-
refugee-or-humanitarian-protection/eligibility (Accessed on 24th October 2014). 





members, as already established in chapter two, had successfully constructed an identity 
within the socio-economic realms of Zimbabwe which lacked ‘tangible and traditional 
markers of elite status.’40 Placing education at the periphery of their lives was identified by 
Kelly Nims as one of the reasons why prior to migration a majority of Coloureds found 
themselves in the lower echelons of Zimbabwean society.41  
Experiences of marginalisation that started in the colonial era created and consolidated the 
desire to preserve Coloured consciousness and to have control over their own destiny by 
making choices which trivialised self-development through education.42 In post-colonial 
Zimbabwe, the government’s inability to correct racial inequalities in education by providing 
more schools and training opportunities to the Coloured community, was a missed 
opportunity to implement policies to eradicate attitudes of trivialising education within 
most Coloureds.43 
With this colonial and post-colonial marginalisation in education, a significant number of 
Coloureds migrated with no history of having been motivated to excel academically. It was 
therefore an expected outcome for the older generation Coloured immigrants not to adopt 
economic integration processes that would involve pursuit of better educational or 
professional qualifications. Without the desire to enrol for Further Education, Hughes, a 
Zimbabwean Coloured living in Essex, admitted that a significant number of older 
generation Coloureds have experienced social stagnation; just as they did in Zimbabwe.44  
40 Kelly M Nims, ‘The Goffal Speaks: Coloured Ideology and the Perpetuation of a Category in Post-Colonial 
Zimbabwe’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2013), p.182.    
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Josephine Lucy Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The Decolonisation of White Identity in Zimbabwe 
(Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), p. 139. 
44 Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013. 





Although the pre-emigration history of Coloureds would have been characterised by 
trivialising education, it would be wrong to conclude that there were no highly skilled or 
professional Coloured immigrants who were also deskilled when they arrived. However, it 
has to be noted that the only difference with the Black Zimbabweans was that the deskilled 
Coloureds did not seek to attain UK professional qualifications as to be competitive on the 
labour market. Esther, who migrated as a teacher and was one of the few Coloureds to 
enrol at the University of Zimbabwe in the 1970s, recalled her frustrating days as a supply 
teacher as she struggled to find a permanent teaching post when she migrated in 2000.45 
Similarly, Patrick, despite having been a director of his own company and living in 
Borrowdale Brookes, one of Harare’s affluent residential suburbs, spoke of how he had to 
survive in what he described as Britain’s ‘cash driven economy’ by starting at the bottom of 
the social ladder. To be able to survive he explained how he had to work in warehouses 
before finding employment in ‘sales’.46  
Table Eight also identifies older generation Zimbabwean Asian immigrants as a community 
which did not embrace education as an option for economic integration. Bhavesh, a 
qualified maths teacher, acknowledged how the invisibility of contemporary older 
Zimbabwean Asians in Britain’s institutions of higher learning was engrained in the 
circumstances surrounding the migration of a community that had a pre-emigration socio-
economic identity of being self-employed.47  
Although it was undeniable that at independence there was a sizeable number of educated 
Asians in professional occupations or working in self-employment as medical doctors, 
45 Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013. 
46 Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015. 
47 Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013. 





accountants and lawyers, the slowdown of Zimbabwe’s economy in the 1990s triggered an 
exodus of Asian professionals from Zimbabwe. Without official statistical evidence, the 
Asian participants identified Australia, Canada and the United States of America as the 
preferred destinations for the Asian professionals leaving the country in the 1990s. Britain 
was therefore not a favoured destination by a majority of professional Zimbabwean Asians 
who would have been inclined to adopt education as an economic integration route. 
 As Asian professionals left Zimbabwe in the 1990s, Kasim, who owned a marketing 
company prior to his emigration in 2002 pointed how the Asian community visibility in the 
country continued to be preserved by the business community.48 It was not until the turn of 
the new millennium when the Zimbabwean Asian business owners adopted emigration as a 
route to escape the decline in the country’s rapid economic decline.49 By migrating with a 
historic cultural identity of self-employment, Kasim admitted that unlike Blacks the older 
generation of the post-millennium Zimbabwean Asians were not inclined to pursue higher 
education as a means of attaining economic integration. Instead, they were more interested 
in exploring ways of either becoming self-employed or joining Britain’s labour market as 
employees with the hope of raising capital to reinvest in their Zimbabwean businesses.50    
With formal employment emerging to be one of the key components of economic 
integration, ex-Zimbabwean Asian business owners who successfully integrated were 
individuals like Bhavesh who migrated with pre-emigration professional or educational 
qualifications which were transferable onto the British labour market. Bhavesh, a qualified 
maths teacher who, prior to migration, had quit teaching to start an engineering company, 
48 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
49 See Chapter Three.  
50 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013. 





decided to work as a supply teacher in Leicestershire. This was after realising that he would 
not be able to establish a business in Britain which would generate profits to match his 
wages as a teacher. 
Finding work was not a problem since he had done his teacher training during the time he 
had temporarily relocated to Britain in the 1970s. By using his British professional 
qualifications he admitted that he had done relatively well in comparison to other 
Zimbabwean Asians who would have migrated with no skills or professional qualifications. 
His positive economic integration was demonstrated when he bought a house in 
Leicestershire’s predominantly middle class area of Oadby; a purchase funded partly by 
proceeds raised from the sale of his properties in Zimbabwe. 51 
Employment 
John Rex and Sally Tomlinson’s argument that it is not how far immigrants enter 
employment but the nature of jobs they do affirms employment (alongside education) as an 
essential indicator of immigrants’ integration.52 With the nature of employment being 
singled out as one of the significant indicators of minority communities’ economic 
integration, it was an expected outcome for homeland influences to play an integral role in 
Black Zimbabweans’ choice of university or college courses. Driven by historic (homeland) 
influences the Black participants demonstrated that there was natural inclination to select 
courses in Further Education which had the potential of guaranteeing employment that 
could facilitate upward social mobility.  
51 Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013. 
52 John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1979), p .16. 





Migrating with a historically nurtured attitude of idolising middle class status as 
professionals meant that few were interested in studying subjects that did not lead to a 
professional ‘Bachelor’s Degree’. It was therefore not surprising that the choice of courses 
by most Black participants shown in Table Ten below were those which would lead to 
professional qualifications. With business qualifications consisting of different disciplines, 
the participants provided clear evidence that nursing was the most popular professional 
qualification pursued by Black Zimbabwean immigrants. The popularity of nursing as a 
profession of choice by many Zimbabweans who envisaged upward social mobility was 
affirmed by McGregor. She identified favourable access to bursaries and grants during 
training and guaranteed employment upon completion as the major reasons which 









Table 10: Adult Black Participants of Choice of Courses 
53 JoAnn McGregor, ‘Professional Relocating; Zimbabwean Nurses and Family in Britain’, Geographical Paper 
No. 178 (2006), University of Reading, p. 6. 
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Although McGregor singled out financial assistance and job opportunities as major reasons 
that persuaded a majority of Zimbabweans to enrol as student nurses, the popularity of 
nursing can also not be divorced from the historically nurtured perceptions of the 
profession. The colonial era’s demonization of Africans’ way of life that included 
consultation of traditional healers and the use of herbal medicine naturally started the 
process of enhancing the privileged position of western biased medical professions within 
the Black community.54 After independence the nursing profession continued to be 
considered as a ‘preventive, promotive, curative and rehabilitative’ indispensable discipline 
54 Rudo Gaidzanwa, Voting with Their Feet: Migrant Zimbabwean Nurses and Doctors in the Era of Structural 
Adjustment (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999), p.16.  





with regards to people’s health.55 It was this pre-emigration invested prestige of the nursing 
profession which made a significant number of Zimbabweans from all social classes feel 
comfortable to train as nurses as it did not carry a stigma that had been historically attached 
to those in the lower echelons of the Zimbabwean society.  
However, the popularity of nursing failed to escape the dynamics of pre-emigration 
prejudices and identities of a multi-ethnic Zimbabwean diaspora community. McGregor’s 
assertion that Britain’s care industry (of which nursing was part of) absorbed a majority of 
Zimbabwean immigrants failed to be replicated within first generation White, Coloured and 
Asian Zimbabwean communities.  The reasons why older members of Zimbabwe’s minority 
communities were not motivated to seek employment in the care industry were to a large 
extent engrained in pre-emigration post-colonial experiences.    
Prior to Zimbabwe’s independence, chapter two explored how health delivery had been 
characterised by separate health facilities for Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Blacks, and a 
two tier-training system for health personnel. When at independence the health sector was 
democratised to facilitate the discontinuation of the racially segregated health system the 
nursing profession gradually ceased to be a desirable alternative profession for White 
nurses.56 They could not comprehend providing health care to those that had been 
conditioned to believe they were below them in the social stratification of Zimbabwe’s 
society.  
Not seeking employment in Britain’s health sector was therefore an expected outcome for 
White Zimbabwean immigrants who would have undergone post-colonial conditioning of 
55 Kudakwashe G. Mapanga, ‘A Perspective of Nursing In Zimbabwe’, Online Journal of Issues in Nursing. Vol. 5 
(2000). 
56 See Chapter Two. 





associating the nursing profession with Blacks. Derogatory remarks like ‘British Bottom 
Cleaners’ and ‘Bum Technicians’ to describe the work of those employed in care homes 
would have further demotivated Whites to join a sector dominated by Black 
Zimbabweans.57 It would have been a remarkable climb-down to work as equals in low 
status employment as care assistants with a community they had historically perceived to 
be below them.  
The failure to work in the British care industry by older generation Coloureds when they 
arrived in Britain can also be understood in the context pre-emigration influences. Although 
there was no consensus between the Coloured participants in explaining why Britain’s care 
industry was shunned by most first generation Coloureds, two reasons were identified as 
the most plausible ones. The first one was related to Zimbabwe’s post-colonial 
indigenisation policies and the second was related to historical desire of preserving 
Coloured consciousness.  
Not finding Coloureds in the British health sector whether as carers or nurses according to 
Esther, a retired Coloured teacher living in Leicester, was an inevitable consequence of a 
process that had started in Zimbabwe. She identified the government’s indigenisation 
policies of empowering Blacks (discussed in chapter two) as a major pre-emigration political 
event which cannot be ignored when explaining why there are few Coloureds in British care 
work or nursing sectors. By embarking on an indigenous policy that failed to provide more 
nurse training opportunities for Coloureds, nursing gradually ceased to be a profession in 
57 JoAnn McGregor, ‘Joining the BBC (British Bottom Cleaners): Zimbabwean Migrants and the UK Care 
Industry’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 33 (2007), pp.801-824. 





which Coloureds would be found.58 It was therefore inevitable that not seeking employment 
in Britain’s care work sector was a continuation of a trend that had started in Zimbabwe.   
Migrating with a consciousness of preserving the community identity was another 
alternative argument presented by ex-businessman Patrick when explaining why Coloureds 
have not been involved in Britain’s care industry. He pointed out that for a community that 
had always been determined to preserve their Coloured identity, working conditions in the 
British health sector were perceived as carrying the potential of creating dysfunctional 
families.59 A history of being marginalised and being isolated by their Black or White 
extended families created an environment in which Coloured families would play an integral 
role in the development and preservation of Coloured consciousness. The failure to 
establish family networks outside the Coloured community throughout the course of 
Zimbabwe’s history made it imperative that economic integration patterns in Britain should 
not infringe on the support network which had been historically provided by families.   
The long and unsociable working hours highlighted by Macgregor that characterised 
Britain’s care industry60 had therefore failed to appeal to the Coloured community which 
Patrick claimed had always been family oriented with women playing an integral part in 
keeping the families together.61 With nursing having been historically perceived to be a 
women’s profession, Patrick explained why most women in Britain did not work as carers or 
58 Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013. 
59 Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015. 
60 McGregor, ‘Joining the BBC’.  
61 Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015. 





train as nurses.62 They would rather work part-time in other sectors of the British economy 
whilst allowing men to work away from home or for long hours.  
As for Asians’ absence in the British care sector, there was a consensus among the 
participants that nursing had never been a professional choice for a majority of the 
community’s members. This was to a large extent a consequence of a pre-emigration self-
employment identity which had made formal employment an undesirable economic activity 
by most Zimbabwean Asians. Asians who worked in Zimbabwe’s health sector prior to 
migration were usually doctors who in most instances had private surgeries and would 
employ Black nurses whilst family members did the administration work.63  
Whilst it is undeniable that education can be a crucial component to immigrants’ overall 
economic integration as it allows access to better formal employment or life opportunities 
that trigger upward social mobility, Stephen Castles also identifies self-employment as 
another socio-economic status indicating immigrants’ position in the host society’s labour 
market.64 This is because: business ownership by immigrants had always been perceived as 
evidence that the receiving society is ‘open and inclusive’ towards what Phillimore describes 
as immigrants’ socio-economic improvements and movement towards parity with the 
indigenous population.65  
It was therefore an expected outcome that one of the most novel developments in Britain’s 
post-war labour market as alluded by Giles A. Barrett, Trevor P. Jones and David McEvoy has 
62 Ibid. 
63 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.  
64 Stephen Castles, Here for Good: Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities (London: Pluto Press, 1984), p. 132.  
65 Phillimore, ‘Restrictionalism Versus Liberalism?’, p. 51. 





been an increasing prominence of ‘ethnic minority self-employment.’66 With self-
employment or business ownership being identified as important caveats in economic 
integration processes it was inevitable for some members within the Zimbabwean 
immigrant community to seek and capitalise on opportunities that would allow them to 
exercise their entrepreneurial abilities by being self-employed.  
The reasons behind the emergence of a self-employed community in Britain cannot be 
divorced from homeland economic activities. Beacon Mbiba points out how retrenchment 
of public and private sector workers including those in managerial roles following 
Zimbabwe’s Economic Structural Economic Programme of the 1990s and the post-2000 
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy had forced a majority of retrenched workers to 
establish small businesses in the informal sector.67 Even those in employment who faced 
increasing job insecurity and decline in living standards were forced to set up informal 
businesses.68 A majority of these informal traders as pointed out by Peter Gibbon were 
involved in cross border trade or selling second-hand clothes.69  
Mbiba identifies these entrepreneurs as the ‘first and most able to emigrate to Britain’ as 
economic migrants following the political crisis and deterioration of the economy.70 A 
significant number of them had developed a mind-set to explore self-employment as an 
alternative route to economic integration.  It was therefore an expected outcome that 
experiences of rejection in the UK labour market, even when education and language 
66 Giles A. Barrett, Trevor P. Jones and David McEvoy ‘Ethnic Minority Business: Theoretical Discourse in 
Britain and North America’ Urban Studies, Vol. 33, (1996), pp.783-809. 
67 Beacon Mbiba, ‘Beyond Abject Spaces: Enterprising Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain’, African Diaspora, Vol. 
4 (2011), pp.  50-75. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Peter Gibbon, Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe: Studies on Labour, Women 
Informal Sector Workers and Health (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1995), p.137. 
70 Mbiba, ‘Beyond Abject Spaces’ pp.50-75. 





competence skills were not a barrier, encouraged these Black first generational 
Zimbabweans to enter into Britain’s entrepreneurial space.71  
Examples of the majority businesses set up by Black Zimbabwean immigrants have been 
small enterprises. These include: grocery stores mainly selling imported Zimbabwean 
products; pubs which have become a meeting place for Zimbabweans; courier services 
delivering parcels and packages to Zimbabwe; one man van drivers; solicitors; and hair 
salons with a predominantly Zimbabwean clientele.72 These were businesses which can be 
described as not representing a route into significant upward social mobility but instead 
economic integration that would ensure a survival mechanism for the majority. Notable 
exceptions of bigger enterprises have been Mwanaka’s maize farming; and Mufaro family 
foods which Mbiba describes as a successful business manufacturing yoghurts and probiotic 
milk.73 
Whilst it is undeniable that first generation Black Zimbabweans in Britain embraced 
entrepreneurship or self-employment as a means of economic integration, it has to be 
recognised that there has been an apparent failure to establish a vibrant and recognisable 
diaspora Black Zimbabwean entrepreneurial class identity. A comparative analysis with 
other non-European immigrants such as Somalis, South Asians or Chinese exposes 
Zimbabweans as a community that has struggled to establish its entrepreneurial 
credentials.74  
71 Ibid. 
72 See for example: Mbiba, ‘Beyond Abject Spaces’ pp.50-75 and Thomas T. Domboka ‘The Entrepreneurial 
Experiences of 1st Generation Migrant Black African Female Entrepreneurs in Britain’ Journal of Business 
Diversity Vol. 13 (2013) pp.40-51. 
73Mbiba, ‘Beyond Abject Spaces’ pp.50-75.  
74See for example: Hilary Metcalf, Tariq Modood and Satnam Virdee (Eds)Asian Self-Employment: The 
Interaction of Culture and Cconomics in England (London: Policy Studies Institute.1996); Monder Ram, Nicholas 





Black Zimbabweans’ failure to establish a visible and vibrant business community had been 
apparent in cities with a high Zimbabwean immigrant population such as Leicester. With a 
population of 3 377, the 2011 census statistics showed Leicester as having the largest 
concentration of Zimbabweans in the East Midlands.75  The failure to establish a 
recognisable business community does not compare favourably with the Somalis who, like 
Zimbabweans, started arriving in the city in high numbers after 2000.76 Despite both groups 
being regarded as recent arrivals in the city, Somalis managed to build a strong business 
community in the St. Mathew and Highfields areas. In contrast, the only recognisable Black 
Zimbabwean business known by a majority of the Zimbabweans in the city had been the 
Pamuzinda grocery shop in the Highfields area.77    
There is an inextricable link between limited visibility of Black Zimbabweans’ diaspora 
businesses (or self-employment engagements) and imported attitudes to education. As 
already established, colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe education policies created a sense 
of meritocracy which indoctrinated most Black Africans to embrace educational attainment 
as the most plausible and realistic route to upward social mobility.78 It was therefore a 
natural outcome that resuscitation of historic elevation of educational attainment by the 
majority of Black Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain (discussed earlier on in the chapter) 
would naturally trivialise self-employment or the motivation to be self-employed.  
Nicholas Theodorakopoulos, Monder Ram and Trevor Jones, ‘Forms of Capital, Mixed Embeddedness and 
Somali Enterprise’, Work, Employment and Society, Volume 22 (2008), pp.427-446; Robin Ward and Richard 
Jenkins (Eds) Ethnic Communities in Business: Strategies for Economic Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1984). 
75 Leicester Mercury, 5 July 2013.  
76 Christopher Roy Zembe, ‘A Comparative Study on the Integration of Culturally Diverse Zimbabwean and 
Somali Communities in Leicester’ (unpublished De Montfort University MA Dissertation, 2012), p. 26. 
77 Ibid, p. 127. 
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Besides the historic elevation of educational attainment, two other major events in 
Zimbabwe’s history should also not be discarded when explaining why self-employed Black 
Zimbabweans have been less successful in Britain. The first one is related to racist policies of 
the colonial era and the second one to post-colonial mismanagement of the economy by 
Blacks.  
The colonial socio-economic racist policies explored in chapter two started the construction 
of an environment which significantly curtailed entrepreneurial Africans’ participation in the 
major sectors of the economy namely mining, finance or manufacturing. With Gerald Mars 
and Robin Ward pointing out that migrants’ commercial success depends on the historically 
constructed imported business experience and skills,79 the imperial racist discourse 
deliberately stifled the entrepreneurship of Blacks by denying those opportunities to gain 
experience or skills needed to set-up or manage large corporate businesses to challenge 
White economic dominance. The long term consequence was it subtly facilitated the 
construction of a mind-set that Whites and not Africans are custodians of Zimbabwe 
economic success; thus undermining confidence in Black owned or managed businesses by 
other Black Zimbabweans. The colonial prejudices against Black owned business were not to 
be restricted within Zimbabwe’s borders, but were to extend into the diaspora.   
With independence failing to radically reform the economic structures of the colonial state 
to facilitate greater Black participation in the economy, the major sectors of the economy 
continued to be under White or foreign ownership; thus allowing Blacks to continue 
reinforcing the colonial constructed mind-set of seeing themselves as employees and not 
79 Gerald Mars and Robin Ward ‘Ethnic Business Development in Britain: Opportunities and Resources’ in Ward 
and Jenkins Ethnic Communities in Business, p.10. 





employers. With this backdrop of economic restrictions or frustrations, a majority of older 
generation Black Zimbabwean immigrants migrated with no motivation or entrepreneurial 
experience to either establish or run large corporate companies so as to construct a 
recognisable diaspora entrepreneurial identity.  
Although it is undeniable that imperial racial discriminatory policies denied Africans the 
opportunity to acquire the relevant entrepreneurial experience or skills needed to establish 
reputable businesses that would have earned the trust of other Black Zimbabweans, failure 
to establish a vibrant and visible diaspora Black Zimbabwean business community should 
also be understood as a consequence of post-colonial governance. The Black participants 
provided an insight on the extent to which imported memories of corruption and poorly run 
state enterprises after independence have also assisted in stifling the entrepreneurial 
potential of Black Zimbabweans in Britain. The older generation interviewees who were old 
enough to make comparisons between the colonial and post-colonial economies expressed 
how migrating with memories of post-colonial mismanaged economy and the country’s 
resources destroyed their trust of Black owned diaspora businesses. 
Although Black participants’ acknowledged the socio-economic and political disadvantages 
associated with racial segregation, they were unanimous in agreeing that the colonial White 
administration had managed the economy better than the Black led government of 
Mugabe. They appreciated that Ian Smith’s led government had managed to keep the 
country’s economy running without cases of hyper-inflation collapse, collapse of transport 
networks, education or health delivery that have characterised independent Zimbabwe. For 





government was not only under economic sanctions, but was also involved in military 
operations against the nationalist movement.  
Panganayi’s comment summarised the shared appreciation of the White managed colonial 
economy when he pointed out that: 
…our parents could still afford to buy meat, clothes…with proper 
Christmas celebration. These are experiences which have been taken 
away from the young generation by politicians and business people 
with close links with the political establishment. Just look at how 
they have run down the Parastatals.80 Who would have imagined in 
1980 that NRZ (National Railways of Zimbabwe) will be in this 
state...how about Air Zimbabwe? All collapsed under Black 
management. Who would have imagined that within thirty years of 
independence there would be mass exodus out of Zimbabwe?’81 
Panganayi’s comments highlighted the discourse of disillusionment within the Black 
diaspora community that had started to emerge in the 1990s after the euphoria of 
independence had died down. This was a community which had experienced the impact of 
the fast rising inflation and corruption which Zimbabweans had not experienced before 
independence. Even those who had been too young to remember life in colonial Zimbabwe 
would have been made aware of the mismanagement of the economy by privately owned 
print media. Andrew Morrison and Alison Love singled out Parade and the Moto magazines, 
and the weekly newspaper the Financial Gazette as important media sites for those who 
80 A term used in some African companies to describe companies that are wholly or partly owned by the 
government.  
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became critical of the way the government was mismanaging the economy by making 
comparisons of what life was like before independence.82 The publications provided the 
avenue for the readers to air their views through letter writing. 
It is this comparative analysis of the colonial and post-colonial era’s economies that 
aggravated shared sentiments against the diaspora Black Zimbabwean owned businesses by 
other Black Zimbabweans. Just like in Zimbabwe, the Black owned businesses became 
synonymous with corruption, poor management and extortion by overcharging; hence no 
reason to support them. The consequence of the imported distrust of Black Zimbabwean 
businesses was articulated by all older generation Black participants when they pointed out 
that they would rather do business with a White Zimbabwean than a fellow Black 
Zimbabwean even when the two are competitors.  
Expressions of having confidence in White owned businesses by the participants were 
reflective of an African mind-set that had been subtly constructed during the colonial era 
and failed to be erased in independent Zimbabwe because of mismanagement of the 
economy and corruption. With the status quo remaining after independence of perceiving 
Whites as having been better managers of the Zimbabwean economy it was expected that a 
majority of Blacks migrated with a negative attitude towards Black owned business which 
was being replicated in the diaspora.  
Without guaranteed support from their kith and kin, Black Zimbabweans’ entrepreneurial 
potential in Britain would naturally be suppressed along two strands. First, it undermined 
the confidence of those in self-employment to expand their businesses: hence the failure or 
82 Andrew Morrison and Alison Love, ‘A Discourse of Disillusionment: Letters to the Editor in two Zimbabwean 
Magazines 10 years after Independence’, Discourse & Society, vol. 7 (1996), pp. 39-75. 





reluctance to transform their businesses into vibrant and visible enterprises. Secondly, those 
contemplating entering self-employment had no extrinsic motivation to do so knowing that 
their community will not be a guaranteed market they will depend on. The result has been 
an inevitable slow increase of Black owned Zimbabwean businesses in Britain.    
A letter published in the online Zimbabwean based newspaper, ‘newzimbabwe.com’ by a 
Leicestershire based businessman exposed the extent to which the distrust had become a 
hindrance to the success of entrepreneurial Black Zimbabweans. The letter was intended to 
stir the consciousness of diaspora Black Zimbabweans into believing that it was not right for 
Zimbabwean businesses to plead for support from their own Black community. In the article 
he wondered why ‘people are still wasting valuable time travelling the earth, spending small 
fortunes on fuel to get exactly the same goods and services that are available locally from a 
Zimbabwean-owned supplier.’83  
His frustration emanated from the fact that with over ten Zimbabwean butcheries scattered 
across the UK, Zimbabweans were prepared to ‘travel for hours to go and patronise a Briton 
who runs a butchery in Milton Keynes; ignoring excellent suppliers in their own home 
towns, many of whom are Zimbabweans, selling exactly the same products.’84 He made 
comparisons with the Leicester Asian community which he perceived to be supportive of 
each other. However, with historical memories of poorly run Black owned businesses 
constructed in both the colonial and post-colonial era it will take more than writing a letter 
to persuade Zimbabweans to support the businesses of their compatriots.   
83 NEWZIMBABWE.COM NEWS Are Zimbabweans naive or what?, 29, August 2010. 
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Entrepreneurialism or self-employment as an indicator of Black Zimbabweans’ economic 
integration also unveiled the significance of diverse historical experiences on the Shona and 
Ndebele diaspora integration processes. This was apparent when a survey of Zimbabwean 
businesses in Leicester, Slough, Birmingham, Coventry, Wolverhampton and Leeds 
unravelled an inextricable link between ethnicity and entrepreneurial activities. There was 
an undeniable dominance of Shona owned businesses in cities like Leicester where there 
was a strong Ndebele community. Without recognisable Ndebele owned businesses in the 
city, the Shona owned businesses identified by both Shona and Ndebele participants 
included the Pamuzinda grocery shop, Leicester Commercial College, Nursing Relief Agency 
and Coedma Freight.  
It was this diaspora dominance of Shona businesses in the city which prompted Mabuza, a 
Ndebele immigrant, to comment that ‘the Ndebele can benefit from the Shona or those 
from Mashonaland in terms of businesses.’85 However, Mabuza’s comment served to 
undermine historical evidence by scholars on pre-colonial Zimbabwean history such as David 
Beach and Gerald Chikozho Mazarire who unveiled pre-colonial Ndebele as an 
entrepreneurial community involved in ivory hunting, trade and pastoral farming.86 As if to 
affirm Beach’s arguments, the Ndebele respondents like Themba shared the pride of the 
pre-colonial existence of a powerful Ndebele kingdom with functioning socio-economic 
structures administered by a centralised political system.87  
85 Mabuza Interview 9th June 2013. 
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With Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial historians Beach and Mazarire acknowledging pre-colonial 
Ndebele entrepreneurialism, attempts to understand the contemporary ethnic 
representation within the enterprising Black Zimbabwean diaspora community should 
therefore be developed as an impact of colonial and post-colonial experiences. The 
historical influences developed in these two phases of Zimbabwe’s history that curtailed the 
entrepreneurship within the contemporary Ndebele community were based on three 
factors: Christian Missionary Activities of the nineteenth and early twentieth century; the 
failure by the Ndebele to relinquish the dream of re-establishing the Ndebele kingdom; and 
the post-colonial Gukurahundi episode in Matabeleland.  
It is undeniable that the advent of Whites as Christian missionaries started the process of 
constructing an environment in which the Ndebele would be forced to play catch-up to the 
majority Shona in producing individuals who would become part of the African business 
elite.  As discussed in Chapter Two, disparity in accessing western education provided by 
Christian missionaries from the mid-nineteenth century into the first two decades of 
colonial rule allowed the majority Shona community to attain numeracy and literacy skills 
earlier than the Ndebele. This facilitated more positive integration into the social and 
economic structures of the colonial state by the Shona. They demonstrated this through the 
establishment of African churches and a diverse range of businesses which included grocery 
shops, market gardening, transport businesses using wagons and donkeys, bricklaying, 
carpentry and tailoring businesses.88 Entrepreneurial activities by the Shona early on during 
the colonial era inevitably created perceptions that the Ndebele were less entrepreneurial 
than the Shona; perceptions that were to be re-incarnated by the Shona in the diaspora.   
88 See Chapter Two.  





Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s assertion that the militaristic Ndebele failed to relinquish the idea 
of re-establishing themselves as an independent kingdom should also not be trivialised in 
seeking to understand why the Ndebele had been historically perceived to be less 
entrepreneurial than the Shona.89 By failing to relinquish the dream, the White missionaries 
working together with the colonial administration had no option but to economically 
alienate the Ndebele through education. Chengatai Zvobgo affirmed the point when he 
pointed out how missionary operations which included the establishment of schools had to 
be halted in the early 1890s thus denying the Ndebele the skills to be economically 
integrated in an economy that was being modelled along western capitalist structures.90 
With V Wild highlighting the slow progress in Ndebele entrepreneurial activities in 
Matabeleland in a survey between 1949 and 1950,91 it would be correct to conclude that 
the Ndebele response to colonial marginalisation was not through the entrepreneurial route 
but migration to South Africa where they had ancestral links.    
Although the Ndebele participants did not refute the colonial experiences of having played a 
role in undermining their entrepreneurship, they were unanimous in identifying post-
colonial economic marginalisation during the Gukurahundi civil war as the most significant 
event which failed to provide them with incentives to challenge Shona dominance in 
business. The conviction by the Zimbabwean government that the Ndebele were supporting 
the armed insurgency in Matabeleland justified the use of socio-economic marginalisation 
as a weapon needed to destroy Ndebele particularism.  
89 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nation-Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism,’ African 
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The economic marginalisation summarised by literature on Gukurahundi included: 
translocation of economic resources from Matabeleland to Mashonaland; closing Ndebele 
owned businesses in rural areas; key jobs in Matabeleland reserved for Shona; and Ndebele 
people deprived of equal opportunities with the Shona at Matabeleland institutions.92 The 
government’s deliberate policy of economic marginalisation had made the Ndebele resign 
to the reality that the majority Shona would continue with their dominance in businesses. 
For Ndebele participants, economic marginalisation mirrored the colonial racist discourse in 
which Blacks were being denied opportunities to compete with Whites. The only difference 
this time was it was Black against Black.   With this background of colonial and post-colonial 
marginalisation a majority of the Ndebele community had therefore arrived in Britain with 
no history of having been motivated to establish businesses to challenge Shona businesses. 
 The consequence of Ndebele lack of historic entrepreneurial identity was the adoption of 
economic integration patterns that would not be measured by how successful they establish 
diaspora businesses; neither were they interested in competing with the diaspora Shona 
entrepreneurial community.  Instead, education and not self-employment or 
entrepreneurship emerged to be the preferred integration process for the majority of the 
community’s members.  The Ndebele participants demonstrated this when eight out of the 
eleven interviewees had attained or when in the process of attaining a British qualification 
at the time of the interview.  
Mars and Ward’s assertion that ‘circumstances of migration’ in the country of origin are 
directly relevant to immigrants running businesses also resonated with the Zimbabwean 
92 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation 
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White immigrant community.93 For a community consisting of members who had been 
sheltered by their social class status in both the colonial era and the first three decades of 
the post-colonial period, it would have been an expected outcome to have recognisable 
White Zimbabwean owned businesses in Britain. Pre-emigration family history of socio-
economic privileges would have given White Zimbabweans familiarity with skills that would 
have encouraged them to enter self-employment once they had regularised their 
immigration status. However, a comparative survey of the White participants’ pre-
emigration status and participation in Britain’s labour market illustrated in Table Eleven 
provided an insight of a diaspora community that failed to replicate their pre-emigration 
entrepreneurial identity.  
Table 11: Employment status of White Zimbabwean Immigrants.  
Name Pre-emigration employment 
or socio-economic status 
Employment in Britain 
Ray Family Businesses (vehicle 
repair garage and farm) 
Vehicle Mechanic 
Elizabeth Family Catering Business and 
Housewife 
Social Worker 
Robert Owned Computer Business Company Director 
Alison Family farm before migrating 
to South Africa 
Unemployed. 
Pensioner.  Voluntary work 
Garth Policeman in Rhodesia and 
Swaziland 
Unemployed. Pensioner 
Kenneth Family Business Secondary School Teacher 
Terry Secondary School Student Artist 
Joy Secondary School Student Vehicle Mechanic 
 
93 Mars and Ward, ‘Ethnic Business Development in Britain’, p.12. 





White participants in the research were unanimous in acknowledging that the community 
has failed to replicate those entrepreneurial successes which had sustained Zimbabwe in 
both the colonial and post-colonial era. This was despite Robert describing significant 
number of Whites immigrants as harbouring proud memories of their resilience, work ethic 
and entrepreneurial capabilities that did not only help sustain ‘Rhodesia’ during UDI despite 
the economic sanctions and nationalist led armed struggle, but also economically sustained 
post-colonial Zimbabwe through their viable businesses and farms.94 Contrary to this pre-
emigration entrepreneurship identity the Table shows formal employment and not self-
employment or business ownership as the best single indicator of their position on Britain’s 
labour market.   
Robert, who used to own what he described as a ‘successful computer business’, attributed 
this lack of entrepreneurialism to homeland political events sanctioned by the government 
to redress colonial injustices.95 He specifically identified the violent circumstances 
surrounding the emigration of a majority of White Zimbabweans as the main reason why a 
majority of Whites failed to replicate their entrepreneurial activities in Britain. He narrated 
how at the height of White farm invasions in 2001 he was forced to sell his computer 
business to a Black entrepreneur. This was after developing perceptions, like most Whites in 
a similar position, that life in Zimbabwe was becoming unsafe for Whites who had no 
connections with the political establishment. By selling his business, his aim was to use the 
proceeds from the sale to start a new life in Britain. However, as the political climate 
became increasingly hostile for Whites he was not able (just like the evicted farmers) to 
94 Robert, Interview. 13 November 2013. 
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pursue payment, thus forcing him to leave the country with ‘nothing’ from the sale of the 
business.96 
The farm evictions and threats to their businesses had therefore made a significant number 
of Whites flee Zimbabwe with little or no financial resources to set up businesses once they 
settled in Britain. With reference to his own experience, Robert explained how a majority of 
Zimbabwean Whites had to start life in Britain ‘from scratch with no bank account’ as they 
had no utility bills to present as proof of residence; neither did they have UK credit history 
to enable them to access bank loans to start a business.97  
The participants singled out ex-Zimbabwean White farmers to illustrate how the violent 
circumstances surrounding their emigration negatively impacted on their diaspora 
entrepreneurship. A combination of being forced to migrate without the financial resources 
to invest in farming following the farm invasions and their inability to provide collateral to 
be able to borrow money from Britain’s financial institutions, made it extremely difficult for 
the White farmers to either lease or purchase a farm. Without access to financial capital, the 
farmers failed to resuscitate their careers; a situation which was affirmed by the participants 
when they expressed ignorance of a British farm owned or leased by a White Zimbabwean 
farmer.   
The diaspora economic fortunes of the White farmers were also inextricably linked with 
(homeland) migration patterns of those who had been evicted. According to a survey taken 
in 2009, the destinations of the dispossessed farmers were as follows: 74.2 per-cent 
remained in Zimbabwe, Australia and New Zealand had 9.3 per-cent, South Africa 6 per-
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cent, SADC (Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) 3.3 per-cent, and UK 2.9 per-cent.98 With 
Lloyd Sachikonye alluding to evidence of a notable increase in agricultural production or to 
the economy in countries they settled in with the exception of the Britain,99 one has to 
conclude that those who migrated to Britain were too old or too demotivated (because of 
the pre-migration trauma of the farm evictions) to reengage in farming activities. Instead, 
Alison (whose family used to own a farm in colonial Zimbabwe until the 1980s) explained 
how a sizeable number of the farmers became content in using their agricultural skills by 
either working on British farms (some as labourers) or for companies selling farm 
products.100   
Apart from those working in the agricultural sector, Alison also highlighted how a significant 
number of White Zimbabweans found employment related to their pre-emigration 
experiences. She identified the construction, automotive industry and industrial engineering 
as employment sectors which absorbed a significant number of White Zimbabwean males 
with relevant skills. According to her, they would have acquired these technical skills 
working on family owned businesses or during the colonial era when technical 
apprenticeship courses were dominated by Whites.101  
In addition to the nature of jobs identified by Alison,102 The Rhodesian Jobs Forum also 
indicated a wide range of unskilled or semi-skilled jobs being sought by White Zimbabweans 
settled in Britain. These included drivers, child-minders, handymen, security personnel and 
estate managers; with no enquiries on how to start a business.   The Rhodesian Jobs Forum 
98 Lloyd Sachikonye, Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society (Harare: Weaver Press, 2012), 
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is a Facebook account created to assist Zimbabweans who were settled or planning to settle 
in different parts of the world to find employment. As of 21 June 2015, it had 1 171 
members.  
The nature of jobs on the Forum provided clues on the nature of qualifications or skills 
possessed by White Zimbabweans who settled in Britain. A majority of them were 
presented as individuals who were not skilled enough to look for highly skilled employment 
that would facilitate rapid movement up the social ladder. It is not because there were no 
highly skilled Whites in Zimbabwe.  Those with skills related to mining, construction, 
business or financial management according to the Forum postings tended to look for jobs 
within SADC or in Australia and New Zealand. These were countries which traditionally have 
been emigration destinations (apart from Britain) for most White Zimbabweans since they 
believed their skills would be utilised without facing much competition.  
However, Robert’s experience from the time he settled in Britain showed that it is 
misleading to conclude there were no White Zimbabwean immigrants who used their pre-
emigration entrepreneurial expertise to establish viable businesses. Although Robert 
admitted that he was initially bitter with the circumstances surrounding his migration, he 
became part of a White Zimbabwean immigrant community which resolved that they will 
not allow the bitterness to deter them from identifying ways of integrating into Britain’s 
economic and social structures.103 This was after developing an attitude influenced by 
memories of their historic economic successes that successful economic integration was 
possible in the unfamiliar diaspora environment. They were convinced that by successfully 
integrating they would be sending a message to Zimbabwe’s political leadership that the 
103 Robert, Interview. 13 November 2013. 





country had lost resilient and entrepreneurial individuals who would not have allowed the 
Zimbabwean economy to collapse as it did during the first decade of the 2000s.104  
He recalled how the challenges of losing his business instead ‘inspired him to find work 
opportunities which would allow him to utilise his imported entrepreneurial skills’.105 It was 
therefore not surprising that his initial attempt to integrate was to work as a self-employed 
distributor of “Kleeneze catalogues” in people’s homes. Although he admitted it was ‘hard 
work’ as he was forced at times to travel long distances, he got satisfaction for being self-
employed. This was because he felt he had no restrictions when utilising his entrepreneurial 
skills in selling the products.106  
After working as a self-employed Kleeneze agent in Milton Keynes for several months he 
was eventually employed by a telecommunications technology company. Using his 
experience in Information Technology (after having owned a computer business back in 
Zimbabwe), he was able rise to the position of company director. This was after forming a 
business partnership with an indigenous colleague to purchase controlling shares in the 
company. As a result of his business achievements, he had to admit that his only regret was 
postponing emigration in the 1990s when he started realising that the gradual deterioration 
of Zimbabwe’s economy was increasingly being accompanied by political rhetoric against 
White economic dominance.107 He was convinced that if he had migrated at that time he 











The diaspora Coloured community’s entrepreneurial engagement also failed to escape pre-
emigration experiences. Although sustained marginalisation in both colonial and post-
colonial eras had fostered the desire to make choices that promoted self-employment 
rather than pursuit of educational attainment, the pre-emigration self-employment identity 
that had characterised the lives of a significant number of Coloureds failed to be replicated 
in the diaspora. This was affirmed by fifty-eight year old ex-Zimbabwean Coloured 
businessman Patrick.109 He highlighted how in cities with a high concentration of Coloureds  
like Milton Keynes, a majority of the community’s members who were known to be self-
employed entrepreneurs back in Zimbabwe failed to re-establish their pre-emigration self-
employment identity.  
As an ex-businessman, Patrick noted why the failure to be self-employed could not be 
divorced from the homeland influences of the colonial and post-colonial era. Placing 
educational attainment at the periphery of their lives meant that a significant number of 
self-employed Coloureds prior to emigration had attained skills through ‘on the job training’ 
without enrolling at a higher institute of learning such as university or tertiary college.110 
Patrick identified motor mechanic, electrical and plumbing as the most popular skills 
acquired through ‘on the job training’ by those who wanted to be self-employed.111    
Although ‘on the job training’ facilitated acquisition of technical skills to be self-employed as 
plumbers, electricians or motor-mechanics, it was always highly likely that individuals with 
these undocumented skills would always be vulnerable to limited economic success if they 
were to migrate. According to Hughes, being self-employed in an ‘unfamiliar business 
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environment’ without certified evidence of their skills was always going to be difficult since 
their clientele was to a large extent restricted to Zimbabwean Coloureds or individuals with 
close associations with the community.112  
Migrating with no certificates of professional qualifications was therefore the most 
significant reason why entering into self-employment was not an economic integration 
indicator for the majority of first generation Zimbabwean Coloureds who would have been 
self-employed prior to migration. Despite having had the desire to re-establish their self-
employment identity, Patrick explained how Britain’s ‘strict codes and standards’ 
represented an environment in which the former self employed Coloureds found it difficult 
to operate.113 Using the example of plumbers, he pointed out how they experienced a 
reality check as they struggled to find work without a gas safety certificate. With their pre-
emigration skills having been gained through ‘on the job training’ there was no motivation 
to pursue further education so as to attain relevant qualifications. Instead, Patrick 
acknowledged how a majority of them decided to seek formal employment in the different 
sectors of Britain’s economy where they would be able to utilise their imported skills 
working as semi-skilled workers.114  
As for Coloured women who migrated with a background of doing office work as 
receptionists, administration assistants or typists, Patrick acknowledged how a sizeable 
number of them found work in offices as temporary agency staff; whilst those who migrated 
without professional qualifications would be engaged in any a variety of jobs which were 
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not physically demanding.115 Examples of such jobs would include shop assistants, working 
as security personnel or providing childcare mainly for the Coloured community working 
parents.  
Historic relations between Blacks and Coloured can also not be ignored when explaining 
why entrepreneurial Coloureds became disillusioned in their attempts to establish diaspora 
businesses. The Black interviewees’ comments signalled that in the eyes of most Black 
Zimbabweans, Coloureds had and will always be seen as ‘others’; a ‘community without an 
identity’ and therefore they are not compelled to interact with them. Colonial 
administration policy (discussed in Chapter Two) of placing Coloured children in residential 
homes after removing them from their African environment was the source of the ‘them 
and us’ attitude between Blacks and Coloureds which was to be exhibited in the diaspora. 
With the wedge between the two communities continuing to exist in independent 
Zimbabwe following indigenisation policies which had excluded Coloureds, support of each 
other’s entrepreneurial activities in the diaspora could not be guaranteed.  
As a minority Zimbabwean diaspora community without a history of close interactions with 
Blacks, it would have been natural for entrepreneurial Coloureds to accept that support 
from the diaspora Black Zimbabwean community could not be guaranteed. The impact of 
not having a large clientele base was illustrated by Hughes when he pointed out that a few 
Coloureds who attempted to be self employed by starting courier or man and van removal 
services either struggled or their businesses were short lived.116 Without support from other 
Zimbabweans he admitted that this outcome was inevitable as they were operating in an 
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’unfamiliar business environment’ in which business success largely depended on 
community success.117 
It would be misleading to conclude that homeland influences were the only determinants of 
the multi-racial Zimbabwean immigrant community’s economic integration. As already 
stated in the chapter’s introductory section; whilst homeland historical influences played a 
major role in determining the economic integration of Blacks, Whites and Coloureds, the 
indicators of economic integration of Asians were more complex as they cannot be entirely 
understood outside the context of post-war South Asian immigration to Britain. This is 
because post-millennium immigration of Zimbabwean Asians had been preceded by notable 
post-war phases of Asians’ immigration from the Subcontinent and East Africa. Rashmi Desai 
identifies the first post-war wave of Asian immigration as taking place immediately after the 
Second World War when economic expansion in Britain resulted in labour recruitment from 
the subcontinent.118  Avtar Brah describes the emergence of East African Asians from the 
mid-1960s into the early 1970s escaping ‘Africanisation’ policies in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda as another notable phase in Asian immigration.119  
Having carved an identity of being entrepreneurial back in Zimbabwe, it would have been an 
expected outcome for Zimbabwean Asian immigrants to replicate East African Asians who in 
the 1970s had managed to create a visible business presence in cities like Leicester.120 
However, since notable immigration of Zimbabwean Asians took place after 2000, Kasim, 
who owned a marketing company in Zimbabwe, pointed out how the reality of being late 
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arrivals in comparison to other Asians proved to be a hindrance for entrepreneurial 
Zimbabwean Asians.121  
As a small community of late arrivals spread across Britain, it was perceived as futile to 
attempt to establish businesses in an environment where non-Zimbabwean Asian support 
would not be guaranteed; especially if the businesses were seen to be competing with 
established Asian businesses owned by those from East Africa and the sub-continent.122 The 
reasons for the reluctance to compete with established Asian businesses were linked to 
historic influences. As already established in Chapter Three, contemporary Zimbabwean 
Asian immigrants found it easier to interact with South Asians from Southern African 
countries of Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa because of shared historical experiences 
and memories. These could be traced back to historic kinship ties established by first 
generation immigrants in Southern Africa which continued to be reinforced through 
marriages.123 The reluctance to compete with Asian businesses therefore affirmed Hilary 
Metcalf, Tariq Modood and Satnam Virdee’s argument that Asian businesses tend to 
develop and succeed where close co-ethnic ties exist.124  
Without being able to reincarnate their Zimbabwean constructed business identity, a 
significant number of ex-Zimbabwean Asian entrepreneurs found themselves being 
identified with the working class as they sought employment in warehouses or factories. 
Kasim recalled how he had to swallow his pride by starting at the ‘very bottom’ of the social 
ladder selling international phone cards outside a ‘corner shop’ of a friend before finding 
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work as a warehouse operative.125 These experiences of downward social mobility were 
described by Kasim as triggering ‘feelings of jealousy’ towards the established 
entrepreneurial class of non-Zimbabwean Asians, especially those from East Africa.126 
Without entrepreneurial engagement, it was an expected response for the research’s 
participants to express ignorance of UK based businesses owned by Zimbabwean Asians. 
The only exceptions were Black participants living in Leicester who were able to identify a 
Zimbabwean owned Asian business operating in the city whose entrepreneurial activities 
are to an extent closely tied with homeland business interests. With Alice Bloch describing 
the Zimbabwean diaspora community as being active in remitting money to relatives and 
friends back home,127 ‘Royal Comms’ owned by a Zimbabwean Asian entrepreneur with 
business interests in both the UK and Zimbabwe emerged as one of the most successful 
money transfer agencies utilised by most Black Zimbabweans across Britain. The money 
transfer business allowed him to raise invaluable foreign currency to reinvest in his 
Zimbabwean businesses. Maintaining business interests back home showed the extent to 
which some within the Asian business community were still determined to keep their 
business identity by pursuing economic integration processes that would generate enough 
income to keep the Zimbabwean businesses operational.   
Social Integration 
The vast and ever emerging academic literature on post-war British migration has been 
dominated by evolving discourses exploring the relationship between immigrant 
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communities’ case studies and societies hosting them.128 Social integration and assimilation 
has therefore become one of the central research themes related to immigration in 
Britain.129 With a majority of migrants arriving with different cultural or religious 
backgrounds that may be different to the indigenous population, there is always potential of 
what Pauline Hope Cheong et al describe as a ‘clash between the management of diversity 
and the context of social integration that is rooted in an archaic sense and mirage of British 
uniformity.’130 To initiate successful integration it becomes imperative for both the 
indigenous population and immigrants to negotiate ways as to how migrants should be 
positively engaged with the local community.  
While it is undeniable that post-war immigrants have had a profound effect on the British 
way of life as alluded to by Panikos Panayi,131 an examination of Zimbabwean immigrants 
unveiled pre-emigration socialisation as an integral component that determines the nature 
of interactions with host society’s social structures. With immigration naturally transforming 
British society to make it culturally, socially or religiously diverse, it was therefore necessary 
to understand the significance of historical influences on trajectories of Zimbabwean 
immigrants’ participation in Britain’s social spheres.  
By focusing on intermarriage, language, religion and constructions of relations with the 
indigenous population, this section will allow that salient assessment of historic homeland 
influences that have been key determinants on Zimbabweans’ social integration patterns. 
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Examination of these social interaction patterns also unravelled ethnicity to be inextricably 
linked with social integration patterns of Zimbabweans. A comparative study of Blacks, 
Whites, Coloureds and Asians revealed a diversity of social integration experiences between 
the ethnic communities.   
Although it is undeniable that increased levels of intermarriage as noted by Lucassen can be 
a litmus test of high levels of social integration,132  Zimbabwean Black participants 
presented clear evidence of a diaspora community that was not keen to embrace inter-
racial relations. The reluctance in establishing diaspora intimate relations with the White 
indigenous population has to be understood as the long term consequence of the colonial 
racist discourse which was engrained in the hierarchical classification of the population. 
Racial categorisation of the population complemented by legislation enacted during the 
early phase of colonial rule successfully created effective imagined racial boundaries that 
were to be preserved by an absence of inter-racial sexual relations or marriages.  
Criminalisation of inter-racial sexualities through the passing of laws such as the ‘Immorality 
and indecency Suppression Ordinance’ enacted in 1903 had set the agenda on how 
interracial relations were to progress in Zimbabwe.133 To ensure effectiveness of the 
legislation, informal policing was introduced that kept interracial relations to a minimum.134 
The racist discourse on interracial relations inadvertently facilitated the development of 
attitudes within Blacks that marrying a White was not a status symbol since it only exposed 
them to racist stereotypes and prejudices   
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Although legislation which had criminalised inter-racial relations particularly between Blacks 
and Whites was repealed in the 1950s, Whites were still not allowed to marry Blacks under 
the Native Marriages Act of 1950.135 The inevitable consequence was that inter-racial 
relations or marriages remained suppressed throughout the colonial era. Even the post-
colonial dismantling of colonial racial barriers especially in education discussed in chapter 
two failed to trigger a significant shift in the acceptance of mixed marriages. It was this 
failure to create a post-colonial environment to encourage inter-marriages that made it 
difficult for Blacks to erase the historically constructed racial discourse that older generation 
Whites are inherently racist.  
Comments by Jessica a 26 year old White Zimbabwean who migrated to Britain in 2002 
when she was in her teens justified the perceptions most Blacks had of Whites who had 
grown up in Rhodesia.136 She pointed out that despite having friends across the racial divide 
at her Zimbabwean school, the older generation in her family were still not comfortable 
with the idea of her forging intimate friendships with non-White school mates to the extent 
of visiting each other in their respective homes. Neither were they expected to ‘date’ non-
White boys or girls.  In the absence of intimate friendships, Jessica admitted that most 
Whites of her age had been subtly nurtured to despise interracial relations by older 
members of the family.137 The ultimate result was that very few individuals of her 
generation crossed the racial boundaries in relations.       
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Black Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain are therefore a community which arrived in the 
country without having experienced significant inter-racial relations or marriages. With Miri 
Song pointing out that intermarriage is an emotive issue because of ‘historically racialised 
beliefs and ideologies’138, it was an inevitable result that pre-emigration experiences would 
have made a significant number of Black Zimbabweans reluctant to cross the racial 
boundaries to be in a relationship with a White British person. The evidence was clear 
among the participants. Of the seventeen Black Zimbabwean participants who migrated 
when they were unmarried (statistics include the six individuals who arrived whilst at 
primary or secondary school and have grown up in Britain), only one acknowledged to have 
been in a mixed relationship with a White Briton.  
Intermarriage like any marriage is regarded by Song as a mechanism that does not only 
transmit  ethnically specific cultural values and practices to the next generation, but also 
transforms ethnic and cultural distinctiveness through the birth of ‘mixed race’ children.139 
With intermarriage requiring such drastic cultural or social identity compromises, imported 
historical social and cultural practices were also cited by both unmarried and married Black 
interviewees as significant traditional values that have discouraged intermarriage in Britain. 
There was universal agreement that the imported historical social and cultural barriers 
needed to be confronted first for the diaspora interracial marriages or relationships to be 
tolerated by older members of the community.   
However, unmarried 29 year old Nqobile summarised the concerns of the youths in regards 
to their parents’ attitude toward mixed-marriages. He highlighted how Black Zimbabwean 
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young people in the diaspora are still not convinced that their parents are prepared to go 
the extra mile to overcome cultural barriers especially those to do with: ‘bride price’ (money 
paid by the groom to parents of the bride), language and role of extended family in their 
married life.140 The young people’s concerns were further compounded by the fact that 
their parents as recent arrivals would not have lived long enough in Britain to let go of these 
cultural practices related to marriage.  
Imported homeland cultural influences also unveiled complex age dynamics in regards to 
attitudes towards intermarriage. Those of the younger generation who completed their 
secondary education in Britain and were still in their early twenties did not mind marrying a 
White British. They viewed cultural values as irrelevant to the younger generation growing 
up in Britain. Kuda a 22 year old university student in Leicester explained how being 
socialised by western values outside the home environment had made her generation 
perceive imported traditions on marriages upheld by their parents to be a hindrance to their 
social integration.141  
Parallel to pre-emigration influences on intermarriage to gauge Black Zimbabweans’ social 
integration was competency in English language.  Whilst migrants’ proficiency in the host 
society’s language can be perceived as an indicator of successful social integration as 
pointed out by Katherine Fennelly and Nicole Palasz142, for Black Zimbabweans it unveiled 
the extent to which colonial influences impacted on the use of vernacular languages in the 
diaspora. This was because Black Zimbabweans did not have to go through the phase of 
learning the English language when they were settling in Britain. 
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 The colonial era’s diffusion of cultures (in which Blacks were indoctrinated to accept a 
European way of life as being superior) had marked the gradual elevation of English 
language as a symbol of status among the Black community. The inevitable consequence 
was the gradual decline of vernacular languages as crucial identity markers within some 
Black Zimbabweans; a trend which continued in post-colonial Zimbabwe and was then 
replicated in the diaspora. The impact of historic British socialisation in diluting the 
traditional identity markers within the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community was well 
articulated by Terence Ranger whilst describing the culture of Zimbabwean asylum seekers. 
He pointed out how Zimbabweans on arrival in Britain did not need instruction in British 
language, belief or culture. Instead, they felt ‘at least part of the same universe of thought 
and culture with the British.’143  
Rangers’ assertion was apparent in most diaspora participants’ homes where indigenous 
languages had been replaced by English, resulting in children not being able to converse in 
either Shona or Ndebele. The parents seemed comfortable speaking in English with children 
like Tarisai going to the extent of defending her son’s reluctance to speak in Shona by 
arguing that ‘he will never live in Zimbabwe, so why speak it?’144 The use of English at home 
affirmed Mary Stopes-Roe and Raymond Cochrane’s argument that when two languages are 
available, the one used in private spaces of home is an important indicator of cultural 
attachment.145  
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Positive social integration as presented by Guido Bolaffi et al should be a process that 
should not diminish the identity of the migrants.146 Instead, there should be equilibrium of 
tolerance of different cultures so as to allow migrants to maintain their pre-emigration 
individual identities whilst continuing to interleave with the dominant culture on the basis 
of implicit egalitarianism.147 Black Zimbabweans’ social integration had to therefore 
resonate with Ajaya Kumar Sahoo’s assertion that imported religious practices of 
immigrants provide an important identity that helps them ‘perpetuate and preserve 
individual self-awareness.’148 
Pre-emigration denominational affiliations within the diaspora Zimbabwean Christian 
community provided that framework to gauge Black Zimbabweans’ social integration. The 
Zimbabwean diaspora Christian community had always been split between those who 
attended home grown churches and those attending the traditional churches. With 
colonialism having successfully introduced Christianity to Africans, denominational 
allegiances emerged to be a significant identity among most Black Zimbabwean Christians. 
As early as the 1920s Black African churches had been established to counter the traditional 
churches by fusing an African style of worship in the services. Chapter two was able to 
establish how the continuous establishment of the African churches became an integral 
component of the Christian landscape throughout Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial 
history.  
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The successful integration of the predominantly Zimbabwean Christian community was 
therefore to be measured by how far they would be able to establish home grown 
Zimbabwean churches without fear of victimisation or prejudices by traditional Churches 
with western identities.  The post-new millennium rapid increase of home grown churches 
like ‘Johane Masowe Chishanu’ or ‘Johane Marange’ in cities like Leicester with distinct 
African traditional ways of worship emerged to be successful social integration indicators of 
the Zimbabwean Christian community. Having the freedom to establish home churches 
without having to compromise pre-emigration styles of worship affirmed Lucassen’s 
assertion that successful integration requires acceptance and tolerance of cultural 
differences in multi-cultural societies.149   
Whilst pre-emigration influences on intermarriage, language and religion were clear 
indicators that assessed Black Zimbabweans’ social integration, the homeland influences on 
Whites’ diaspora social interactions were more complex. With similar physical features to 
the indigenous population, it would have been an expected outcome that the shared 
physical features with the host community would have assisted in disentangling any barriers 
to successful social interactions of White Zimbabweans.  
However, White interviewees’ experiences unveiled how migrating with a historically 
nurtured sense of a collective identity embedded in the belief that they are a nation 
emerged to be a major hindrance when attempting to establish relations with the 
indigenous population. The White Zimbabwean immigrants who had decided to stay in 
Zimbabwe when it became independent were third or fourth generation White 
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Zimbabweans who saw themselves as having little cultural commonality with the indigenous 
population. They would have severed links with their ancestral European heritage.  
The title of Ranka Primorac’s discussion ‘Rhodesians Never Die? The Zimbabwean Crisis and 
the Revival of Rhodesian Discourse’150 in which he explores the narratives of twenty-first 
century displaced White Zimbabweans living in the diaspora, resonates with White 
Zimbabweans who would not let go of White Rhodesian identity markers as they attempt to 
establish social integration patterns in Britain. They instead viewed themselves as ‘White 
Africans’; born in Zimbabwe; growing up there in a sheltered life of socio-economic 
privileges; and their presence in Britain was not by choice but had been enforced on them 
by Zimbabwe’s political establishment.  
The disconnection with Britain was made clear by the older generation White interviewees 
who were unanimous in acknowledging how they still introduced themselves to new 
acquaintances as Zimbabweans. Despite the violent circumstances surrounding the 
migration of the majority of the community members, they still clung on to the hope that 
they would return back to their ‘home’ country and reclaim their citizenship. This was 
testimony of their failure to re-connect with their ancestral links as they settled in what had 
become their adopted home.  
It was this historically nurtured sense of a collective identity embedded in the belief that 
they are a nation which has been a major hindrance on how the Zimbabwean Whites 
construct interactions with British society. The exclusive nature of events like ‘July Braai’ 
advertised as a Rhodesian event with use of Rhodesian symbols such as the Rhodesian flag 
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and Coat of Arms have demonstrated the extent to which the White community imported 
the Rhodesian national identity.151 However, Elizabeth admitted that failure to let go of that 
Rhodesian identity has not only been a hindrance to establishment of cordial relations with 
non-White Zimbabweans, but also in developing strong social interactions with the host 
society despite the majority of them having British ancestral links.152 
Elizabeth’s experience in Cumbria highlighted the extent of the challenges posed by 
migrating with this strong Rhodesian or White African identity when attempting to establish 
social interactions with the host community in areas with a predominantly White British 
population. When she settled in the county in 2002, 98.4% of the county’s population was 
identified as being White British.153 It was this racial demography which Elizabeth identified 
as the trigger of her apparent isolation from the local society.  
In a community dominated by the indigenous population she recalled how she would 
constantly be asked her country of origin since speaking English with an accent would not 
hide her Rhodesian identity. She interpreted the inquisitive question about her origins as a 
deliberate ploy of reminding her that she was a foreigner. Being married to a Briton failed to 
facilitate acceptance as equals with the indigenous community members. In the eyes of the 
majority of the local people her family would always be foreigners with restricted rights in 
accessing social benefits such as allocation of social housing. This became apparent when 
she was allocated a council house ahead of members of the local community who might 
have been on a waiting list before her. Although she did not experience violent abuse when 
151 See Chapter Four. 
152 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013. 
153 Office for National Statistics, Census 2001 Key Statistics, Local Authorities in England and Wales: Available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/census-2001-key-statistics/local-authorities-in-england-and-
wales/index.html (Accessed on 29 October 2014). 





she moved into her council house, she still felt ostracised by her neighbours as there was no 
initiative to make her family feel welcome: ‘not even a greeting on the street’ she 
claimed.154 
She also narrated how both her fifteen year old daughter and twelve year old son felt 
bullied and ostracised by their schoolmates who would pretend not to understand their 
English accent. She described how her daughter would often be labelled ‘a posh girl with an 
accent’ for not wanting to be part of the teenage clubbing and drinking culture.155 Without 
much social interaction, her daughter suffered depression for two years after completion of 
her GCSE exams in 2003; a situation which she believed was the source of temporarily 
strained relations between her daughter and the rest of the family. However, her youngest 
daughter who migrated when she was eight years old did not face similar problems. 
Elizabeth attributed this to her young age which enabled her to pick up the British accent 
much faster than her siblings thus enabling her to establish friendship networks. She 
believed developing friendship networks naturally facilitated her assimilation into the local 
community faster than her siblings.   
Understanding the diaspora Coloured social interactions with the host society is also 
entrenched in fully grasping the dynamics of homeland racial relations developed in both 
the colonial and post-colonial eras. The older generation Zimbabwean Coloureds in Britain 
were second or third generation products of the colonial racial classification of the 
population who also migrated with a post-colonial history of marginalisation.  Chapter two’s 
discussion showed how marginalisation in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe had 
154 Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013. 
155 Ibid. 





created and consolidated the desire in subsequent generations to preserve Coloured 
consciousness by making choices that trivialised interaction with other communities. A 
majority of older members of the community had therefore migrated with no historical 
point of reference to justify the advantages of forging close ties with other races.  
With pre-emigration cultural alignment to either Whites or Blacks best described as a 
metaphoric experience as there were no meaningful interactions to bring closer ties, a 
majority of the older generation migrated with no motivation of wanting to forge relations 
with the host society. This is the reason why Pamela described Zimbabwean Coloureds as 
continuing to create ‘enclaves’ in Milton Keynes, a town shown by 2001 and 2011 census 
statistics as becoming more multi-ethnic. In 2001, 13.2% of the town’s population was 
identified as being ethnic minority communities, rising to 26.1% in the 2011 census.156 
Pamela’s assertion indicates how memories of past relations with other ethnic groups had 
superseded the need to establish social interactions.157 
Despite the limited overall interaction with the host society, interracial partnering among 
the younger Coloured generation has been on the rise in Britain; a development 
acknowledged by Simon who is in a relationship with a White British and Esther whose son 
also crossed the racial divide.  Pamela who had been married to a White British back in 
Zimbabwe admitted that Coloureds’ alignment to Whites during the colonial era had been 
instrumental in the acceptance of interracial relations when it involved a White.158 She 
singled out the colonial hierarchical classification of the population and placing of Coloured 
children in exclusive residential homes for facilitating the construction of attitudes of 
156 Milton Keynes Council, Available at http://www.milton-keynes.gov.uk/your-council-and-
elections/statistics/census (Accessed on 29 October 2014). 
157 Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013. 
158 Ibid. 





viewing marrying a White person as a status symbol.159 With interracial relations supressed 
in Zimbabwe, the long term consequence of colonial policies was that a majority of older 
Coloureds would not object when their children crossed the racial boundaries to be in 
relationships with White British people.160  
Social integration of Asians, co-occupiers with Coloureds in the second category of colonial 
categorisation of the population, was a process that was also shaped by pre-emigration 
socialisation. Although the delayed exodus of Zimbabwean Asians could have been a 
deterrent to their economic integration, Kasim claimed the delayed arrival of Zimbabwean 
Asians had a positive impact in establishing social interactions with the host society.161 
Unlike East African Asians who were forced to migrate during the first decade of their 
countries’ independence, Zimbabwean Asians had the opportunity of living for over thirty 
years in an independent Zimbabwe before deciding to emigrate.  It is this relatively long 
period of living in independent Zimbabwe which Kasim believed gave them enough time to 
dismantle remnants of colonial socialisation of seeing themselves as superior to Blacks. The 
result according to Kasim was the attainment of social skills on how to mix and actively 
participate with non-Asian individuals including those who do not share their religious 
beliefs.162  
Like other Zimbabweans, the most essential skill posed by Zimbabwean Asians to facilitate 
this positive interaction was their ability to speak English. Long historical associations with 
British traditions had allowed Zimbabwean Asians to fall into the category of Asian 
159 Simon, Interview. 17 September 2013.  
160 Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013. 
161 Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013. 
162 Ibid. 





communities described by Mohan Luthra as ‘secularised and westernised’..163 As recipients 
of British inspired education in which they learned the English language, the Zimbabwean 
Asians did not have to undergo radical cultural adjustment to be able to interact with 
Britain’s social or economic structures. Their historic association with British traditions was 
in contrast to those from the sub-continent whose majority was described by Rashmi Desai 
as having arrived in Britain speaking very little English and therefore needed severe 
adjustment in their knowledge of English if they were to socially or economically 
integrate.164  
Song’s assertion that intermarriage fundamentally changes ethnic cultural distinctiveness 
has been a major reason why Zimbabwean Asians have been reluctant to engage or 
promote intermarriage.165 Prior to migration, this was a community which had managed to 
preserve their cultural distinctiveness without practicing intermarriage. It was therefore 
expected that the need to preserve historical traditional values was cited by Zimbabwean 
Asian participants as the major reason why intermarriage has been discouraged in the 
diaspora. Twenty-two year old Kamal who is in a relationship with a British born non-
Zimbabwean Asian admitted that the only intermarriage most Zimbabwean Asian parents 
can accept is within the Asian community; especially from those of the same caste or 
religion.166 As a Muslim, his choice of a partner had been influenced by his religion.  
Summary and Conclusion 
163 Mohan Luthra, Britain’s Black Population: Social Change, Public Policies and Agenda (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1997), pp. 21-22. 
164 Desai, Indian Immigrants, p.9. 
165 Miri Song, ‘Is Intermarriage a Good Indicator of Integration?’, pp. 331-348. 
166 Kamal, Interview, 4 November 2013. 





This chapter has developed an argument showing how the dynamics in the construction of 
social or economic interactions by Zimbabwe’s diaspora community failed to conceal 
community and individual identities which had been constructed in both the colonial and 
post-colonial eras. By focusing on education and employment, the chapter unravelled 
diverse economic integration processes between the different ethnic and racial groups. The 
diversity was a direct consequence of attitudes and prejudices developed during the colonial 
era which were not desensitised in independent Zimbabwe. Historical socialisation of 
elevating education attainment as a means of attaining middle class status has been 
influential in the economic integration of Black Zimbabweans as the majority of them 
pursued higher professional and educational qualifications more than any other 
Zimbabwean community.  
The chapter unveiled the extent to which having confidence in White owned businesses by 
the participants were reflective of an African mind-set that had been subtly constructed 
during the colonial era and failed to be erased in independent Zimbabwe due to perceived 
economic mismanagement. With the status quo remaining after independence of perceiving 
Whites as having been better managers of the Zimbabwean economy in both the colonial 
and post-colonial eras, a majority of Blacks have migrated with a negative attitude towards 
Black owned business. The inevitable consequence of harbouring such pre-emigration 
perceptions was justification of why diaspora businesses owned by Black Zimbabweans 
should not expect support from Blacks. Without guaranteed support from their fellow Black 
Zimbabweans’ entrepreneurial potential was naturally suppressed thus resulting in the 





The chapter also showed how the economic integration of White Zimbabweans had been a 
complex process determined by variables emanating from colonial privileges engrained in 
the hierarchical classification of the population and the circumstances that led to their post-
colonial emigration. With a history of privileges in both the colonial and post-colonial era a 
majority of older members of the community had migrated without having gone through 
experiences of appreciating the need for higher educational qualifications as a means of 
moving up the social ladder. Education was therefore not embraced by the majority of the 
older members as an indicator of their economic integration. Their economic integration 
was to a large extent focused on providing their children with an economically stable future 
they believed had been violently taken away from them by the Zimbabwean government’s 
authorised farm invasions.  
The failure to adopt economic integration processes that would have allowed Zimbabwean 
Asians to curve a visible presence in Britain was a result of three inter-related historical 
factors: their late arrival in Britain compared to other Asians; the uneven dispersal of the 
community across Britain; and professional qualifications attained prior to emigration. As 
late arrivals, it was inevitable that a majority of Zimbabwean Asians became resigned to the 
fact that they would find it difficult to resuscitate an affluent life they had been used to in 
Zimbabwe as business owners. This was because: they were reluctant to compete with the 
already established entrepreneurial Asians from East Africa and the sub-continent. The only 
exception of those who successfully integrated into Britain’s economic structures were 
individuals who migrated with transferable skills such as teaching.  
Economic and social integration of first generation Zimbabwean Coloured immigrants could 





phases of Zimbabwe’s history. By having a history of placing education at the periphery of 
their lives, the diaspora community of older generation Coloureds has not been motivated 
to enrol for further education, a trend which is gradually changing in the younger 
generation. Older generation Coloureds’ participation in Britain’s economic structures had 
therefore been a varied and complex process determined by the level of professional or 
educational qualifications and the desire to be self-employed and preserve Coloured 
consciousness.   
The ability by Zimbabweans to start their home based churches with a distinct style of 
worship has been identified by the chapter as an indicator of successful social integration in 
which British society demonstrated tolerance of immigrants imported cultures. The 
Zimbabwean home grown churches have firmly established themselves as part of the 
Christian community especially in cities like Leicester where there is a large concentration of 
Black Zimbabweans. The result has been the preservation of styles of worship which had 
become identifiable with Zimbabwean Black African churches since the 1920s. 
With intermarriage becoming an accepted cultural phenomenon in Britain, patterns of 
intimacy between non-White Zimbabwean immigrants and White Britons would have been 
a ‘litmus test’ for social integration. However, given the fact that the first generation Black 
Zimbabwean immigrants who arrived in Britain had grown up in an environment in which 
imagined racial boundaries created by colonial classification of the population had not been 
fully dismantled, racial prejudices and social or cultural differences emerged to be 
significant barriers to intermarriage with natives. A correlation between imported cultural 





Asian immigrants has also not instigated a significant rise in marriages between their 
children and White Britons. 
By making a comparative analysis between the different ethnic and racial communities the 
chapter was able to affirm why Zimbabweans in the diaspora should not be regarded as a 
monolithic community. The diversity of the integration processes between the different 
ethnic or racial groups shows how the historical nurtured ideologies unique to each group 
has necessitated the need to look at multiple paradigms when exploring the integration of 
Zimbabweans. One important aspect which came out of the chapter was that the influence 
of historical socialisation on economic or social integration had allowed the Black 





The colonial creation of a nation-state was an alien concept to Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial 
African communities described by David Beach as having been divided by language dialects 
and loosely defined territories.1 The colonial invention of a state modelled along Western 
socio-economic and political systems facilitated stimulation of ethnic particularism that 
would undermine the creation of a cohesive nation in both the colonial and post-colonial 
phases of Zimbabwe’s history. Construction of relations and integration processes of 
Zimbabwean diaspora communities in Britain can therefore not be fully understood outside 
the context of the evolution of socio-economic structures developed under colonial rule as 
discussed by Smart Otu.2  
With Graham Day pointing out how belonging to a community is encapsulated in 
consciousness of social boundaries, it would have been misleading for the thesis to have 
examined Zimbabwean diaspora communities as uniform, static or rigid.3 In recognition of 
the ethno-racial diversity of the Zimbabwean immigrants, the research adopted a 
comparative analysis of Blacks (Ndebele and Shona), Whites, Coloureds and Asians. As the 
respective diasporic Zimbabwean communities settled in Britain, consciousness of their 
minority status led to social reconstruction or reinforcement of their historically embedded 
sense of community identities and prejudices that had engendered a sense of belonging 
during the course of Zimbabwe’s history. Consolidating these historic identities and 
prejudices affirmed Gerard Delanty’s argument that legacies of the past are significant 
1 David Beach, Zimbabwe Before 1900 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984), p. 5. 
2 Smart Otu, ‘Class Struggle, Resistance and the Revolutionary Pressures of Crisis in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe‘, 
Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 3 (2010), pp. 189-210. 
3 Graham Day, Community and Everyday Life (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p.2. 
 




components in producing and shaping collective or individual identities of diaspora 
communities.4  
In unravelling the impact of historical influences on the Zimbabwean diaspora community, 
chapters three and four explored relations between the Zimbabwean communities and their 
interactions with Britain’s socio-economic structures. Education, employment (formal and 
self-employment), intermarriage, religion and language were used to measure 
Zimbabweans’ socio-economic integration. Focusing on these themes enabled the thesis to 
demonstrate that Zimbabweans in Britain are still a product of unresolved ethno-racial 
prejudices and identities that were constructed during the phases of Zimbabwe’s history.   
Whilst it is undeniable that colonial Zimbabwe was beset with a series of political and 
economic policies which constructed a racially divided community, the thesis also revealed a 
Black diaspora community imbued with historic communal tensions and prejudices. 
Although Zimbabwean scholars like Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu recognised how the 1830s 
arrival of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe marked the beginning of tensions with the Shona,5 it 
was the arrival of Whites that would consolidate that ethnic particularism. The thesis 
established three developments linked to the arrival of Whites as being significant 
contributory factors to the consolidation of ethnic prejudices or particularism within the 
African community. These were: Christian missionary activities, 1890s colonisation process 
and creation of ethnic named regions.  
Chapter two established how Christian missionary activities led to disparities in establishing 
mission schools between Mashonaland and Matabeleland thus allowing the Shona to have a 
4 Gerard Delanty, Community  (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 158. 
5 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nation-Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism,’ African 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.8 (2008), pp. 27-56. 




head-start in acquiring numeracy and literacy skills to integrate into the colonial economic 
systems. An environment had therefore been created to nurture Shona prejudices and 
arrogance. The colonial process that saw Mashonaland and not Matabeleland being 
colonised first was the second development that consolidated Ndebele prejudices of seeing 
themselves as being superior to the Shona. The colonial administration’s creation of ethnic 
named boundaries was the third significant factor that legitimised ethnic distinctions within 
the African community. Awareness of ethnic differences would inevitably stifle future nation 
building initiatives within the Black Nationalist movement fighting the colonial autocratic 
socio-economic and political systems. 
Upon attaining independence on 18 April 1980, the new Zimbabwe had therefore inherited 
a society not only polarised by racial prejudices, but also ethnic tensions and allegiances 
within the Black community that needed to be tactfully addressed in building a new nation-
state. However, as evidenced in chapter two, the post-colonial government failed to invoke 
nation building initiatives to conceal the fractures of ethnicity within the Black community 
that could be traced back to the pre-colonial era. With ethno-nationalism continuing to 
dominate African politics, any initiatives to deal with historic ethnic tension were severely 
undermined with the outbreak of Gukurahundi in 1982. The government’s response to the 
insurgence inflamed ethnic tensions as the Ndebele found themselves not only being 
marginalised, but also going through a period of indiscriminate and disproportionate 
persecution by the security forces. 
Without pre-emigration sensitisation of how to deal with historic ethnic tensions there was 
no paradigm shift within the Black diaspora community to unite. Memories of atrocities 




within the Shona community trivialised) became a major deterrence in uniting Black 
Zimbabwean immigrants. With the atrocities of Gukurahundi becoming an integral 
component of Ndebele history, ethnic particularism continued to be reinforced in Britain 
through restricted interaction with the Shona.  
Migrating with the historical dominance of the Shona which some Ndebele feel was 
effectively used against them during Gukurahundi has not only comprised their attachment 
to Zimbabwe, but it has also made them feel vulnerable in an environment dominated by 
the Shona. Chapter three provided clear evidence of the reluctance by most Ndebele to 
participate in diaspora community events or Zimbabwean Associations in which the Shona 
dominate unless there were guaranteed proportional representation in the leadership. The 
Ndebele actions served to confirm how some members of the community emigrated with 
perceptions that they will always be threatened by the majority Shona community. With 
memories of Gukurahundi still embedded in the lives of the Ndebele, they continued to 
entertain the belief that a real sense of security or their interests could only be guaranteed 
when among fellow community members. This has been one of reasons why cities like 
Leicester experienced an influx of the Ndebele thus creating a community large enough to 
challenge the Shona dominance. 
Apart from ethnicity, relations within the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community have 
also been immersed in suspicion, augmented by profound distrust and jealousy of each 
other. With a significant number of middle class Zimbabweans experiencing deskilling, the 
inherited prestige of social class had been replaced by immigration status in determining an 
individual’s diaspora socio-economic status. Without immigration papers, Zimbabweans 




professional qualifications. It was therefore expected that Black Zimbabweans (whether 
deskilled or not) working illegally would not feel comfortable interacting with other 
Zimbabweans or seeking advice on immigration issues. They would prefer to stay at home 
whilst their immigration papers were being processed. This was because of the fear of being 
reported to immigration officials for working illegally. Only after they had regularised their 
immigration status would they feel comfortable to interact. 
The source of the diaspora suspicions and mistrust within the Black community was 
entrenched in both the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe’s history. 
Regrettably, during the armed liberation struggle for independence, there were instances in 
which personal rivalries or jealousy would result in Blacks falsely labelling each other as 
collaborators with the colonial state. With death being the ultimate punishment of such 
accusations, there were a significant number of innocent victims, hence the mistrust. After 
independence, intolerance to political opposition that triggered an exodus of political 
asylum seekers at the turn of the new millennium further reinforced mistrust and suspicion. 
A significant number of first generation Black Zimbabweans had therefore migrated with 
memories of Black against Black acts of violence.  
A holistic understanding of the debates surrounding the Black Zimbabwean diaspora 
community could not have been fully appreciated without a comparative analysis of the 
colonial and post-colonial immigrants. Despite emigration taking places in different periods, 
the construction of relations could not be immune from shared historic commonalities. 
Chapter three’s examination of colonial and post-colonial Black immigrants revealed 
differences on how they constructed their identities. Whilst a majority of contemporary 




of any nation building initiatives, shared colonial subjugation stimulated a consciousness of 
sameness that superseded any historic ethnic tensions within the majority of Blacks who 
arrived in the colonial era. 
 The determination to return to an independent Zimbabwe had forged a united identity in 
political activism to remove colonial injustices. This was because the Black students in the 
1970s viewed themselves as victims of colonial racial policies and not political refugees or 
economic immigrants. Their diaspora political activism had emerged to be another front in 
the liberation struggle for independence. To ensure success their political activities were not 
characterised by ethnic affiliations. It was this unwavering attachment to Zimbabwe and 
political activism which did not condone any ethnic differences that distinguished the 1970s 
Black student community from contemporary Black Zimbabwean immigrants. 
The colonial categorisation of the population created racial boundaries which to a large 
extent were maintained by an absence of intermarriage. The racial prejudices that hindered 
intermarriage had created a Black community that disregarded intermarriage as a status 
symbol. The failure at independence to desensitise Zimbabweans from colonial racial 
prejudices resulted in very little change to colonial attitudes on intermarriage. A majority of 
individuals from all the racial communities continued to be reluctant to cross the colour bar 
in marriage. Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain had therefore arrived in the country without 
having experienced significant inter-racial relations or marriages to motivate them to enter 
into relations with the indigenous population.  
The thesis was also able to develop an argument showing how the dynamics in the 
economic integration of Zimbabweans had been a complex process determined by variables 




colonial capitalist system that facilitated the exceptionally intelligent within the Black 
community to climb the social ladder had started the process of conditioning Black Africans 
to believe that educational attainment was not only a symbol of status, but also a viable 
route out of poverty. This inextricable link between education and meritocracy continued to 
be reinforced in post-colonial Zimbabwe under the principle of ‘education for all’ that was 
targeting the Black community. This was when measures were implemented to facilitate 
universal accessibility to educational opportunities. It was this historically nurtured 
inclination to pursue education which was to play a pivotal role in the economic integration 
of the contemporary Zimbabwean Black diaspora community in Britain. The utilisation of 
education facilitated the rapid movement up the social ladder of Blacks in comparison to 
other diaspora Zimbabwean communities. 
Whilst, it is undeniable that communalism had naturally undermined cohesiveness or unity 
of Black diaspora Zimbabwean immigrants, the impact of colonial hierarchical categorisation 
of the population cannot be trivialised when seeking to understand the development of 
relations between the diaspora Zimbabwean communities. With the establishment of 
colonial racial boundaries that could not be transgressed, the racial hierarchical 
classification of the society in which Whites were placed at the pinnacle of the country’s 
socio-economic structures triggered socialisation processes that could not conceal the 
development of racial prejudices that were to extend in independent Zimbabwe.  
As evidenced in chapter two, Zimbabwean scholars Karen Alexander, David Hughes and 
James Muzondidya point out how a majority of Whites after independence continued to 
exhibit their racial prejudices in several ways. These included: continuing to segregate 




that had been designated for Blacks during the colonial era); not wanting to economically 
empower Blacks, especially in farming; not making efforts to learn indigenous languages or 
live in areas that were once reserved for Blacks during the colonial era; and not attending 
national events like independence. It was this failure to dismantle racial prejudices by not 
positively engaging with nation building initiatives in post-colonial Zimbabwe that would 
emerge to be a hindrance in establishing inter-racial relationships in the diaspora. 
After having gone through the trauma of nationalist guerrilla attacks during Zimbabwe’s 
armed struggle from the late 1960s to the late 1970s and the violent eviction from their 
farms at the turn of the new millennium, a majority of older generation Whites emigrated 
with perceptions that a majority of Black Zimbabweans especially within the nationalist 
movement had never accepted White Zimbabweans as citizens of Zimbabwe. It was 
therefore an accepted outcome for a majority of older generation Whites, especially those 
with a farming background, not to forge diaspora associations with Blacks. Memories of 
colonial historical experiences and the violent nature of post-colonial emigration had 
instead been instrumental in developing a strong support network within the White 
diaspora community.  
Migrating with this shared ethos of wanting to support each other had been an essential 
catalyst that led to the establishment of support networks with roles of assisting struggling 
community members in Britain and pensioners in Zimbabwe. The support ethos of the 
White community was a distinct identity marker that differentiated them from the Black 
community. Whilst historical experiences had created a mind-set of unity within the White 




The colonial transformation of the Zimbabwean White community which resulted in the 
creation of a Rhodesian identity had been instrumental in determining social integration of 
White Zimbabweans in the diaspora. The establishment of a Rhodesian identity was a 
natural process for a community in which its pioneers were not a monolithic group made up 
of individuals with the same ancestry. The construction of a Rhodesian identity to repel any 
external or internal threats would not have been possible without the development of a 
sense of nationalism within the White community. Support of Smith’s Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence which ultimately delayed Zimbabwe’s independence showed the extent to 
which nurturing a sense of nationalism had strengthened the determination to make 
Zimbabwe a White man’s country with a permanent White population. 
 It was this historically nurtured sense of a collective identity embedded in the belief that 
they are a nation which established itself as a major hindrance to how the Zimbabwean 
Whites construct interactions with other communities. The exclusive nature of events like 
‘July Braai’ advertised as a Rhodesian event with use of Rhodesian symbols such as the 
Rhodesian flag and Coat of Arms have demonstrated how the first generation members of 
the White community had imported the Rhodesian national identity. The Rhodesian identity 
had therefore not only been a hindrance to the establishment of cordial relations with non-
White Zimbabweans, but also the development of strong social interactions with the host 
society despite the majority of them having British ancestral links.  
Pursuit or upgrading of educational or professional qualifications that had become a 
necessity for a majority of Blacks was not reciprocated by a majority of older generation 
Whites. Instead, their integration was driven by the consciousness that the violent 




a majority of them over forty-five years of age and experiencing financial challenges when 
they first arrived, they perceived as ‘selfish’ and ‘foolish’ the pursuit of personal gains of 
academic attainment at the expense of providing the best quality of life for their children 
who had been robbed of a financially stable future.  
 A majority of older Whites had also migrated without having experienced social or 
economic marginalisation that would have encouraged them to attain higher educational 
qualifications as a means of moving up the social hierarchy. By virtue of having occupied the 
pinnacle of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic structures both in the colonial and post-colonial 
eras, they had been able to move up the economic structures without having to put much 
emphasis on higher academic or professional qualifications’ attainment.  
Zimbabwean Coloured’s interactions with other Zimbabwean communities in Britain had 
been a consequence of Coloured consciousness stimulated during the colonial era and 
reinforced by the Lancaster House Constitution negotiations which facilitated Zimbabwe’s 
independence. Without official representation of either Coloureds or Asians, the Lancaster 
House negotiations had unwittingly endorsed the bi-polarisation of Zimbabwe’s 
multicultural society. Whilst the colonial era had clearly demarcated population categories 
in which Coloureds were co-occupants with Asians of the intermediate category, the 
absence of a conduit to unite all Zimbabweans placed the Coloureds in a vulnerable 
position. The older generation of Coloureds therefore emigrated with no motivation or 
reason to interact with other Zimbabweans as they had been made to feel invisible in the 
realms of Zimbabwe’s economic and social structures. Instead, they established exclusive 




The diaspora Coloured community (just as it was in Zimbabwe) continued to demonstrate 
their disdain of the Black community (driven by attitudes of superiority) by not encouraging 
inter-marriage with those from the Black community; and also by resisting being described 
as ‘Blacks’. Although it is undeniable that Coloured consciousness contributed to strong 
resistance to marry Blacks, chapter two also established how colonial residential foster 
homes in which Coloureds were being conditioned to align with Whites by adopting English 
names and being required to speak in English led to an acceptance of relationships between 
Coloureds and Whites. However, despite the conditioned alignment to Whites, imported 
memories of historical racial prejudices have stifled intermarriage between Coloureds and 
White Zimbabweans.    
Experiences of sustained marginalisation in both the colonial and post-colonial period 
created and consolidated the desire in subsequent generations to preserve Coloured 
consciousness and to have control over their own destiny by making choices which 
trivialised self-development through education. There was therefore general contentedness 
within the community to deal with their marginalisation by acquiring technical skills as 
electricians, motor mechanics or plumbers which would allow them to be self-employed 
tradesmen. With the advent of independence failing to eradicate attitudes of trivialising 
education following the government’s inability to correct racial inequalities in education by 
providing more schools and training opportunities to the Coloured community, a significant 
number of Coloureds  migrated with no history of having been motivated to excel 
academically. As a result, it was an expected outcome that very few older generation 
Coloured immigrants adopted integration processes which would involve pursuit of better 




Zimbabwean Asians migrated from an environment in which their group cultural 
mindedness had denied them the opportunity to develop collective will-power necessary to 
interact with other Zimbabweans. Adhesive identity features in the development of group 
mindedness were historic cultural commonalities not shared by non-Asian Zimbabweans. 
These included caste, religion, language and historic family ties which allowed them to carve 
community enclaves with limited interaction with other communities outside business 
activities.  
By not having shared historical or cultural commonalities with non-Asians, the Zimbabwean 
Asian immigrants arrived in Britain as a community which had managed to safeguard 
themselves from cultural contamination. It was therefore a natural response that 
Zimbabwean Asians’ diaspora interactions were determined by shared commonalities with 
other South Asian communities already settled in Britain. The ultimate consequence has 
been assimilation into Asian communities with the same cultural, language, caste or 
religious identity markers; a process which has made the Zimbabwean Asian community 
virtually invisible.  As a small community of late arrivals spread across Britain, Zimbabwean 
Asians’ invisibility was also exacerbated by their failure to resuscitate their business identity. 
Whilst historical memories that had been constructed in Zimbabwe were instrumental in 
the economic integration of Black, Whites and Coloureds, the same could not be said about 
Asians. Britain’s historical post-war migration trends have instead influenced the economic 
integration patterns of Asians. Contemporary Zimbabwean Asians’ migration to Britain had 
been preceded by post-war Asian immigration from the subcontinent and East Africa from 




perceived it a futile attempt to compete with established Asian businesses with no 
guarantees of support. 
In conclusion, whilst it is undeniable that racial and ethnic prejudices developed during 
Zimbabwe’s history led to the construction of separate insular communities which rarely 
interacted, the contribution of post-colonial events cannot be omitted when examining why 
Zimbabweans migrated with no unifying national identity. Although a majority of 
Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain are still comfortable to introduce themselves to new 
acquaintances as Zimbabweans, their identity with Zimbabwe is mainly based on cherished 
environmental memories of their homeland. These include physical features (climate and 
tourist attractions) and social features (food, drinks and family connections).  
However, memories of post-colonial political tragedies and the collapse of socio-economic 
structures (which forced a majority to emigrate) have made a significant number of 
Zimbabweans in the diaspora become ashamed of association with a contemporary brand 
of Zimbabwe under Mugabe’s leadership. For most Zimbabwean immigrants, the image of 
Zimbabwe has been tainted and soiled by corruption, farm invasions, undemocratic 
tendencies manifested in the violent suppression of political opposition, infrastructure 
collapse and economic disaster. With such an image, Zimbabweans in the diaspora have 
found no reason to organise or celebrate national events such as Independence or Heroes 
Day. 
The socio-economic identities of the Zimbabwean diaspora community have been a product 
of multifaceted but inter-connected processes of: ethnic divisions (which can be traced back 
to pre-colonial); divisive and racist policies of the colonial times; ethnic identities within the 




which historic racial and ethnic diversity and tensions would be managed. Migrating without 
experiencing state-building initiatives has naturally created a fragmented Zimbabwean 
community that is recognisable along ethnic or racial lines.  
With historic identities continuing to be an integral part of their lives, the Zimbabwean 
diaspora community exists as an imagined nation that still needs to conquer the effects of 
imported ethnic and racial differences and tensions that have characterised Zimbabwe’s 
two historical interludes: colonial and post-colonial. Diasporic national identity as a 
collective sentiment based upon what Montserrat Guibernau describe as a ‘collective 
sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation’ has failed to resonate 
with Zimbabweans in Britain.6 Migrating with no common history, kinship, language or 
national has meant that a unified Zimbabwean immigrant community has failed to emerge. 
Zimbabwean contemporary immigrants arrived with identities, prejudices and memories 
which were devoid of any nation building. Migrating without experiencing coherent and 
inclusive political initiatives allowed the thesis to demonstrate how the construction of 
Zimbabwean diaspora communities cannot only be understood as contemporary outcomes 
of colonialism, but also as consequences of tragic failures by post-colonial governments to 
construct a radical nation building agenda. With Jan Penrose describing a nation as a social 
construction with common tangible characteristics such as language, cultural practices or 
religion,7 the Zimbabwean diaspora community demarcated by ethnic and racial differences 
provided an illustration of social dissolution embedded in the post-colonial failure to create 
a national identity. Instead, historical experiences and memories emerged to be frameworks 
6 Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 11. 
7 Jan Penrose, ‘Reification in the Name of Change: The Impact of Nationalism on Social Constructions of 
Nation, People and Place in Scotland and the United Kingdom’, in Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose (eds), 
Constructions of Race, Place and Nation (London: UCL Press, 1993), pp. 28-30. 




undermining the development of feelings of wanting to establish a united diaspora 
community. As the thesis has shown, the only unifying consciousness of being part of a 
Zimbabwean diaspora community was encapsulated in the sharing of territorial boundaries 
of the country of origin.   
Migrating without a collective national identity gave respective communities a leeway to 
use historic memories to interpret what it means to be Zimbabwean. In the absence of 
shared historic experiences, the Zimbabweans in the diaspora have emerged to be a 
community which fits well with what Benedict Anderson describes as an ‘imagined 
community.’8 It is imagined because in the absence of shared historic cultural, economic or 
political experiences most members have never made an effort to interact with other 
Zimbabweans of different race or ethnicity despite knowing of their existence. Awareness of 
their presence has allowed them to develop an image of communion in their minds which 
has failed to evolve into practical interactions as a community of Zimbabweans living in 
Britain.       
 
 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
 
                                                          
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
Migration and Settlement 
1. When and why did you migrate to Britain? 
2. Where did you first settle e.g. city? 
3. Why choose the place as your initial settlement/destination? 
4. What made you move from your initial place of settlement? 
5. Describe your socio-economic experiences when you first settled? 
6. Was/Is there a recognisable Zimbabwean community where you first settled? If not 
did you make any effort of finding other Zimbabweans? 
7. Was Britain you first choice migration destination? 
8. Did you/Do you have plans of settling in Britain permanently? (Why?) 
9. What made you want to settle permanently in Britain? 
Historical (Colonial and Post-Colonial Zimbabwe) 
10. To what extent did the colonial period undermine African culture as of pagan origins, 
and somehow deficient and unable to progress? How did this help in constructing a 
colonial community identity based on racial, tribal or regional prejudices? 
11. Did/Is the Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement do/doing enough to restore 
Zimbabwean traditional pride and dignity which could have been undermined during 
colonial rule? 
12. To what extent did post-colonial Zimbabwean government implement  socio-
economic and political policies to 
a.  Remove or overcome socio-economic barriers/prejudices placed by the colonial 
regime  





c. Forge a united Zimbabwean nation (not a Zimbabwean community constructed 
on racial, tribal, class, regionalism basis) 
13. How best can you describe the Zimbabwean community in colonial Zimbabwe: 
a. United 
b. Fragmented 
14. How best can you describe the Zimbabwean community in post-colonial Zimbabwe 
a. United 
b. Fragmented 
15. How effective were tribalism, racism, political affiliations and regionalism in creating 
a Zimbabwean community (you described in questions 13 and 14) during 
a. Colonial period 
b. Post-colonial period 
16. Back home where you a member of a political or social organisation? 
17. Describe the ethnic or social class composition of the group members (described in 
question 16).  
Diaspora Interactions 
18. Within the Zimbabwean UK community do you have any close associations with 
those of different racial, tribal, cultural, religious etc. background from you? (Why?) 
19. To what extent do the following factors influence the construction of  visible and 
united Zimbabwean community in the Diaspora: 
a. Colonial governance 
b. Post-colonial governance 




d. Political associations 
e. Religious affiliations 
f. Immigration status (Asylum seekers V Non-Asylum seekers) 
g. Transnational associations (Religious and political)          
20. Do Zimbabweans’ personal/community associations (both in Zimbabwe and in the 
Diaspora) cut across tribal, regional, racial etc. differences? 
21. Have you ever attended or invited to any Zimbabwean community event?  
22. Are there any Zimbabwean organised events in your area of residence? 
23.  What are you views on inter-marriage vis-à-vis community identity? 
24. Are you a member of a Zimbabwean political, religious, social club etc. organisation? 
(If not, Why?) 
25. Are you actively involved in activities which bring you closer to other Zimbabweans 
in your community? 
26. In comparison to multi-ethnic /tribal African communities in the Diaspora (e.g. 
Zambians) do you think the Zimbabwean community is united? 
Transnational Links 
27. Do you maintain contact with home country? (How and Why?) 
28. In what ways are Zimbabweans continuing to keep contact with home? 
29. Do you feel trapped in the UK? (Why) 









31. If you were describing yourself to a new acquaintance, would you describe yourself 
as Zimbabwean/British/Both (e.g. British-Zimbabwean)/ethnicity first and then 
Zimbabwean? 
32. How often do you wear or do something which is meant to show a connection with 
Zimbabwe? 
33. How often and to whom do you speak in your native language? 
34. Which socio-economic sector(s) are Zimbabweans in the Diaspora more visible or 
active in?  
35. How do you see the Zimbabwean community 20 years from? 
36. Identify cultural norms, racial prejudices or tribal prejudices/conflicts which were 
imported by Zimbabwean s when they migrated (thus hindering the construction of 
a visible and united Zimbabwean Diaspora community).  
37. Describe Zimbabwean immigrants who migrated before Independence and in the 
early 1980s. 
38. Identify differences, if any, between the colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwean 
immigrants. 
39. How do you maintain your ethnicity/cultural norms? 











Youth Questionnaire: What makes you Zimbabwean? 
 
1. Gender 





3. Were you born in the UK? 
Yes                No    
 
4. If answer to Q3 is No; when did you migrate to the UK? 
________________ 
 
5. Where do you live during holiday time? 
 
6. Is there a visible Zimbabwean community where you live during holiday time? 
Yes             No               I don’t Know   
 
7. When was the last time you visited Zimbabwe? 
__________ 
 
8. How many times have visited Zimbabwe since you migrated? 
__________ 
 
9. How do you describe yourself to a new acquaintance? 
Zimbabwean               British          Zimbabwean born British       
 British-Zimbabwean   
 
10. What is the main language of communication at home? 
Shona                       Ndebele       English    
Mixture Ndebele/Shona with English          Other (Specify)___________ 
 
11. Describe your fluency in either Ndebele or Shona? 
Excellent         Good            Average        Poor       
                  
12. Can you speak both Ndebele and Shona? 
Yes              No               Slightly  
 
13. Do you see yourself relocating back to Zimbabwe? 





14. Can you sing the Zimbabwean national anthem? 
Yes        No            Slightly    
 
 
15. Can you sing the British national anthem? 
 
Yes         No         Slightly   
 
16. Do you know the meaning of the Zimbabwean flag colours? 
Yes         No         Slightly    
 
17. Are you aware of pre-colonial and colonial Zimbabwean history? 
Yes          No    
 
18. Are you aware of post-colonial Zimbabwean history? 
Yes         No         Slightly   
 
19. Do you know major Zimbabwean national dates such as Independence Day, Heroes and 
Defence Forces day? 
Yes          No    
 
20. Are you a member of any Zimbabwean organisation?  
Yes        No    
 
21. Do you have any close associations with those of different racial, tribal, cultural or religious 
or background from you? 







• David                                      13 January 2013                    Stevenage and Leicester 
• Edison                                    17 January 2013                     London 
• Zivanayi                                 17 January 2013                     Essex 
• Happison                               23 January 2013                     Derby 
• Jacob                                     23 January 2013                      Derby 
• Mathew                                  3 February 2013                    Leicester 
• Collins                                     6 February 2013                    Leicester 
• Israel                                      10  March 2013                      Kent 
• *Junior                                    3 March 2013                        Northampton 
• *Solomon                               3 March 2013                        Birmingham 
• *Marvelous                            3 March 2013                        Nottingham 
• *Kuda                                      3 March 2013                        Chesterfield 
• Sharai                                    14 March 2013                        Leicester 
• Taku                                       21  March 2013                       Surrey 
• Panganayi                             24  March 2013                       Reading 
• John                                       24 March 2013                        Slough 
• Kudzi                                       1 April 2013                            Bradford 
• Tarisai                                     2 April 2013                           Derby 





• Timothy                                10 May 2013                            Leicester 
• Paurosi                                   2 July 2013                             Zimbabwe 
• Gutu                                      24 July 2013                             Zimbabwe 
• Lenny                                    28 July 2013                             Zimbabwe 
• Mary                                     13 October 2013                     Cambridge 
• Memory                               27 November 2013                 Leicester 
*Leicester Students Interviewed as a group.  
Blacks (Ndebele) 
• Jonah                                  28 February 2013                        Leicester 
• Jabulani                              18 February 2013                        Leicester 
• Zanele                                   2 March 2013                            Leicester  
• *Nqobile                               3 March 2013                            Leicester  
• Ralph                                  13 May 2013                                Leicester 
• Mabuza                                 9 May 2013                               Leicester  
• Linda                                      1 September 2013                   Leicester  
• Daniel                                 10 November 2013                    Leicester  
• Themba                              17 November 2013                    Leicester  
• Sibo                                     19 April 2015                              Liverpool and Leicester  
• Irene                                    28 April 2015                            Leicester  
 







• Natalie                                18 October 2014                            High Wycombe 
• Brenda                                 23 October 2014                              Luton 
                          
Whites 
• Ray                                         17 January 2013                          London  
• Elizabeth                                  6 November 2013                    Cumbria 
• Robert                                   13 November 2013                     Milton Keynes 
• Terry                                      14 November 2013                     Cumbria 
• Alison                                    15 November 2013                      London 
• Jessica                                   26 November 2013                      Lincoln 
• Gareth                                   28 November 2013                      Surrey  
• Kenneth                                   9 January 2014                           London  
Coloureds 
• Ellen                                         7 March 2013                           Cardiff 
• Esther                                      10 June 2013                             Leicester 
• Anita                                        26 July 2013                               Zimbabwe 
• Simon                                       17 September 2013                 London 
• Pamela                                     13 October 2013                      Cambridge 
• Hughes                                      4 November 2013                   Essex 







• Abdi                                             17 June 2013                        Leicester  
• Bella                                              1 August 2013                     Zimbabwe 
• Bhavesh                                        1 September 2013              Leicester  
• Kasim                                             4 November 2013              Leicester  
• Kamal                                             4 November 2013              Leicester  
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